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Summary 
The persistence of high unemployment has placed increasing stress on the role of 
active labour market policies. They have been seen as the main policy tool in moving in-
dividuals from income support to employment. This thesis attempts to evaluate the ef-
fectiveness of active labour market policy in fulfilling the difficult task given to it. This is 
done by empirically exploring the impact of active labour market programmes on the 
overall level of open unemployment, participants' repeat unemployment incidence and 
their subsequent employment record. By this means, the thesis examines the achieve-
ment of both macroeconomic and individual goals given to active labour market policy. 
The main finding running through all chapters, and consequently through different esti-
mation methods, samples and aggregation levels, is that active labour market policy im-
proves the employment performance of the economy but it can help only so far as it 
goes. The beneficial effect remains far too limited to bring down the current high levels 
of unemployment or to wipe out the gap in labour market possibilities prevailing be-
tween advantaged and disadvantaged individuals. This is not to say that active labour 
market policy would not be useful in conjunction with other policies affecting unemploy-
ment, but without any support its effects will remain modest. 
CHAPTER 1. 
Introduction 
During the 1990s governments' powerlessness in bringing down high unemploy-
ment has induced a substantial shift towards active labour market policies, OEeD (1990, 
1993). The view is supported by various studies which connect passive measures, most 
significantly the level and the duration of unemployment benefits, to persistent unem-
ployment, see Jackman et. al. (1990), Layard et. al. (1991), Heylen (1993) and Scar-
petta (1996), inter alia. Active labour market policy has been seen as a key to enhance 
the functioning of labour markets and to help the employability of hard-to-employ per-
sons. To achieve these aims active labour market programmes should reduce the overall 
level of open unemployment together with improving the employment records of pro-
gramme participants. These are the broad issues of interest in this thesis. 
Active labour market policy originates from Sweden at the end of the 1940s. As a 
part of the Swedish model\ it was given the role of ensuring full employment when re-
stricting fiscal policy, together with solidaristic wage policy, was employed in combating 
inflation. To join the two seemingly controversial goals, active labour market policy was 
selectively employed in increasing the demand for labour and in reducing labour market 
mismatches. These macroeconomic goals have remained among the targets of active la-
bour market policy throughout the decades. Nowadays they are combined with a variety 
of individual goals aimed at increasing human capital, improving work habits, preventing 
discouragement and stabilising work careers. 
Because of the twofold aims, this study adopts both the macroeconomic and the 
micro economic point of view. The effectiveness of active labour market programmes is 
The Swedish model was first e:\.lJIicitly laid down in 1951 by two central blue-collar trade union 
(LO) economists Rehn and Meidner (1951), Robinson (1995). 
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addressed through empirical evaluations for two reasons. First, the discussion in chapter 
3 reveals that active labour market policy affects the employment performance of the 
economy in many different ways which tend to counteract each other. This leaves the 
overall effect ambiguous on theoretical reasonings. Second, a massive and yet unex-
plored data set is available for assessing the effectiveness of Finnish active labour market 
policy in helping the participants. 
There remains the question of how to measure efficiency. As discussed at great 
length in chapter 2, the emphasis of Finnish active labour market policy centres on the 
employment and unemployment effects of active programmes. From the stated goals, 
this thesis examines the effectiveness of active programmes through assessing the 
achievement of three targets, viz. reduction in the overall level of open unemployment, 
increase in participants' job stability and improvement in participants' subsequent em-
ployment record. Further motivation for the adopted outcome variables is provided by 
the literature survey in chapter 3 which shows that the existing evidence on these issues 
is both limited and somewhat mixed. 
The equilibrium unemployment effects of active labour market policy have been ex-
amined mainly through cross-country regressions which suggest that active programmes 
reduce unemployment. This beneficial view is forcefully challenged by time-series stud-
ies which assess the wage pressure effects of ALMPs. The contradiction motivates the 
macroeconometric part of the study in which the unemployment effects of programmes 
are scrutinised through time series analyses. The main questions put forward in chapter 
4 are as follows. First, do active programmes increase wage pressures? Second, can they 
prevent discouragement among hard-to-employ persons, as hypothesised for instance in 
Layard et. al. (1991)? Third, what is the impact of ALMPs on open unemployment and 
does it depend on the overall unemployment situation? 
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The macro econometric evaluation suggests that active labour market policy is more 
efficient in the high unemployment situation. To get a fuller picture of the relation be-
tween the effectiveness of active labour market programmes and the level of unemploy-
ment, the next two chapters of the thesis focus on the individual level. The fifth chapter 
examines the relation between participation and repeat unemployment incidence. The 
aim of this chapter is to shed some light on the differences in programme effects across 
different individuals according to their characteristics. By this means it is possible to 
identify individuals who are likely to capture higher than average gains from programme 
participation. 
To complement the micro econometric findings of the fifth chapter, chapter 6 stud-
ies the different groups of active labour market programmes in the eras of low and high 
unemployment. This offers also a close link to chapter 4 and makes it possible to com-
pare the findings to macroeconomic ones. The principal aim of chapter 6 is to assess the 
effects of different programmes on participants' subsequent employment record. This 
gives some guidance to the question of what is the effective structure of active labour 
market policy. 
The micro econometric chapters raise many interesting issues about the benefits of 
active labour market programmes. The main questions put forward in chapters 5 and 6 
are as follows: 
• Do active programmes help to reduce participants' risk of renewing 
unemployment? 
• Do they improve participants' subsequent employment record? 
• At whom should active programmes be targeted? 
• What is the ranking of labour market training and selective employment 
measures in terms of their efficiency? 
3 
• Which one is more effective, job placement in the public sector or job 
placement in the private sector? 
• Are large scale job placement obligations useful? 
• Are there any changes in the answers to the above questions between 
different eras of unemployment? 
By seeking the answers to the above questions, together with ones put forward in 
chapter 4, this study aims at producing new insights into the functioning of active labour 
market policy and its possibilities in improving the employment performance of the 
economy. During the period of high and persistent European unemployment this task is 
surely worth under taking. 
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CHAPTER 2. 
Introduction to Finnish Unemployment and Labour Market Policies 
This chapter provides a short introduction to the main features of Finnish unem-
ployment and unemployment policies. Since micro econometric evaluations in the thesis 
raise questions concerning different groups of individuals, the evolution of Finnish un-
employment is introduced through differences in unemployment between sexes, age 
groups and regions. 
Even though the main focus of the study is on the 1980s and the 1990s, the history 
of Finnish active labour market policy is shortly introduced. When necessary, the discus-
sion is related to the empirical work presented in later chapters. 
2.1 Basic Features of Finnish Unemployment 
Figure 2. 1 shows the unemployment rates by gender. One special feature of the 
Finnish labour market is that, despite women's high labour force participation rate of 
some 70 per cent, their unemployment rate is lower than men's. Another noteworthy is-
sue is women's high participation rate among all prime age groups, the distribution of 
age-specific participation rates having a similar inverted V-shaped curve to that of men 
(Lilj a et. al., 1990). This suggests the significant role of the welfare state in removing the 
obstacles to the labour market participation of married women due to, for instance, 
childbearing. 
The most dominant feature in figure 2.1 is, however, the occurrence of mass unem-
ployment at the beginning of the 1990s; the overall unemployment rate more than quad-
rupled! A rapid worsening of labour market possibilities expanded the unemployment 
rates of both sexes. Analogously with previous recessions, an increase in unemployment 
was more pronounced among men. This reflects the persistence of sex segregation in 
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employment. Male-dominated occupations are concentrated in cyclically sensitive indus-
tries, whereas women are typically employed in the public sectorl. Since public sector 
employment is mainly full-time employment, part-time employment is fairly rare in Fin-
land; only 11 per cent of the employed women worked in part-time basis in 1996 (Em-
ployment Outlook, 1997). 
Figure 2.1 Unemployment Rates by Gender 
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Source: Finnish Labour Review. 
Another picture of the occurrence of mass unemployment in the early 1990s is 
given in figure 2.2 which shows the average monthly flows in and out of unemployment. 
A net increase in the number of unemployed job seekers was over 10 000 persons per 
month during the years 1991 - 1993! To put this in context, the average number of un-
employed persons was around 88 000 in 1989. 
According to Lilja et. al . (1990) some 85 per cent of women have always been employed in occupa-
tions where women comprise a majority. A good example of this is the proportion of women in health 
care and social work that was as high as 88.4 per cent in 1996, Santamaki-Vuori & Parviainen (1997) . 
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Figure 2.2 Inflow and Outflow Figures; Monthly Averages in a Year. 
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As discussed below, combating youth unemployment is one of the main aims of ac-
tive labour market policy. Figure 2.3 gives the unemployment rates of teenagers (aged 
15 - 19) and young adults (aged 20-24) together with the overall unemployment rate. 
The picture of youth unemployment in Finland is fairly similar to the other OEeD coun-
tries. Even though the unemployment spells of young people are short, their unemploy-
ment rate is over two times higher than that of the adults. This gap tends to worsen in 
economic downturns and to improve when the economy is recovering. An increase in 
the relative rate of unemployment of young people in economic downturns can be par-
tially explained by a decline in recruitment and by an increase in dismissals. The former 
makes it more difficult to find a job when entering the labour market, whereas the latter 
hits harder young persons who have had less time to accumulate firm-specific skills. 
In addition to cyclical factors, also structural factors and the labour market partici-
pation of young people affect youth unemployment. Structural factors tend to reduce the 
demand for young workers through minimum wages, which are set through collective 
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agreements, and employment security legislation. Labour market participation, on the 
other hand, affects the supply of labour. The greater flexibility of young persons' labour 
force participation is highlighted by a sharp increase in the proportion of young people 
enrolled in education; 27.3 (12.1) per cent of the 19 (24) years of old in 1989, the corre-
sponding figure being 42.2 (20A) per cent in 1993 (Parjanne, 1997). 
Figure 2.3 Youth Unemployment Rates by Age Groups. 
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Regional disparities in unemployment are persistent in Finland, the unemployment 
rate being the lowest in the Southern and Western parts of Finland and the highest in the 
Northern and Eastern parts of Finland. Figure 2A shows the location of selected labour 
districts. Low unemployment areas include two southern regions (the capital area Uusi-
maa and Turku) and one western region (Vaasa). High unemployment areas include the 
northern regions of Kainuu (situated in the Eastern half of Oulu) and Lappi as well as 
Pohjois-Karjala which is situated in the Eastern Finland. 
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Figure 2.4 The location of selected labour market districts 
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Figure 2.5 below reveals that the absolute difference between the highest and the 
lowest regional unemployment rate has remained in some 10 percentage points through-
out the period of 1975 - 95 . There are some indications that this gap declined at the end 
of the 1980s but it widened again during the recession years in the early 1990s. Accord-
ingly, despite the target of reducing regional unemployment differences through active 
labour market programmes, there are no signs of convergence in regional unemployment 
rates. Whether this reflects the ineffectiveness of active labour market policy as a re-
gional policy tool or not is one of the issues raised in chapters 5 and 6. 
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Figure 2.5 Unemployment Rates by Selected Labour Districts . 
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Source: Finnish Labour Review. 
It is interesting to relate the picture of regional unemployment differences to re-
gional differences in unemployment duration which are given in figures 2.6 and 2.7 
below. 
Figure 2.6 The Average Duration of Unemployment by Selected Labour Districts. 
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10 
Figure 2.7 Long-term Unemployment by Selected Labour Districts; Proportion of all 
Unemployed. 
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The figures above show the relation between lengthening unemployment spells and 
increasing unemployment. During the economic slump in the beginning of the 1990s the 
average duration of unemployment increased by 30 weeks and the share of the long-
term unemployed by over 25 percentage points. The lengthening of unemployment spells 
implies that Finland is likely to experience high levels of unemployment also in near fu-
ture, regardless of expanding economy. This is highlighted by the finding that a net in-
crease of some 10 million jobs during the period 1985 - 91 reduced the proportion of the 
long-term unemployed only by some 15 percentage points within the EU, see Employ-
ment in Europe (1996). Long unemployment spells also have implications for active la-
bour market policy, the crucial question being the effectiveness of active programmes in 
helping the long-term unemployed. This is one of the questions investigated in chapter 5. 
When it comes to regional differences in the length of unemployment, it is surpris-
ing to find out that the duration of unemployment is adversely related to the overall Ie el 
of unemployment shown in figure 2.5. This puzzle can be explained by the regional 
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supply of active labour market programmes. Regions suffering from higher than average 
unemployment also receive a larger than average share of funds allocated to job place-
ments, which in tum cuts long unemployment spells. But it seems that the reduction 
both in the share of long-term unemployed and in the average duration of unemployment 
is only a statistical one. Figure 2.5 suggests that a large proportion of programme par-
ticipants return back to unemployment after a period of job placement. Chapters 5 and 6 
take a closer look at this issue. 
2.2. The Short History of Finnish Active Labour Market Policy 
Before the 1963 Employment Act, Finland did not have a universal unemployment 
benefit system. Instead, municipalities were instructed to arrange jobs for the unem-
ployed through public works. In the early 1960s over 50 per cent of the unemployed 
participated in public works. The total level of participants peaked at over 4 per cent of 
the labour force (about 90 000 persons) in 1960, after which it has steadily declined to 
under 2 per cent of the labour force. There are, however, considerable doubts over the 
importance of public works as an ALM policy. The labour administration's share of 
funds allocated to public works was around 25 per cent in 1960 and just 2 per cent in 
1988. Accordingly, public works investments have not been carried out merely to create 
jobs for the unemployed implying that public works have been mainly used as another 
form of public employment, see Lilja et. aI. (1990). Since this is even more pronounced 
in the 1980s, we have followed the labour administration and the DEeD, according to 
which public works are not counted as selective employment measures. 
Labour market training was established as a part of ALM policy by law in 1966, 
Mikkonen (1997). It was given the clearly structural goal of preventing labour shortages 
in rapidly growing manufacturing sector caused by the lack of vocational education 
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among the middle aged. Figure 2.8 below implies that these structural targets have re-
mained as principal goals of LMT until the early 1990s; its role in combating unemploy-
ment in economic slumps has been modest compared to selective employment measures. 
The unimportance of ALM policy as a demand side policy in the 1960s is clearly seen in 
the levels of programme participants during the recession years 1967 - 68 . 
The recession at the end of the 1960s lead to the revised Employment Act in 1971 . 
The main outcome of this act was the introduction of the two scheme unemployment 
compensation system which consists of the means tested unemployment assistance 
scheme and the unemployment insurance scheme. In addition to strengthening the cash-
support line, the Employment Act also strengthened the role of supply-side measures in 
labour market. This can be seen as an upward trend in the number of participants in la-
bour market training. 
Figure 2.8 The Number of Participants in Labour Market Training and Selective 
Employment Measures. 
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Figure 2.8 shows that the level of selective employment measures remained modest 
until the first oil shock. The role of job placements as a demand side measure is clearly 
indicated by their growth in economic downturns in the 1970s; the number of partici-
pants more or less quadrupled during the two recessions in the years 1973 - 75 and 1977 
- 80. While the growth of LMT programmes remained fairly modest, the focus of Fin-
nish active labour market policy was shifted towards selective employment measures. 
One notable thing in Finnish employment measures is that they do not seem to move 
counter-cyclically. However, the clear-cut relation between expanding unemployment 
and increasing selective employment measures indicate the need to take account of the 
endogeneity of active programmes in chapter 4. 
The administration and evaluation of labour market policy is the responsibility of 
the Labour administration which is directly responsible to the Ministry of Labour. The 
actual implementation of ALMPs is given to local public employment services agencies 
which are under the labour district administration. In line with Finnish corporatism em-
ployers' and employees' organisations can affect the design of labour market policy 
through various committees, boards and working groups, Lilja et. al. (1990). The most 
important of these bodies is the Council for Labour which takes also part in the Ministry 
of Labour's annual budget proposal. In this respect actual labour market policy is the 
outcome of a political process which may affect its macroeconomic efficiency, for in-
stance through insiders' wage requirements analysed in chapter 4, see Saint-Paul (1996). 
2.3. Active Labour Market Policy After the 1987 Employment Act 
The micro econometric evaluations of the thesis employ the data from the years 
1987 - 92. Hence, it is worth taking a closer a look at the changes introduced by the 
1987 Employment Act which strengthened considerably the role of active labour market 
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policy and especially its emphasis towards the youth and the long-term unemployed. The 
Employment Act introduced the obligation to arrange, as a last resort, either training or 
job placement for young persons and the long-term unemployed after 3 and 12 months 
in unemployment, respectively. Persons with a history of repeat unemployment spells be-
came eligible after 12 unemployment months within the last 2 years. This raises the 
question of the effectiveness of large-scale employment measures, the issue which is put 
under scrutiny in chapter 6. 
The obligation, which was almost totally fulfilled by selective employment meas-
ures, was implemented in stages during the years 1988 - 90. According to table 2.1, the 
main burden of implementation was carried out by municipalities, their share of all obli-
gated, last resort job placements being around 70 per cent. 
Table 2.1 Participant Outflow from Different Selective Employment Measures, Selected 
Years. 
1988 1990 1992 
N % N % N % 
Persons employed as a last 5836 8 13054 20 17982 17 
resort by the state 
Other state subsidies 4962 7 1971 3 2749 3 
Persons employed as a last 20537 28 29945 46 48132 44 
resort by municipalities 
Other municipal subsidies 20495 28 5580 9 4265 4 
Employment by enterprises 10355 14 9049 14 24344 22 
Enterprise allowance 3818 5 2716 4 3019 3 
Other selective employment 7963 11 2907 4 8567 11 
measures 
Total 73966 100 65222 100 109058 100 
.. Notes: The figures correspond to the number of partICIpants who have temunated a selectIve employ-
ment measure during the years 1988, 1990, and 1992. The first (second) column reports the number of 
(the percentage share of) participants in ajob placement category. 
Source: Aho, et.al. (1996). 
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Figures 2.6 and 2.7 above show the effectiveness of the 1987 Employment Act in 
cutting long unemployment spells. The obligation to arrange either training or job place-
ment for the long-term unemployed was implemented in the high unemployment areas in 
1988 and in the low unemployment areas in 19902. During those years the proportion of 
the long-term unemployed dropped by some 5 percentage points in the high unemploy-
ment regions, the corresponding drop being around 10 percentage points in the low un-
employment regions. But the overall effectiveness of large scale job placement 
programmes, such as one introduced in the 1987 Employment Act, requires that they do 
not merely reclassify the participants. They also need to improve the job prospects of the 
participants, the issue which is raised in chapters 4 and 6. 
2.3.1. Unemployment Benefit System 
At the end of the 1980s the main element of passive measures, i.e. the unemploy-
ment compensation system, consisted of the means tested unemployment assistance 
scheme and the earnings related unemployment insurance scheme governed by union 
funds. 
During the period 1988 - 92 unemployment assistance was payable to all registered 
unemployed job-seekers aged 17 - 64 who were fit for work and looking for full-time 
employment, provided that they were not eligible for unemployment insurance. Persons 
under 55 years of age were subject to a means test. In contrast to unlimited unemploy-
ment assistance, unemployment insurance was payable for a maximum of 500 working 
days, provided that an unemployed person had been a union fund member for at least six 
months preceding the unemployment. The maximum payable days were further 
2 To recall. Kainuu. Pohjois-Karjala and Lappi are examples of high unemployment regions. whereas 
Uusimaa. Turku and Vaasa represent 1m, unemployment regions. 
16 
increased by 400 days if an unemployed person was over 55 years of age at the end of 
the unemployment insurance period. 
When it comes to compensation levels, the full unemployment assistance allowance 
was FIM 81 a day in 1988 (FIM 116 in 1992) with possible child increases. Income over 
a fixed maximum reduced the full amount of benefit by 75 per cent of the excess3. 
Nearly every type of income, personal as well as spouse's, is taken into account when 
determining the level of unemployment assistance allowance. In contrast, earnings re-
lated unemployment insurance does not have a means tested element in it. It also pro-
vides higher compensation levels, the allowance being the unemployment assistance 
allowance plus 45 per cent (42 after January 1992) of the difference between previous 
daily salary and the unemployment assistance allowance up to a break-point which is 
slightly higher than average earnings. After the break-point the addition is 20 per cent. 
Before July 1989 unemployment insurance allowance was reduced by 12.5 per cent after 
the first 200 days. Increases of unemployment insurance allowance for children are simi-
lar to unemployment assistance allowance and both unemployment compensation 
schemes are subject to taxation4. 
The replacement ratios of the unemployment assistance and unemployment insur-
ance schemes were approximately 23 and 57 per cent for a single person in 19875 . The 
marked difference between the two schemes has remained throughout the 1990s; in 
1994, the corresponding average monthly amounts of paid unemployment benefits were 
FIM 2554 and FIM 4487, respectively (Santamaki-Vuori & Parviainen, 1996). As 
A fixed maximum for a single people was FIM 2690 a month in 1988 and FIM 3700 a month in 
1992, the corresponding figures for people with dependants being FIM 4030 and FIM ))OoW. The in-
come cut-off level was FIM 8710 for married couples "ithout children and FIM 6870 for single persons 
in 1992. 
Statistical Yearbook of the Social Insurance Institution (1992) 
S The ratios are based on average before tax hourly earnings of an employee which was FIM -l-l.87 in 
1987 (Asplund. 1993). 
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mentioned above, unemployed union fund members became eligible (before 1996) for 
the higher compensated unemployment insurance scheme after six months in employ-
ment which equals the period of statutory obligation introduced in the 1987 Employ-
ment Act. 
It would be surprising if the opportunity to become eligible for higher compensated 
unemployment insurance allowance through statutory obligation had no effect on the in-
centives of some unemployed persons to accept low paid jobs. Especially, since the pre-
vious salary employed in calculating unemployment insurance allowances remained 
unchanged if any temporary work done did not exceed six months. This hypothesis is 
among the things which are put under scrutiny in chapter 6. It is worth noticing that the 
coexistence of active and passive labour market measures is implicitly included in the es-
timated programme effects also in the other chapters of the thesis. 
2.3.2. Labour market Training 
Labour market training (LMT) is primarily adult, non-basic vocational training 
which often involves work practise. In principle it is offered only to persons over 20 
years of age but in some cases younger persons are eligible for LMT. Trainees who are 
not members of union unemployment funds, or otherwise eligible for unemployment as-
sistance, obtain a training allowance which takes the form of a basic allowance equalling 
unemployment assistance allowance. In 1991 the basic training allowance was payable at 
its full rate if a trainee's monthly income from primary employment was below FIM 700 
and his additional monthly income from a statutory social security benefit or part-time 
employment did not exceed FIM 3139. The basic training allowance is reduced by 75 
per cent of the income in excess of limits. The earnings related training allowance is pay-
able to the unemployed who are eligible for unemployment insurance allowance 
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Increases for children are payable in the same way as with the unemployment compensa-
tion schemes. In addition, a maintenance allowance is payable in respect of travel and 
food expenses incurred while participating in LMT. In 1992 the average unemployment 
assistance allowance and training allowance were FIM 119.8 and FIM 163.4 a day, re-
spectively6. Since the training allowance is generally higher than unemployment compen-
sation, it should provide incentives to participate in training programmes, at least when 
compared to open unemployment. 
As mentioned above, labour market training was given structurally oriented targets 
in the 1960s. The aim of preventing labour shortages through LMT, which is one part of 
more general targets of equating labour demand and supply and facilitating economic 
growth/preventing unemployment, has remained throughout the decades. In addition, 
the law has two individual goals, viz. to stabilise unemployed persons' employment 
and/or to reduce the threat of unemployment. The latter also makes unemployed work-
ers eligible for LMT. The share of trainees without unemployment experience has re-
mained fairly low, being some 20 per cent in the 1980s, see Lilja et. al. (1990). 
The economic slump in the early 1990s induced alterations in labour market train-
ing programmes. First, the acceptance ratio dropped by some 10 percentage points to 50 
per cent. Second, the drop-out rate fell from 14 per cent in 1989 to below 9 per cent in 
1995. Third, the share of laid-off trainees increased to over 40 per cent. This was a tem-
porary phenomenon, their share returning back to under 10 per cent by the mid 1990s. 
Fourth, the monopoly of special vocational centres in offering training courses was bro-
ken down. The change has been rapid, the share of vocational centres from purchased 
training days was only 56 per cent in 1995, see Mikkonen (1997). One explanation for 
the decline in the share of vocational centres is an enormous increase in the number of 
6 Statistical Yearbook of the Social Insurance Institution (1992) 
19 
trainees during the early 1990s recession, a rival explanation being the effectiveness of 
training courses provided by outside vocational centres. The above changes raise ques-
tions concerning the effectiveness of training programmes in different eras of unemploy-
ment and especially the role played by a sharp increase in the proportion of laid-off 
trainees. These issues are analysed implicitly in chapter 4 and explicitly in chapter 6. 
2.3.3. Selective Employment Measures 
A standard employment subsidy paid to an employer varies among sectors, cover-
ing all wage costs in central government and equalling the unemployment allowance in 
local government and in the private sector. The employment subsidy can be increased by 
the maximum of 100 per cent under certain conditions. At the beginning of the 1990s 
the employment subsidy varied from FIM 2500 to FIM 4300 a month. Accordingly, the 
paid employment subsidies cover less than half of the average wage costs. During the 
placement period a participant receives the prevailing market wage set in collective 
agreements. In Finland collective agreements between employers' and employees' or-
ganisations are binding throughout the economy, so the wage rate is not dependent on 
the union status of a participant. Accordingly, job placements offer much higher com-
pensation than training courses which may be reflected in some individuals choices' be-
tween different types of active programmes. 
Unlike labour market training, selective employment measures are more directly 
targeted at young persons and the long-term unemployed. The relative importance of 
these two groups has, however, changed during the early 1990s. At the end of the 1980s 
the vast maj ority of placements were targeted at the young (61. 8 per cent), the share of 
the long-term unemployed being under 10 per cent (based on figures given in Lilja et. 
aI., 1990, table 63). The corresponding figures in 1993 were 23.6 and 43.6 per cent 
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(based on figures given in Skog, 1994, appendix 4). There seems to be also great differ-
ences across placement sectors. Firms employ almost 70 per cent of the youth partici-
pants (24 per cent of the long-term unemployed), whereas municipalities concentrate on 
employing the long term unemployed participants (48.5 per cent and only 27.5 per cent 
of the youth). The targets, which are to be achieved by selective employment measures, 
are individually oriented and consist of cutting long unemployment spells, improving 
participants' labour market position and strengthening their possibilities for stable work 
careers. The changes in the composition and in the level of selective employment meas-
ures raise questions concerning the effectiveness of job placements across different indi-
vidual characteristics, across employer sectors and at the different eras of unemp-
loyment. These issues are examined in chapters 5 and 6. 
2.4. Finally 
The aims given both to labour market training and to selective employment meas-
ures highlight the emphasis of Finnish active labour market policy towards employment 
related issues. There are no explicit targets of improving the earnings of the 'working 
poor' which are common, for instance, in the USA. For this reason, the emphasis of the 
thesis is naturally focused on evaluating Finnish ALMPs through their impact both on 
participants' employability and on the overall unemployment level. 
A rapid increase in unemployment during the early 1990s put the statutory obliga-
tions introduced in the 1987 Employment Act under pressure. The obligation was re-
laxed at the beginning of 1992 and finally totally lifted in 1993. However, since these 
changes do not concern the evaluation period of the thesis, they are not discussed above. 
The evaluation period is driven purely by the availability of data. The quarterly data em-
ployed in the macro econometric part of the thesis is collected from the data sets of the 
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Bank of Finland and the Ministry of Labour. The Ministry of labour started to publish 
quarterly data in the year 1980 and the data set of the Bank of Finland was available 
only until the year 1992. The micro econometric parts of the thesis, on the other hand, 
are carried out by employing large, register based data set collected by the Statistics Fin-
land. This data set covers the years 1987 - 1992. Finally, according to the government 
plan the number of participants in active programmes will remain at the current excep-
tionally high levels, at least, to the next millennium. 
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CHAPTER 3. 
A review of the Literature 
The purpose of this chapter is to briefly summarise the existing evidence on active 
programmes' employment effects. This question has been studied both from the macro-
econometric and the micro econometric points of view. The increasing emphasis towards 
activating labour markets has been reflected especially in the number of 
macro econometric studies which were virtually non-existent before the 1990s. In micro-
econometrics on-going programmes have been evaluated for decades. The bulk of this 
research has focused on earnings related issues of labour market training in the USA. 
Consequently, the question of individuals' subsequent employment prospects has re-
mained relatively unexplored. This reflects the differences in the aims of active labour 
market policy that prevail between the USA and Europe. In the latter countries active 
programmes are mainly targeted against unemployment, whereas in the former country 
they are aimed at helping the working poor. 
Both macro and micro approaches for assessing ALMPs have their own gains and 
drawbacks. Microeconometric evaluations have been criticised due to their partial equi-
librium nature, see Blanchflower et. al. (1995) and Calmfors & Skedinger (1995). This 
inability of microeconometric evaluations to assess the changes in the equilibrium level 
of unemployment arises from three sources, viz. dead-weight effect, substitution effect 
and displacement effect. Each of these three effects reduces the potential downward im-
pact of active programmes on total unemployment, either because some of the partici-
pants would have got hired anyway (dead-weight) or because they replace other 
workers in the same firm (substitution)/in other firms (displacement). 
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To be fair to microeconometric evaluations, it has to be said that many of the 
macro econometric studies do not try to assess the equilibrium unemployment effects of 
ALMPs, either. Furthermore, the necessary condition for observing any macroeconomic 
gains is that active programmes benefit participants' subsequent employment prospects. 
Since macroeconometric studies cannot shed any light on this issue, these two research 
branches have to be considered as complements to each other. Especially, since nothing 
ensures that the policy implications of studies examining individual and macroeconomic 
effects will coincide with each other. This follows if participants, say, in training courses 
either give up or reduce their job seeking efforts during the course. Then even in the ab-
sence of displacement effects, potential increases in participants' employability do not 
necessary show up at the macro level as a reduction in total unemployment. 
3.1. Macroeconomic Studies 
3.1.1. Framework for Analysis 
If labour markets are to be made more effective through active labour market pro-
grammes there has to be some inefficiencies which ALMPs can tackle. It is quite com-
mon to consider competitive markets as a benchmark for efficiently functioning markets. 
Blanchflower et. al. (1995) examine the arguments in favour of active labour market 
programmes against this benchmark. Market failures put forward in their study included 
inefficiencies in job search/recruiting, imperfect competition in product and labour mar-
kets, price distortions induced by labour market institutions, and imperfections in finan-
cial markets (insurance markets against the event of unemployment). A convenient way 
of introducing these market imperfections to a unified macroeconomic framework is 
through the following two figures employed in OECD (1993), Calmfors (1994) and 
Calmfors & Skedinger (1995), inter alia. 
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Figure 3.1 shows an upward sloping wage-setting schedule which, under imper-
fectly competitive labour markets, effectively replaces the labour supply curve in deter-
mining the labour market equilibrium. The setup is consistent with several models of 
involuntary unemployment, such as union wage bargaining models (for descriptions of 
different bargaining models, see for instance Pencavel, 1991, and Booth, 1994), Effi-
ciency wage models (Shapiro & Stiglitz, 1984, and Akerlof & Yellen, 1986), and the 
Insider-Outsider theory (Blanchard & Summer, 1986, and Lindbeck & Snower, 1986). 
The downward sloping employment schedule hypothesises the negative relationship be-
tween real wages and regular employment. Under imperfectly competitive product mar-
kets and profit maximising firms it can be interpreted as the labour demand curve or 
equivalently as the price setting curve, see Layard & Nickell (1986). 
Figure 3.1 The Labour Market Outcome in Imperfectly Competitive Labour Markets. 
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Figure 3.2 The Beveridge Curve. 
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Figure 3.2 shows the Beveridge curve, see Blanchard & Diamond (1989), which 
traces the labour market equilibrium condition as a locus of points which equate the 
flow into and out of unemployment at the given unemployment rate. The downward 
sloping curve gives the negative relationship between vacancies and total unemploy-
ment, a higher rate of available jobs being associated with lower total unemployment. If 
figure 3. 1 deals explicitly with the impact of non-competitive wage setting on labour 
market outcome, figure 3.2 measures the matching process in labour markets. Due to 
imperfect and costly information there exists simultaneously both unemployed job seek-
ers and recruiting employers. The more effective is the matching process the closer is the 
Beveridge curve to the origin, associating a lower total unemployment rate to a given 
vacancy rate. 
Empirical macro econometric studies have employed either the Layard-Nickell 
(figure 3.1) or the Beveridge curve (figure 3.2) framework in assessing active labour 
market programmes. Even though the former concentrates on labour market institutions 
and the latter on matching effectiveness, they should yield similar conclusions given that 
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the equilibrium levels of total unemployment implied by the two models must coincide 
(defined as U in figures 3.1 and 3.2). Below we have examined several channels through 
which active labour market policy may affect the equilibrium unemployment. Table 3.1 
is based on the Layard-Nickell framework due to its analytical convenience for the cur-
rent purpose. 
Table 3.1 The Potential Impacts of ALl\1P on the Equilibrium Level of Unemployment. 
Effect Total UNt Open UNt Shifting schedule in figure 3.1 
Improved matching Reduce Reduce WS and E rightwards 
Increased productivity Reduce Reduce E rightwards 
of participants (Increase) (Increase) (WS leftwards) 
Work test Reduce Reduce LFS leftwards 
Reduced discouragement Increase Increase LFS rightwards 
(Reduce) (Reduce) (WS rightwards) 
Deadweight/Substitution Increase Increase E leftwards 
Reduced welfare loss Increase Increase WS leftwards 
Notes: Modified by grouping together various effects presented in the following studies: OECD (1993), 
Calmfors (1994), Calmfors & Skedinger (1995). WS = Wage-setting schedule; E = Employment sched-
ule; LFS = Labour force schedule. 
Let us first concentrate on the impacts of ALl\1Ps on labour demand (E = Em-
ployment schedule). An increase in the effectiveness of the matching process together 
with the better productivity of programme participants expands the demand for labour, 
and hence reduces unemployment, at the given wage level. To improve the efficiency of 
matching active programmes have either to reduce occupational (industrial, regional) 
mismatch or to boost job search activity. Or they may work as a signalling device 
(Spence, 1973) lessening employers' uncertainty about programme participants as re-
cmits. However, the latter effect is likely to worsen non-participants' position reducing 
the overall matching process effect. This worsening of others' labour market possibilities 
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is known as substitution/displacement which shifts the labour demand curve leftwards in 
figure 3.1 leading to higher unemployment, ceteris paribus. 
Having said all that, it is likely that the impact of ALMPs on the labour demand 
schedule remains negligible. First of all, Blanchflower et. al. (1995) argue that the 
matching process is fairly effective in which case there is little room for improvement 
through active labour market policy. Secondly, an increase in productivity is also likely 
to introduce wage pressures captured by an upward shift of the wage-setting curve, see 
Bean et. al. (1986). This in tum tends to leave regular employment more or less un-
touched, see Calmfors (1994). Finally, a drop in open unemployment caused by more 
productive programme participants (the ceteris paribus result was that only regular em-
ployment remains untouched) is mostly offset by displaced regular workers. 
Turning next to the impact of active programmes on wage-setting (WS = wage-
setting schedule). Ceteris paribus, a lower wage level is connected to higher employ-
ment and hence lower unemployment. A fall in wages at the given employment level is 
captured by a rightward shift of the wage-setting schedule which may happen through 
the improved matching process and/or through the reduced discouragement effects of 
ALMPs. Both of these effects tend to tighten labour markets, the former by reducing the 
number of job seekers and the latter by increasing the competition which insiders face. 
This in tum leads to a fall in insiders' wage demands. As far as active programmes re-
duce welfare losses in the event of unemployment, they also have a counteracting impact 
on wages. This is suggested by wage bargaining theories which hypothesise a positive 
relationship between collectively set wages and alternative wages elsewhere in the econ-
omy. By offering the compensation level beyond unemployment benefits, ALMPs reduce 
the insiders' incentives to moderate wages. 
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Traditionally active programmes have been selective and targeted (mainly) at indi-
viduals with labour market difficulties. These persons have also the largest risk of be-
coming discouraged, which in turn tends to reduce the number of unemployed actively 
seeking work. Provided that ALMPs help to keep them in connection with labour mar-
kets by reducing discouragement, they increase the effective labour supply and hence 
shift the labour force curve (LFS) rightwards. Accordingly, reduced discouragement 
causes an increase in the equilibrium level of unemployment, the effect which is lowered 
by the reduction in wage pressures as discussed above. Active programmes may also 
lessen the supply of labour, and hence recorded unemployment, if they have a work test 
function. This, of course, requires that individuals who do not accept a programme offer 
become ineligible for unemployment benefits. 
Before surveying the empirical macro evidence over the above effects, we con-
clude this section with a few things worth bearing in mind. On theoretical grounds the 
impact of active programmes on the equilibrium level of unemployment (employment) is 
ambiguous and hence basically an empirical question. It would be highly surprising if the 
same wage setting/employment effects raised in different countries since different labour 
market institutions result in different labour market outcomes. The differences become 
even more pronounced if unemployment elasticities of wages/labour supply or the wage 
elasticity of labour demand vary across countries. One part of the question mark about 
elasticities is highlighted in Blanchflower & Oswald (1994) who report remarkable simi-
larities in the wages-unemployment relation across countries. Unfortunately, systematic 
studies of the same size over the elasticities of labour demand and labour supply have 
not been executed, making it hard to assess the importance of country specific slopes of 
these curves. Finally, both the size and the composition of active labour market 
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programmes affect their impact. These, together with the overall unemployment situa-
tion, differ vastly both across countries and in time. 
3.1.2. Cross-Country Studies 
In cross-country studies the main issue of interest has centred on the general equi-
librium effect of ALMPs which has been analysed through the relationship between 
cross-country differences in unemployment rates and in expenditures on ALMPs. In few 
cross-country studies the focus has been on cross-country differences in real wage flexi-
bility or differences in changes in wages/employment. Excluding Jackman et. al. (1990), 
these studies have adopted the theoretical framework given in figure 3. 1 that consists of 
imperfectly competitive product markets and wage-setting between workers and firms. 
Control factors differ from one study to another, the common elements mainly proxy the 
institutional features, especially the degree of corporatism and the generosity of unem-
ployment benefits. In the Jackman et. al. (1990) study the main issue of interest is the lo-
cation of the Beveridge curve, so the vacancy rate is included in the right hand side. The 
study by Scarpetta (1996) examines also some open economy factors, such as terms of 
trade and foreign competition, together with taxation effects through the wedge between 
product and consumer prices, and interest rates. The parameter estimates of the ALMP 
variable has to be interpreted as the net effect of various channels discussed in section 
3. 1. 1. Table A3. 1 in the appendix summarises the main findings of cross-country studies. 
As a general overview, cross-country studies seem to suggest that higher expendi-
ture on ALMPs in connected to lower unemployment, positive parameter values being 
reported only in the Forslund & Krueger (1994) study. Studies focusing on wage related 
issues seem to confirm the beneficial effects of ALMPs~ active programmes have been 
found to increase real wage flexibility (Heylen, 1993) and reduce real wages (OECD, 
1993). The views, however, differ on the question of which groups gain from active 
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programmes. The results reported in Scarpetta (1996) indicate that active programmes 
might be effective in reducing short-term unemployment, whereas the results reported in 
Heylen (1991) and Jackman et. al. (1996) suggest that the target group should be the 
long-term unemployed. 
These favourable results have not been unilaterally accepted, the main concern be-
ing the specification and the endogeneity of the ALMP variable, see Forslund & Krueger 
(1994), Calmfors (1994), and Kenyon (1994). Table A3.1 reveals that the impact of ac-
tive programmes has usually been examined through some relative measure of pro-
gramme expenditures that includes the number of unemployed persons in the 
denominator. This runs the risk of introducing negative correlation between the ALMP 
variable and the dependent unemployment variable since spending on ALMPs is in rela-
tion to unemployment. Excluding Sweden, the number of programme participants (ac-
cordingly total spending) has a tendency to rise less than proportionally with 
unemployment (Grubb, 1993), in which case an increase in unemployment leads to a re-
duction in the value of the ALMP variable. The same line of argument can also explain 
the negative relation between spending on ALMPs and employment reported in the 
OECD (1993) study given that the wage bill behaves procyclically. 
Another worrying issue concerning the robustness of the results of cross-country 
studies follows from the limited number of observations. The sensitivity of estimates to 
'outliers' is highlighted in two of the most recent studies; in Scarpetta's study the exclu-
sion of Sweden from estimations increases the absolute value of the estimated coeffi-
cient of the ALMP variable up to -0.23, whereas in the study by Jackman et. al. the 
exclusion of Sweden eliminates the effect of ALM spending on long-term unemploy-
ment. One task for further research is to find out whether these differences arise from a 
different set of countries and/or different explanatory variables. It has to be noted that 
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the random effects model adopted in the studies by Jackman et. al. and Scarpetta does 
not ease the problem of limited observations. When the time period is fixed, the parame-
ter estimates, which in these studies are estimated by GLS, are consistent only with a 
large number of countries, Hsiao (1986). Furthermore, an increase in the number of ob-
servations may produce additional difficulties, such as serial correlation due to serially 
correlated omitted variables and the non-normality of the randomness of country specific 
effects. Hence there exists considerable doubt on whether two period random effect esti-
mations give any additional information over and above traditional least squares estima-
tions. 
3.1.3. Time Series Studies on Wage Pressure 
Unlike in general equilibrium cross-country studies, the focus of time-series stud-
ies has usually been on some particular aspect of active labour market policy. The main 
area where empirical research exists is the impact of ALMP on wage setting in unionised 
labour markets. In these studies the parameter estimates present the net effect of various 
counteracting channels through which ALMPs may shift the wage-setting schedule as 
discussed in section 3.1.1. A typical empirical wage equation consist of variables which 
come into analyses through a firm's revenue function and a union's objective function. 
To assess the wage pressures of ALMPs some combination of the number of unem-
ployed persons (U) and programme participants (R) is also included in estimations. 
Equations (1) - (3) below report various specifications through which the relation be-
tween active programmes and wages has been examined. For explanatory purposes 
equations (1 ') - (3 ') give the rewritten forms of basic relations. The rewritten form of the 
first equation employs the condition u = 1 - n - r, in which n stands for regular 
employment. 
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(1) W = ao + a 1 U + a2r + ... (1 ') W = aO + a 1 (1 - n - r) + a2r + ... 
(2) W = ~o + ~l(r+u) + ~2(r~u) + ... (2') W = ~o + (~l - ~2)(r+u) + ~2r+ .. . 
(3) W=AO+Al(r+U)+A2(1--r-)+ ... (3') W=Ao+(AI-A2)(r+u)+A2 U + .. . 
r+u 
Usually the unemployment rate u and the programme participation rate r are measured 
as per cent of the labour force, but in some studies they are measured as relative to the 
level of employment. All studies have adopted the log-linearity assumption so the lower-
case letters stand for logarithm transformations. The ratio of programme participants (r) 
to total unemployment (r+u) has been named as the accommodative stance in Calmfors 
& Forslund (1991). It proxies the probability of participating in a programme in the 
event of unemployment. 
Negative parameter estimates in equation (1) suggest downward wage pressure 
from open unemployment (u) and active programmes (r). These effects are readily read-
able from the estimated parameters, a 1 < a 2 implying smaller wage resistance of active 
programmes than open unemployment. If the programme variable can be constrained to 
zero both from the statistical and the economic point of view, programme participants 
are perfect substitutes for regular employment in terms of wage setting. At the given 
level of open unemployment a reduction in regular employment that is totally offset by 
an increase in programme participants has no wage effect (Calmfors 1994). Finally, a 
positive parameter estimate for the programme variable indicates that ALMPs actually 
expand wage pressures. In terms of figure 3.1, the wage schedule shifts leftwards (the 
reduced welfare effect dominates) if a 1 < a 2. 
In the last two equations the equivalent conditions for the wage pressure effect of 
active programmes can be obtained from equations (2') and (3'). Active programmes and 
open unemployment have the same impact on wages, i.e. only total unemployment 
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matters, if ~2 (~) does not differ from null. In the second equation active programmes 
have smaller impact on wages than open unemployment if~] < ° and ~2 >0, the equiva-
lent condition being ~ < ° in equation (3). If the total unemployment variable (r+u) dis-
appears from equation (2'), i.e. ~] = ~2' only active programmes have any impact on 
wages. In equation (3 ') the main determinant in suppressing wage pressures is open un-
employment if the condition A] = ~ holds. 
Turning next to the estimates of the wage pressure presented in the literature. 
Given the greater emphasis towards ALMP in the Nordic countries, it is hardly surpris-
ing that empirical wage-setting studies have been executed with Nordic data. The first 
striking thing to be noticed from the summary table A3.2 in the appendix is that only 6 
estimations out of 17 produce conventionally significant parameter estimates for the 
ALMP variable. This complicates the interpretation of the dependence between active 
programmes and wages if analyses are based on the accommodative stance variable, 
r/(r+u). On the one hand the reported parameter estimates imply smaller wage resistance 
of ALMPs than open unemployment. On the other hand the statistical insignificance of 
these estimates suggest that only total unemployment affects wages, in other words ac-
tive programmes and open unemployment have the same downward effect on wages. 
This conflict does not arise when programme and open unemployment variables are 
separately included in estimated equations. 
When it comes to differences across countries, the results largely agree that active 
labour market policy has increased wage pressures in Sweden and reduced them in Nor-
wa/. Given the Swedish emphasis towards ALMPs, the results suggest that the 
The study by Raaum and Wulfsberg (1998) examines the impact of ALMPs on wages by employing 
Nonvegian industry level data which consists of 5-l28 firm over the years 1980 - 1991. The estimated 
total wage elasticity of active programmes is almost identical to the ones reported in time series studies 
being around -0.1 
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reduced-welfare loss effect is a dominate factor only when active labour market pro-
grammes are 'over ambitious' compared to prevailing unemployment. This is consistent 
with the Norwegian experience with low unemployment and moderate levels of active 
programmes. A rival explanation for the Swedish experience is the simultaneity bias due 
to the tendency of programme participation to increase more than proportionally with 
unemployment in Sweden. An increase in real wages, which leads to a fall in employ-
ment, expands the size of ALMPs by more than open unemployment, which might have 
biased the estimated parameters upwards, see Calmfors (1994). 
The results estimated for the other countries, viz. Denmark and Finland, are less 
clear-cut. From the statistical point of view insignificant parameter estimates imply ei-
ther zero effects or downward effects of ALMPs on wages, depending on the model. 
However, the signs of parameter estimates suggest a moderate upward pressure on ne-
gotiated wages. All in all it may be safe to conclude that previous studies support the 
view that Danish or Finnish active labour market policy has not had any wage pressure 
effects, the conclusion being slightly stronger for Denmark. 
As was the case with the cross-country studies, the results produced by time se-
ries estimations have not been unilaterally accepted. All of the surveyed studies have em-
ployed yearly data in examining the wage-setting relation. Hence, these studies are not 
completely secured from the limited number of observations problem which has been 
one of the main arguments against cross-country studies. Another problem common for 
all macroeconometric studies is the simultaneity bias. In this respect time series studies 
have a comparative advantage over cross-country studies. They have a possibility, which 
is also usually employed, of constructing reliable instruments from past observations. A 
final difficulty associated with time series studies follows from cyclical effects which par-
tially determine the scale of ALMPs, Jackman et. al. (1996). Provided that cyclical 
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effects are not totally controlled in estimations, together with the usual assumption of 
fixed parameters, the end-point estimates may be give a biased picture if the impact of 
active programmes varies along the business cycle. 
3.1.4. Other Studies 
Calmfors & Skedinger (1995) examined the relationship between regional total 
unemployment rates and two categories of ALMPs, viz. training and job-creation. The 
data employed in the study consists of24 Swedish regions over the years 1966 - 90. The 
first conclusion of the results is that job-creation programmes tend to crowd out regular 
employment, the effect being some 60 - 90 per cent. This implies a 1 - 4 percentage 
points fall in total unemployment if selective employment measures are expanded by 10 
percentage points The second result is that training programmes have a more favourable 
effect on regional total unemployment. Finally, there is no substantial evidence that ac-
tive programmes help young people. 
Calmfors & Skedinger study employs dynamic panel data models and the fixed ef-
fect model with four year non-overlapping averages. They estimate these models both in 
levels and in first differences by employing both OLS and IV estimation methods. In the 
IV regressions all independent variables (active labour market policy variables and the 
lagged regional unemployment rate) are treated as endogenous. When the model is esti-
mated in first differences, the lagged dependent variable is instrumented with its second 
lag as suggested by Anderson and Hsiao (1981). 
From the methodological point of view, these results have to be considered with 
care for various reasons. First, all estimators employed in estimating the models are con-
sistent only when the number of regions approaches infinity, see Sevestre & Trognon 
(1992). Second, other factors influencing employment are controlled either by regional 
36 
dummy variables or by the national unemployment rate, so the results may suffer from 
omitted variable bias. Authors are well aware of this and they argue that the problem 
tends to disappear the longer the observation period since the actual rate of unemploy-
ment is then likely to be closer to the equilibrium rate. Third, the results tend to vary 
across different specifications which, according to authors, arise from simultaneity and 
identification problems common to all macro econometric studies. Despite these short-
comings, the results are interesting given the attempt to separate the effects of different 
programmes. 
The final category of which there exists macro econometric research is the dis-
placement effects of ALMPs. Time series evidt;nce on displacement/substitution is based 
either on unemployment flow analyses (Rantala, 1995, Eriksson & Pehkonen, 1995) or 
on non-theoretical V AR models (Holmlund, 1995, Skedinger, 1995, Pehkonen, 1995b). 
In the Forslund & Krueger (1994) study a rival approach is adopted, namely a cross-
section of 24 Swedish regions. The displacement/substitution results tend to differ 
across estimation methods; estimations based on matching functions imply negligible dis-
placement effects in Finnish youth labour markets (Rantala), whereas V AR analyses in-
dicate almost total crowding out effects of job-creation programmes in youth labour 
markets both in Sweden (Holmlund, Skedinger) and in Finland (Pehkonen). One expla-
nation for this might be connected to omitted variables, since the studies based on 
matching functions tend to control more factors than the V AR studies. In the latter 
branch of studies the problem with omitted variables is potentially severe given that the 
displacement effect is studied by regressing residuals with each other. When it comes to 
displacement effects across unemployment durations, the results reported in Rantala 
(1995) and Eriksson & Pehkonen (1995) suggest that programmes directed to the long-
term unemployed displace short-term employed persons but the estimated effects remain 
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modest. Finally, in the Forslund & Krueger's study the results show the considerable dis-
placement effect of some 70 per cent in the construction sector; no such evidence was 
found in the health sector. 
3.2. Microeconometric Studies 
The standard practise of evaluating social programmes at the administrative level 
is to produce information about the proportion of participants who are employed some 
time after participation. Being of interest in their own right these measures are not suffi-
cient to measure the impact of various programmes for two reasons. First, summary 
measures do not provide any information about the importance of individual characteris-
tics in determining the outcome. Second, what we really need to know is whether the 
outcome would have been observed even without an intervention. 
The evaluation of government programmes has been a common practise in the 
United States for decades. The first major employment and labour market initiative in 
the US was the Manpower Development Training Act (MDT A) of 1962. The impact 
studies of MDT A were relatively unsophisticated by today's standards due to the lack of 
common data on both participants and non-participants, Riddell (1991)2. For this reason, 
the U.S. Department of Labor started to collect the Continuous Longitudinal Manpower 
Survey (CLMS) on participants after implementing the next initiative in the year 1973 
called the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA). Data for CETA par-
ticipants were supplemented with data for non-participants taken from the Current 
Population Survey (CPS). In 1982 CETA was replaced by the Job Training Partnership 
Act (JTPAl 
2 The study by Ashenfelter (1978) for MDT A trainees was one of the first studies which documented 
that participants in MDT A do not represent a random sample of eligible population. 
3 For more information about the design and target groups of CET A and ITP A. see Hayeman and 
Hollister (1991). 
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Data for CETA participants and non-participants resulted in numerous evaluation 
studies4. In 1978 CET A was given the explicit target to increase the earned income of 
participants. For this reason, the main research question has been the impact of CETA 
on participants' subsequent earnings. According to a review by Haveman and Hollister 
(1991), CET A had small, positive effects on participants' earnings that materialised 
through higher hours of work rather than higher wage rates. The groups that benefited 
the most from these programmes consisted of disadvantaged individuals, women, and 
those with the least previous labour market experience. The most effective programme 
types were public sector employment and on-the-job training, whereas work experience 
and classroom training had little or no effect on participants' subsequent earnings. 
The worrying finding of CET A evaluations was, however, that the estimated pro-
gramme effects differed widely between different studies. The studies by Lalonde (1986) 
and Fraker and Maynard (1987) examined this issue by comparing the experimental and 
non-experimental estimates of the programme effects. The experimental data employed 
in these studies was collected from the National Supported Work Demonstration 
(NSWD) which was a temporary, natural experiment in the mid 1970s5. Both studies 
conclude that non-experimental evaluation methods fail to produce reliable estimates of 
the programme effect. Partially for this reason, the U.S. Ministry of Labor decided to 
employ random assignment in the evaluation of the JTPA, Riddell (1991). The experi-
mental evaluations of JTP A have provided evidence that training increases adult partici-
pants' earnings by $585 - $625 per year. Unlike in CETA evaluation studies, the JTPA 
evaluations indicate that both men and women gain from participation. The impact of 
4 Among others, Bassi (1983), Ashenfelter and Card (1985), Dickinson, et. al. (1987). Jantzen 
(1987), and Card and Sullivan (1988). A review by Bamow (1987) examines eleycn major studies of 
this literature in detail. 
5 For more information about the design and target groups of NSWD. see Haveman and Hollister 
(1991). 
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JTP A programmes on the earnings prospects of the youth is, however, less satisfactory. 
They may even harm the short-term earnings prospects of young men, Burtless (1993). 
Nowadays, it seems to be widely acknowledged that social experiments produce 
more reliable estimates of the programme impact, provided that they are carefully intro-
duced6. Having said that, the results by Heckman & Hotz (1989) imply that there is no 
reason why non-experimental econometric methods would not produce reliable esti-
mates if the estimated models are carefully tested. Due to the emphasis of the study, this 
part of the survey focuses on non-experimental assessments of active labour market pro-
grammes. Following the same line of argument we concentrate purely on the empirical 
evidence of the relation between programme participation and subsequent employment, 
leaving aside studies in which the earnings impacts of AL.l\1Ps have been examined. The 
latter literature is extensively surveyed in Barnow (1987), OEeD (1993) and Fay 
(1996). 
3.2.1. Selection Bias 
All micro econometric evaluations try to answer the question of whether partici-
pants have experienced improvements in their labour market position. To answer this 
question the focus is in estimating the conditional joint distribution of the outcome vari-
able under evaluation (y) and the programme variable (p) 
(4) fey, p I X, Z, u, y), 
in which all subscripts have been omitted for exhibition purposes. X and Z stand for the 
determinants of the outcome variable and the participation decision, respectively. The 
6 It has to be noted, however, that also social eXlJeriments are subject to limitations in evaluating gov-
ernment programmes, see Heckman (1992), Heckman & Smith (1993) and Burtless (1993), inter alia. 
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parameter vectors connected to explanatory variables are denoted by a and y. The re-
sulting likelihood function is a simplified version of a general model in which the dura-
tion of a programme, and possibly the duration of unemployment after a programme, are 
also jointly modelled, see Dolton (1994). As a further simplification the programme vari-
able (p) is usually modelled within the context of net utility which leads to a dichoto-
mous programme variable, see Heckman & Robb (1985). 
The problem with micro econometric evaluations is the one of missing data since 
we do not observe the outcome under the counterfactual state, i.e. had a participant not 
participated in a programme. Let us define the counterfactual outcome by Yo and the ob-
served outcome by y!. Provided that the joint distribution (4) can be determined, the im-
pact of active programmes on the programme participants can be assessed through the 
distribution of impacts, see Heckman & Smith (1993), 
(5) fey! - Yo I d=l, X, Z, a, y). 
In practise we do not observe the same individuals in different states, i.e. partici-
pating in a programme and non-participating. To deal with the problem an analyst needs 
a comparison group which is thought of as presenting the counterfactual outcome of 
programme participants. This raises an additional problem since the data is generated by 
individuals who make choices of belonging to one of the two groups. So called selection 
bias is present in estimations if the mean labour market outcome of programme partici-
pants differs from the mean outcome of control-group members even in the absence of 
an intervention. In a stylised framework the consequences of selection bias can be exam-
ined through the means of observed outcomes for programme participants (p = 1) and 
non-participants (p = 0) 
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(6) E(YI I p=l, X, Z, a, Y) = ~ + E(yo I p=l, X, Z, a, Y) 
(7) E(YI I p=O, X, Z, a, y) = E(yo I p=O, X, Z, a, y). 
The observed mean outcome of the participants consists of two terms; the programme 
effect (~) and the mean of the counterfactual outcome. Naturally the two means are the 
same for comparison-group members. If we attempt to evaluate a programme through 
the difference in mean outcomes, the result becomes 
(8) E(YI I d=l, X, Z, a, y) - E(YI I d=O, X, Z, a, y) = 
~ + {E(yo I d=l, X, Z, a, y) - E(yo I d=O, X, Z, a, y)}. 
The conditional means in curly brackets form the selection bias term. If the mean 
outcome of participants in the non-participation state differ from that of non-
participants, the conventional single equation estimation methods do not yield the con-
sistent estimates of~, see Heckman & Smith (1993). The direction of bias is unknown a 
priori. If selection is based on comparative advantage due to ambition or motivation, 
ALMPs produce greater benefits under self-selection than under a random assignment, 
Roy (1951), see also chapter 9 in Maddala (1983). In the case of comparative disadvan-
tage the reversed outcome emerges. Whatever the reason, selection bias makes it impos-
sible to assess which part of the programme effect is due to active programmes and 
which part is due to uncontrolled factors7. 
The solution to the self-selection bias depends crucially on whether this bias 
arises, in Heckman & Hotz (1989) terminology, as selection on observables or as selec-
tion on unobservables. In the former case the bias is easily corrected by inserting the ob-
served factors, which affect a person's participation decision and subsequent labour 
7 The direction of selection bias is less evident if some part of the population selects positively (com-
parative advantage) and others negatively (comparative disadvantage). In this case. the direction of se-
lection bias in equation (8) depends on the relative effects of different selection criteria. 
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market possibilities, in the outcome equation. In the latter case one has to take account 
of the dependence between the error terms in the participation and outcome equations. 
There are numerous ways of handling the selection bias parametrically, see Mad-
dala (1983), Heckman & Robb (1985) and Limdep manual version 7, inter alia. The 
choice of method depends on the outcome variable (linear or non-linear), the selection 
process (bivariate or multinomial) and distributional assumptions. In principle all selec-
tion models can be estimated by specifying the joint distribution (4) between the out-
come variable and the participation variable(s). In practise, however, the computational 
burden of calculating multiple integrals restricts the number of endogenous variables. In 
earnings oriented cross-section studies the outcome variable is linear in which case com-
putations can be further simplified by 2-stage estimation methods, see Heckman (1979) 
for dichotomous participation choice and Lee (1983) for multinomial choice model. But 
in non-linear models, such as in limited dependent variable models, 2-stage estimation 
methods are not valid, see O'Higgins (1994). To take account of selection on unobserv-
abIes one has to estimate the joint distribution given in equation (4). Needless to say, the 
exact formulation depends on the adopted distributional assumptions. 
In specifying a parametric model one needs to make some distributional assump-
tions concerning error processes, the most common being the multivariate normal distri-
bution. This assumption is hardly ever tested, even though the severe consequences of 
departures from normality are well reported in the case of 2-stage estimation methods, 
see Goldberger (1983), Duncan (1983), Maddala (1983) and Lee (1984). Recently the 
assumptions required in specifying all moments of a conditional distribution are chal-
lenged by semi parametric estimation methods which parametrically model only part of 
the model (for a survey of different estimators see Robinson, 1988). However, the appli-
cations of semi parametric estimation methods in selectivity models have remained 
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limited, one exemption is Newey et. al. (1990). One reason for this is likely to be that 
the cost of weaker distributional assumptions is paid by fewer questions which can be 
asked of the data, see Heckman (1990). 
3.2.2. Cross-Sectional Evaluations 
In non-linear cross-sectional studies the focus is on latent variables y'" and p"'. Fac-
tors determining the outcome under evaluation, X and p, and the participation decision, 
Z, are connected to the latent variables via linear indicator functions. This set up leads to 
the following model 
(9) 
(10) 
The observed realisations of the latent outcome and participation variables are y 
and p. If only the sign of the latent variable is observed, the observed outcome variable 
is determined by the rule y = 0 ify'" < 0, otherwise y = 1. In Torp's (1994) study the out-
come variable is employment months within a year in which case the relation becomes y 
= 0 if y'" < 0, y = 12 if y'" > 12, otherwise y = y"'. Excluding the Jensen & Jensen (1996) 
study, the joint distribution of error terms ty and tp is modelled as bivariate normal with 
the correlation coefficient p and variances cr 2 and cr 2. Table A3.3 in the appendix sum-y p 
marises the results of cross-sectional evaluations of active programmes as a manpower 
policy. 
All studies report results in which the impact of programmes is examined by one 
or more dummy variables, but the specification of the participation decision differs 
amongst studies. In probit or logit estimations the participation status is treated as ex-
ogenous conditional on controlled factors. More precisely, the untested assumption in 
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these studies is the zero restriction on the correlation coefficient, p. This may introduce 
a substantial bias in the estimated programme effect. For instance, Zweimuller and 
Winter -Ebmer (1996) report that the estimated programme effect changed from a small 
positive value to a significantly negative one when the joint distribution is estimated. 
Torp (1994) attempts to correct the selection bias via Heckman's (1979) method. 
Strictly speaking this is not valid in non-linear models as discussed in section 3.2.1. The 
proper likelihood function in her context would consist of six terms~ four joint cumula-
tive distributions of participation status and the limit values of employment months, to-
gether with two joint probabilities of observing an uncensored outcome variable 
multiplied by its conditional joint density. 
Unfortunately, the unrestricted covariance matrix arises another difficulty, namely 
the question of identification. In the case of two dichotomous dependent variables, 
equations (9) and (10) form a model with mixture structure, as defined in Maddala 
(1983) p. 122. Unlike in the standard bivariate probit model the parameters of the out-
come equation remain unidentified if both equations include the same regressors. Ac-
cordingly one has to have an instrument for the participation decision which does not 
enter the outcome equation (9). The four multiple equation studies have adopted the fol-
lowing identification restrictions: O'Higgins (1994) defines home background and labour 
market dummies differently in the two equations; Raaum et. al. (1995) include the par-
ticipants to total applicants ratio in the participation equation but not in the employment 
equation~ Torp (1994) excludes prior participation and participation rate in the home 
community variables from the employment months equation~ and finally Zweimuller & 
Winter-Ebmer (1996) employ projected employment change in a district as an 
instrument. 
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Turning next to the estimated impact of active labour market programmes. The 
first two studies, which concentrate merely on programme participants, suggest that par-
ticipants in labour market training have difficulties in getting a job directly after termi-
nating a programme. This finding may reflect the lower job search incentives of the 
trainees during a programme in which case potential gains will materialise after some 
time of terminating a training programme. According to Ackum Agell's (1995) results 
the Swedish replacement programme is also superior to job placement programmes, the 
latter having no significant impact on the employment probability directly after participa-
tion. The Jensen & Jensen (1996) study implies that previous training experience does 
not have any effects over and above the most recent training period. 
When it comes to the treatment group versus the control group comparisons, the 
studies seem to report more beneficial than damaging results. The only significantly 
negative impact is reported in the Main (198 7 a) study which evaluates Youth Training 
Scheme using Scottish data. However, the downward effect turns into a positive one 
within the next year, Main & Shelly (1990). An interesting contrast in evaluating the 
youth training scheme is found between Scotland and EnglandIW ales, in the latter coun-
tries disadvantaged trainees gaining more from participation than advantaged, O'Higgins 
(1994). There are some implications that disadvantaged persons benefit more from par-
ticipation also in Scotland but the gain difference reported in Main (1991) remains some 
5 percentage points lower than that reported in O'Higgins. The study by Raaum et. al. 
(1995) aims to assess the relative efficiency of different training programmes by specifY-
ing three different training dummies. According to their results only training courses 
providing formal qualification have beneficial employment effects. The magnitude of the 
parameter estimate (training 6 in appendix A3. 3) differs across estimation methods, the 
crucial thing being the significance of the estimated correlation coefficient. The standard 
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bivariate probit model produces a well determined, positive correlation coefficient which 
seems to lower the significance of training variables. The positive dependence between 
the error terms implies that participants are more advantaged compared to controls. This 
is contrasted by the O'Higgins (1994) and Zweimuller & Winter-Ebmer (1996) studies 
which report significantly negative correlation coefficients. Accordingly their results 
suggest that participants are initially in a worse labour market position than controls8. 
The two studies in which the employment effect of labour market training is not 
assessed through the employment probability seem to give the greatest gains from par-
ticipation. The significantly positive parameter estimate (0.677) reported in Torp (1994) 
indicates that the subsequent working career of the trainees is more stable than the non-
trainees. Interestingly the next two estimations (duration variables not reported in table 
A3.3) connect this benefit to short and long training courses, employment months of 
trainees exceeding those of non-trainees by more than one month if a training course is 
either shorter than 5 weeks or longer than 37 weeks. The Zweimuller & Winter-Ebmer 
(1996) results confirm the greater job stability of training participants. Their standard 
man calculations imply that the trainees benefit almost by 40 per cent drop in their re-
peat unemployment probabilities9. If taken at face value it demonstrates the possibilities 
of labour market training as a manpower policy. One difficulty with Torp's (1994) re-
sults, of which the author is fully aware, is that the sampling procedure is based on two 
different random samples; one consisting of programme participants and the second of 
It has to be noted that control groups differ amongst these studies. Raaum et. al. (1995) employ a 
control group which consists of rejected applicants, whereas O'Higgins (1994) and Zweimuller & 
Winter-Ebmer (1996) use unemployed persons without a programme period. 
9 The standard man calculation in Zweimuller & Winter-Ebmer (1996) is based on the marginal pro-
gramme effect which is calculated for a reference person. In these calculations an analyst removes the 
programme effect from a participant. An altematiye evaluation is employed in O'Higgins (1994) who 
calculates the programme effect as a difference between the outcomes of a reference participant and a 
reference non-participants. In terms of equations presented in section 2.2.1, Zweimuller & Winter-
Ebmer employs equation (5) in which the counterfactual outcome is based on parameter estimates. 
O'Higgins, on the other hand, employs equation (8). 
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non-participants. This so called choice-based sampling results in overrepresentation of 
programme participants in estimations. When analysing choice-based samples in cross-
sections through a parametric model, one really should use some modified estimator 
, 
such as the one developed by Manski & McFadden (1981). 
Another shortcoming of some studies is the lack of misspecification tests. In par-
ticular' the adopted distributional assumption is rarely put under scrutiny. This is surpris-
ing given that relatively simple distributional tests, which are based on artificial 
regressions, have been proposed for the tobit and probit models in Lee & Maddala 
(1985) and Pagan & Vella (1989), and for the logit model in Poirier (1980) and Smith 
(1989). The score tests for the distributional assumption of bivariate normality have 
been derived in Lee (1984) and Smith (1985) but these tend to become fairly compli-
cated due to the complexity of the likelihood function. A simpler version for testing nor-
mality in the bivariate probit model is recently given in Murphy (1994). In addition to 
distributional misspecifications, also other forms of misspecifications result in biased pa-
rameter estimates, and hence biased policy conclusions, in non-linear models. The im-
portance of specification testing is highlighted in O'Higgins (1994). After correcting for 
heteroskedasticity (homoskedastic specifications are rejected against the heteroskedastic 
ones in all estimations) the beneficial programme effect on a disadvantaged person more 
than doubles, the selection correction making only little difference in heteroskedastic 
models. This together with theoretical results of misspecifications cast considerable 
doubts on the untested results. In this respect the current state of micro econometric 
evaluations can only be improved1o. 
10 Convenient specification tests, which are based on artificial regressions, are reported in Oa\'idson & 
MacKinnon (1984, 1989), Newey (1985), Chesher & Irish (1987), Gourieroux et. a1. (1987), Godfrey 
(1989), Pagan & Vella (1989), and Maddala (1995), inter alia. 
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3.2.3. Duration Studies 
The fundamental building block in duration models is the hazard function which 
gives the probability of ending a spell in the short interval of time conditional on having 
survived up to that time. If we denote the duration distribution function by F(t) and its 
density function by f(t), the hazard function becomes A(t) = f(t)/[1 - F(t)]. The usual as-
sumption adopted in duration studies is the proportionality of the hazard function by 
Cox (1972). This results in the conditional hazard h(tIX) = A(t)hj(X) in which A(t) de-
notes the baseline hazard and hj (X) incorporates the explanatory variables into the 
model. The assumption of proportionality of hazards simplifies calculations considerably 
since it makes it possible to estimate the parametric part of the model without specifying 
the form of the common function A(t). As a further simplification the parametric part of 
the model is usually specified as exponential, i.e. hj(X) = exp( a'X). 
Hazard function evaluations of active programmes try to model their impact on in-
dividuals' unemployment/employment spells. In terms of section 3.2.1 the main issue of 
interest is the joint distribution of the unemployment duration, 1, the programme dura-
tion, r, and the programme participation, p, see Dolton (1994), 
(11) f(1, r, p I X, Q, Z, a, S, y). 
The additional terms in equation (11) are the determinants of the programme duration 
(Q) and the parameter vector of these factors (s). Due to the complexity of the resulting 
likelihood function, most of the studies have concentrated merely on modelling the un-
employment duration, 1, conditional on programme participation and other explanatory 
variables. 
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Duration models form an attractive alternative to cross-section models. Instead of 
modelling the employment probability at some point of time, duration models attempt to 
evaluate the conditional exit probabilities of different exit routes at any point of time. 
Not surprisingly, there are costs connected to more ambitious questions that duration 
studies ask of the data. Even in single-duration models the resulting competing risks 
model becomes fairly cumbersome to estimate. To simplify the task of optimisation an 
analyst is tempted to assume the independence of hazard functions. This makes it possi-
ble to treat exits to other states as censored observations in which case the estimation of 
the multiple destination model becomes a series of single destination models. But the im-
plicit assumption incorporated in independent competing risks, and analogously in single 
destination models, is that individual's participation status is exogenous which may be 
implausible when evaluating active programmes. 
There are three different ways employed in tackling the selection problem. Dolton 
et. al. (1994a) specify a two equation system which consists of the accelerated time 
model and the participation equation. The resulting system is essentially the linear out-
come version of the equations shown in section 3.2.2, so the Heckman procedure is 
available for estimations. Gritz (1993) constructs a three-state duration model in which 
the time spent in programmes is among the states. To allow correlation across the states 
he introduces unobserved heterogeneity terms which follow the one-factor structure. 
This implies correlated risks but places limitations on possible correlation among sur-
vival times. The most attractive way of solving the endogeneity problem is to employ 
data from experimental designs as in Dolton et. al. (1996) and Ham & LaLonde (1996). 
Provided that these experiments are carefully introduced,11 they assure that an individ-
ual's heterogeneity is independent of his programme status. Hence an analyst can leave 
II For various potential problems in e~."perimental design. see Heckman & Smith (1993). 
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aside the endogenous selection into treatments and controls and concentrate on solving 
other difficulties included in transition data. An experimental design does not, however, 
ensure that durations of treatments and controls are readily comparable, so nonexperi-
mental methods have to be employed in analysing the programme effect, see Ham & 
LaLonde (1996). 
The decision whether or not to allow for endogenous participation decision is just 
one of the difficulties in analysing transition data. One issue which has evoked consider-
able interest is unobserved heterogeneity. The need to control for unobservable individ-
ual differences provides another explanation for the popularity of Cox's (1972) 
proportional hazard model, since it includes the ability to correct for unmeasured hetero-
geneity. The resulting specification is a so called mixture model of the form h(tIX,v) = 
vA(t)h1(X) where v is a random variable capturing uncontrolled heterogeneity. Failure to 
take account of unobserved heterogeneity may result in, not only spurious duration de-
pendence, but also inconsistent slope estimates, Lancaster (1990). There are basically 
two ways of correcting this problem, either through a fully parametric model or through 
points of support. Heckman & Singer (1984) argued that the former approach leads to 
an overparametrised survival function and possibly to serious errors in inference. Which-
ever specification is chosen, the price to be paid comes in the form of the complexity of 
the likelihood function. 
Another problem arises with censored samples. Right censoring is usually solved 
by including right censored observations in a separate component in the likelihood func-
tion. Even though this treats all right censored observations in a similar way, and may 
hence be unjustified, a bigger problem arises with left censored observations. That is 
with individuals who are observed in the middle ofa spell at the beginning of the sample. 
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If one is willing to accept that there is no unobserved heterogeneity, and there are no 
functional relationships between the distributions of interrupted and completed duration 
times, the left censored observations could be excluded in estimations, Gritz (1993). 
These are, however, strong requirements since the requirement of no functional relation-
ship between distributions is essentially the one of no duration dependence. In single-
duration competing risks studies, which employ inflow data, the problem of left-
censoring becomes the one of modelling the time spent in programmes, see Dolton et. 
al. (1994a). Sometimes the problem of programme spells has been left aside by analysing 
the inflow to open unemployment data. However, the non-random selection to unem-
ployment spells may result in comparing a control group of higher than average unem-
ployed persons to less than average programme participants, Ham & LaLonde (1996). 
To identify the estimated models, one has to assume some functional form restric-
tions. The suitability of the adopted distributional assumptions is a common problem in 
microeconometric studies. In complicated likelihood functions these distributional as-
sumptions become easily untestable. 
As has become evident, there are various difficulties, and solutions to these diffi-
culties, when evaluating ALMPs through duration models. Table A3.4 in the appendix 
summarises the main results an the adopted specifications in hazard function evaluations 
of active programmes. The discussion above may prove useful in comparing the results 
reported in different studies with each other. 
We start the discussion about the results by comparing the three 'pure' evaluation 
studies which have not taken account of the endogeneity of the participation decision. 
The first thing to notice is that these studies report the most negative parameter esti-
mates. For instance, the Ackum-AgeU's (1996) study suggests that all forms of active 
programmes increase unemployment duration. Her results have to be taken as tentative 
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due to four possible misspecifications arising from choice-based sample, unobserved het-
erogeneity, left-censoring and the endogeneity of the participation decision. In particular 
the choice-based sampling procedure may affect the results since the similar kind of in-
flow study by Jensen & Jensen (1996) report more favourable results. According to their 
results labour market training up to a year before entering unemployment increases the 
pace at which participants get hired in a new job. Older training courses, on the other 
hand, seem to have a beneficial effect on returning to an old job. These gains are more 
pronounced for women. Since Jensen & Jensen's study assumes the independence of dif-
ferent spells, the total employment effect is easily calculated by summing up separate 
employment effects. Due to some negative training parameters the employment effects 
remain quite small. The third study in this category, namely Dolton et. al. (1994a), high-
lights the dependency of the results from the control group. If programme participants 
are compared to unemployed persons, significantly beneficial effects on transition to ei-
ther a job or a good job is found for both men and women. When the control group is 
specified as all schoolleavers, the only gain from YTS is obtained by women in terms of 
a transition to a good job. Dolton et. al. (1994a) also put their results under scrutiny by 
assessing the impacts of training spells, unobserved heterogeneity, and the selection 
problem on their results. Due to the adopted estimation method (competing risks) they 
have to introduce these potential misspecifications one at the time by (in some cases) 
second best solutions. According to their results, only the choice whether or not to sub-
tract training spells from the time taken to get a job matters. 
Turning next to two studies which assess ALMPs in an indirect way, namely 
Carling et. at. (1996) and Mealli et. al. (1996). In the former study the programme vari-
able is measured as the availability of programmes in a region. The authors' aim is to test 
the impact of active programmes on the reservation wage through their effect on the 
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escape rate from unemployment to employment. Their results do not support the view 
that ALMPs increase unemployment duration by increasing reservation wages. Not sur-
prisingly, the local supply of active programmes has a strong effect on the rate at which 
individuals enter programmes. The positive parameter estimate in the third hazard func-
tion, i.e. the transition from unemployment to out of the labour force, suggests that 
ALMPs have a work test effect discussed in section 3.1.1. Mealli et. al. (1996) acknowl-
edge that the programme spell is necessarily truncated at the upper limit which in the 
case of the YTS is two years. They develop a limited competing risk model which they 
apply on YTS trainees data. According to their results YTS places in clerical and an-
other non-manual occupations significantly reduce the transition time from unemploy-
ment to employment. 
The final category of duration studies takes account of the endogeneity of the par-
ticipation decision, Gritz (1993) being the only purely non-experimental study. He al-
lows unobservable differences among individuals which are correlated with the duration 
times. The other two studies, viz. Dolton & O'Neill (1996) and Ham & LaLonde (1996), 
employ data on experimental designs. The results seem to differ somewhat between ex-
perimental and non-experimental training studies. Gritz (1993) finds that training 
courses offered by the public sector increase unemployment duration and decrease em-
ployment duration. This is challenged by Ham & Lalonde (1996) whose results suggest 
that they increase employment duration, having no effect on unemployment duration. In 
another study based on completely different experimental data, Dolton & O'Neill (1996) 
report beneficial effects of restart interviews on unemployment duration. Furthermore, 
the restart interview seems to work also as a work search test since it increases the tran-
sition rate from unemployment to out of the labour force. 
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There are several reasons which may cause the diverged results reported in Gritz 
(1993) and Ham & LaLonde (1996). To highlight the differences in modelling strategies, 
we take a closer look at some potential factors. First, the studies evaluate separate pro-
grammes. Gritz's study employs data on the Youth Cohort of the National Longitudinal 
Study (YNLS) whereas Ham & Lalonde's study examines the National Supported Work 
(NSW) demonstration which provided work experience to a random sample of eligible 
disadvantaged women. According to the results summarised in appendices A3. 3 and 
A3.4, females tend to benefit more from programmes, in which case Ham & LaLonde's 
results may give the upper bound of possible programme effects. The second explana-
tion may be connected to the specification of left-censored observations. In Gritz's study 
these observations are treated as if there is no distributional relationship between left 
censored spells and completed duration times. This may introduce a downward bias on 
parameter estimates. When Ham & LaLonde allowed the correlation between the inter-
rupted and fresh unemployment spells, the effect of training on unemployment duration 
turned from positive to insignificant. Similarly, the positive effect on employment dura-
tion became more pronounced. Third, Gritz does not condition the heterogeneity distri-
bution on being eligible for training (Ham & LaLonde, 1996). Accordingly, in his study 
the evaluation question concerns the effect of training on a randomly selected person, 
whereas Ham & LaLonde evaluate the effect on programme participants. Fourth, the 
data employed by Gritz does not contain all information about the programme spells, so 
he is forced to model training status through a dummy variable. Dolton (1994) points 
out that this may introduce a downward bias on programme effects. Finally, as Gritz re-
marks, his method of correcting the endogeneity bias may not adequately capture the 
impacts of government sponsored training. Especially since the private sector training 
seems to be highly effective in shortening unemployment spells. A rival explanation 
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might be the small number of individuals in the sample (77) who actually have received 
public sector training makes it hard to assess government training courses. Most proba-
bly the explanation is the mixture of all these factors. Whatever the reasons, these stud-
ies are welcome contributions to hazard based evaluations of active labour market 
programmes. 
To conclude this section we briefly mention three other types of panel data studies 
which have evaluated the employment effects of ALMPs and which are not summarised 
in appendices. Jantzen (1987) examines the impact of the Comprehensive Employment 
and Training Act (CET A) on quarterly hours worked through the tobit model. Accord-
ing to his findings, participation increases males' working hours by 74 - 135 hours in a 
quarter, the equivalent results being 132 - 315 hours for females. Ridder (1986) employs 
non-stationary Markov chains in analysing different forms of active programmes. He as-
sumes that selection into programmes depends on the labour market state, unemployed 
persons being more likely to participate in a programme. His results imply that employ-
ment programmes are more effective than recruitment programmes, which in turn are 
more effective than training programmes. Females, minority workers and young workers 
benefit the most. Finally, Card & Sullivan (1988) evaluate the CET A programme by 
modelling the selection into programmes through previous labour market history. This 
solves the endogeneity problem provided that sample selection is purely based on past 
work histories and these histories are adequately captured by the employed profiles. 
Their results imply that the CET A programme has a small to moderately large positive 
impact on the post-training employment probabilities in every year after training, the ef-
fects ranging from 2 to 5 percentage points. 
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3.3. The Lessons of Previous Studies 
What have we learned about the effectiveness of active labour market policy in 
improving employment prospects? The evidence is rather mixed, especially when it 
comes to macroeconomic effects, but it seems reasonable to hypothesise the following. 
First, active programmes seem to reduce unemployment. This piece of evidence is 
mainly based on cross-country analyses so time series studies about the impact of 
ALMPs on equilibrium unemployment are urgently needed. Second, Swedish evidence 
suggests that active programmes increase wage pressures only if they are overambitious 
compared to prevailing unemployment. Whether or not this results in higher unemploy-
ment remains to be seen. According to cross-country studies this is not the case. Third, 
the displacement effects may be large. Before drawing any definite conclusions, more 
studies about displacements at the occupational/industry level are needed. Especially 
since studies based on different framework (matching function vs. V AR) tend to give di-
verse results. Fourth, micro economic evaluations suggest that training courses increase 
subsequent employment prospects at the individual level. It is noteworthy that this piece 
of evidence does not seem to depend on the exact evaluation method. But it is still based 
on very limited number of evaluations which have evaluated active programmes of even 
fewer countries. And it has to be noted that the robustness of the results remains some-
what unsure due to the lack of misspecification tests. 
Since the literature does not completely agree on the main issues, such as whether 
ALMPs reduce unemployment or not, it is not surprising that there exists different views 
also on the target groups of active programmes. Microeconometric cross-section 
evaluations indicate that disadvantaged participants experience an increase in their em-
ployment probability of some 10 percentage points and possibly a huge reduction in their 
repeat unemployment probability. Most of the panel studies suggest similar quantitative 
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outcomes, the most benefited group being women. In some cross-country studies 
ALMPs have been found of being the most effective when targeted to the long-term un-
employed. But this result has not been unilaterally accepted by all macroeconometric 
evaluations. When it comes to relative effectiveness of separate programmes, the results 
are almost non-existent. To sum up, there are indications that active labour market pol-
icy may be effective as a manpower policy. But since there is no unilaterally accepted 
truth about ALMPs, and convergence to one is slow (or non-existent), more evaluation 
is urgently needed, not only about the statistical significance of the estimated parameters 
but also about the economic importance of active labour market policy in combating 
unemployment. 
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Appendix 3.1. Summary Tables of Previous Studies 
Table A3.1 Empirical Findings of Cross-country Studies. 
Study Dependent The measure of Impact of Sample Estimation Special notes 
variable ALMP ALMP method 
Jackman et. al. UN rate ALMP1 -0.01 (2.2) - 14 countries in the 2SLS on Focused on the UV curve 
(1990); table 4 -0.03 (2.7) years 1971 - 88 pooled data 
Heylen (1991); Share of long-term ALMP spending per -0.87 (0.7) - 9 - 16 countries OLS Number of observations varies 
table 3 unemployment unemployed person -3.43 (2.6) with explanatory variables 
Layard et. al. Average UN rate ALMP1 -0.13 (2.3) 20 countries OLS 
(1991 ) in 1983 - 88 
Forslund & UN rate in 1993 ALMP spending l.73 (1.42) 20 countries OLS Estimated the same equation as 
Krueger (1994); [average in relative to GDP [-0.42 (l.18)] in Layard et. al. (1991) 
table 6 1983 - 88] 
Forslund & UN rate in 1993 ALMP spending 10.19 (9.49) 20 countries OLS Estimated the same equation as 
Krueger (1994); [average in relative to all labour [-8.78 (3.19)] in Layard et. al. (1991) 
table 6 1983 - 88] market measures 
Jackman et. al. Average log ALMP spending as -0.008 (0.7) 20 countries Random effects Estimated the same equation as 
( 1996); table 3 (UN rate) % of GDP divided in 1983 - 88 GLS in Layard et. al. (1991); the 
in 1983 - 94 by unemployment and 1989 - 94 ALMP variable instrumented 
-
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Jackman et. al. Average log (long- ALl\1P spending as -0.03 (2.0) 20 countries Random effects Estimated the same equation as 
(1996); table 3 term Wrate) % of GDP divided in 1983 - 88 GLS in Layard et. al. (1991); the 
in 1983 - 94 by unemployment and 1989 - 94 ALl\1P variable instrumented 
Scarpetta Wrate ALl\1Pl -0.04 (1.17) - 17 countries in the Random effects Estimates also for youth unem-
(1996); table 1 -0.06 (1.83) years 1983 - 93 GLS ployment and non-employment 
Scarp etta Long-term ALl\1Pl -0.01 (0.45) - 17 countries in the Random effects Estimates also for youth unem-
(1996); table 6 Wrate -0.03 (1.15) years 1983 - 93 GLS ployment and non-employment 
Heylen (1993); Wage responsive- Expenditure on 9.19 (3.96) 17 countries Weighted LS Weighted by the inverse of the i 
table 6 ness to W ALl\1Ps relative to variance of wage responsive-
paSSIve measures ness estimates in 8 studies 
OECD (1993); Change in log Change in -0.11 (2.3) 19 countries OLS Explanatory variables consist 
table 2.2. eq. 1 ( employment) in log(spending on ofGDP, real wages and the 
1985 - 90 ALl\1Ps relative to interaction term between 
the wage bill) in GDP and ALl\1P 
1985 - 90 
OECD (1993); Change in Change in Significantly 19 countries OLS Explanatory variables consist 
table 2.3 real wages loge spending on negative for of unemployment rate, 
in 1985-90 ALl\1Ps relative to 10 countries, productivity growth and 
the wage bill) in significantly terms of trade 
1985-90 positive for 
2 countries 
Notes: ALMPI = Total spending on active programmes per unemployed person relative to GDP per person; The number of observations equals the number of countries except 
in those cases where specific years have been reported; If tables report several equations, the lowest and the highest parameter estimate have been reported: Forslund & 
Kmeger (I <)<)..J.) estimated the same equations with two different time periods of which the former one is given in square brackets. 
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Table A3.2 Long-run Estimates of Wage Pressure. 
Study ALMP Unt Period The ALMP effect on wages Special comments 
Denmark 
C & N (1990Y 0.009 -0.125+ 1960 - 89 Perfect substitute for regular 
employment (a2 = 0) 
C & N (1990t 0.34 -0.126+ 1960 - 89 Either increase wages (PI < 0 & 
P2> 0) or reduce (P2 = 0) 
Nymoen et. al. -0.29 -0.123+ 1969 - 93 Either increase (AI - A2 > 0) Specified as first differences. Long-run parameters I 
(1996t or reduce (~= 0) consist of variables shown in equation (3). 
Finland 
C & N (1990Y 0.018 -0.017 1960 - 89 Perfect substitute for regular 
employment (a2 = 0) 
C & N (1990)b 0.08+ nla 1960 - 89 Small increase since eq. (2') Unemployment did not enter the cointegration 
becomes w= -0.08(r+u) - 0.08r vector 
Nymoen et. al. -0.33 -0.048+ 1962 - 94 Either increase (AI - A2 > 0) See Denmark. 
(1996t or reduce (~= 0) 
E-S-V (1 990)a,b nla -0.031 1960-85 Perfect substitute for regular No estimates for the ALMP variable presented since 
employment (a2 = 0) they were insignificant. 
Norway 
C & N (\990Y -0.085" nla 1960 - 89 Reduce wage effects (a2 < 0) Unemployment did not enter the cointegration 
vector 
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C & N (1990)b n/a -0.155* 1960 - 89 Reduce (~2 = 0) The programme variable did not enter the cointe-
gration vector 
Nymoen et. al. - -0.089* 1964 - 94 Reduce (Az = 0) See Denmark. 
(1996Y 
Sweden 
C & N (1990Y n/a -0.228* 1960 - 89 Perfect substitute for regular The programme variable did not enter the cointe-
employment (u2 = 0) gration vector 
C & N (1990t 0.41 * -0.236* 1960 - 89 Increase (~I < 0 & ~2 > 0) 
C & F (1991Y 0.05* - -0.11 * - 1960 - 86 Increase (u2 > 0) Estimated several different specifications. Lowest 
0.34* -0.17* and highest values shown. 
C & F (1991)b 0.15* -
-0.85 - -2.00 1960 - 86 Increase (~2 > 0) See above. 
0.25* 
N & S (1987Y -0.35 -5.26* 1965 - 83 No effect (u2 = 0) Unemployment term measured in levels. 
Nymoen et. al. -0.25* -0.17* 1965 - 93 Increase (AI - A2 > 0) See Denmark. 
(1996Y 
Forslund (1995)b 0.13 -0.05 1960 - 93 increase (~I < 0 & ~2 > 0) Estimated as a part of the Layard- Nickell model. 
Employed 2SLS. No standard errors presented for 
long-run solutions 
Notes: (a) Specification as in equation (1) ; (b) Specification as in equation (2); (c) Specification as in equation (3); * = significant at the 5 per cent significance leveL Estima-
tion method is OLS if not otherwise stated; C & N = Calmfors and Nymoen; C & F = Calmfors and Forslund; N & S = Newell and Symons; E-S-V = Eriksson, Suvanto and 
Vartia. 
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Table A3.3 Summary of Employment Related Cross-sectional Studies 
Stud~ and (countf)':) Programme Estimate ~ probabilit~ Method Dependent variable = 1 N Comments 
dumm~ (%) 
Adv Disadv 
Eml2.loy-ment 
probability 
Ackum Agell (1995); Training -0.436· n/a n/a Probit Employment directly 2486 Estimated for programme 
table 3; (Sweden) Replacement +0.209· Probit after a programme participants only. 
Job placement -0.091 Probit 
Jensen & Jensen Training 1; men -0.140 n/a n/a Logit Employment directly 1281 Register based random 
(1996); Training 2; men +0.140 Logit after a training course data. 
table 4a; (Denmark) Training 1; women -0.280· n/a n/a Logit following the unem- 748 Estimated for programme 
Training 2; women +0.330 Logit ployment spell participants only. 
Training 1 (2) for partici-
pation upto a year (1 - 2 
years) before entering 
unemployment 
Main (1987); On YTS in Oct -1.443··· n/a n/a Probit Employment in April 2617 Data based on survey sent 
table 2; (Scotland) 1984 1985 of those who left- to randomly selected 
school in 1983/84 school leavers. 
63 
Main (1987); On YOP in Octo- Females: Employment in April See Main (1987). 
table 8.11; (Scotland) ber 1982 +0.551"''''''' 18 18 Probit 1983 of those who left 871 Probability values calcu-
Males: school 1981/82 and lated for a reference man. 
+0.170'" 4 4 Probit were not employed in 922 
October 1982 
Main (1991); Ever on YTS +0.460"''''''' 14 19 Probit Employment in Octo- 1383 See Main (1987). 
table 2 (both sexes); Completed YTS +0.068 Probit ber 1987 of those who Results also available for 
(Scotland) left school in 1983/84 separate sexes. 
Main & Shelly (1990); Ever on YTS +0.400"''''''' 17 11 Probit Employment in April 1198 See Main (1987). 
table 3; (Scotland) Completed YTS +0.079 Probit 1986 of those who left 
school in 1983/84 
O'Higgins (1994); Ever on YTS +0.270"''''''' 3 4 Probit Employment in spring 2855 See Main (1987). 
tables (2) and (6); Ever on YTS +0.550"''''''' 0 11 Hetsked. probit 1986 of those who left Joint distribution estima-
(England and Wales) Ever on YTS n/a 1 12 Bivariate probit school in 1983/84 tions corrected for 
Ever on YTS n/a 1 9 Swit. biv.probit heteroskedasticity 
Raaum et. al. (1995); Training 4 +0.055 n/a n/a Probit Employment in No- 915 Control group consists of 
Tables 5.1.1 and 5.1.2; Training 5 +0.064 Probit vember 1992 for par- rejected applicants. 
(Norway) Training 6 +0.241 """ Probit ticipants in August and Training 4 denotes public 
September 1991 service, technical / admin-
Training 4 -0.004 Bivariate pro bit istrative work, training 5 
Training 5 +0.071 Bivariate probit manufacturing and trans-
Training 6 +0.176 Bivariate pro bit port work. Training 6 
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Training 4 -0.012 Bivariate probit provides formal 
Training 5 +0.110 with interaction qualification. 
Training 6 +0.213* terms 
Em12.loy-ment months 
Torp (1994); Training +0.667** nJa nJa 2-limit tobit Employment months 6406 Choice based sample. 
table 2; Training +4.437*** 2-limit tobit between June 1989 - In the last two estima-
(Norway) Training +3.667*** Heckman May 1990 tions duration of training 
corrected and duration squared are 
2-limit tobit included as regressors 
Job Stability 
Z weimuller & Winter- Training +0.073 nJa nJa Probit Repeat unemployment 1945 Register based random 
Ebmer (1996); Training -1.26}** -39.7 -39.7 Bivariate probit within one year ofter- data of unemployment 
tables 2 and 3; minating a programme leavers 
(Austria) Probability values calcu-
lated for a reference man. 
Notes: * = significant at the 10 per cent significance level; ** = significant at the 5 per cent significance level; *** = significant at the 1 per cent significance level; Training 
stands for a training programme; If no significance levels are given the standard errors have been employed in calculating the t-statistic; Job placement denotes a selective em-
ployment measure; Replacement is the scheme introduced in 1991 in Sweden in which a programme participants replaces a regular worker who is on leave for education: YTS 
= youth training scheme; YOP = Youth Opportunity Scheme; Hetsked. Probit denotes the heteroskedasticity corrected probit estimation; Swit.biv. probit stands for the switch-
ing bivariate probit model 
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Table A3.4 Summary of Programme Effects in Duration Studies. 
Study Estimated effect Unobserved Specification of the Specification of the N Comments 
(Country) heterogeneity programme variable model 
Hazard estimations 
Gritz (1993)~ Government training Controlled (i) Dummy variables (i) Baseline hazard 1703 (i) A subsample of YNLS 
table 3 (N=77): through five that obtain values of Log-logistic. over the years 1978 - 82. 
(USA) Aen = +0.374 (0.163)** points of one if participated in (ii) Three-state du- (ii) Duration variables de-
Ane = -0.397 (0.174)** support. private or government ration model based fined as time spent in em-
Aep = + 1.064 (0.523)** sponsored training. on continuous time ployment / unemployment 
Anp = -0.345 (1.078) (ii) Endogeneity al- Cox's proportional during the sample period. 
Private training (N=535): lowed by specifying hazard. (iii) Left censoring by as-
Aen = -0.099 (0.099) training as another suming independence be-
Ane = -0.095 (0.091) state and by allowing tween fresh and interrupted 
Aep = +0.390 (0.282)* for the existence of un- unemployment spells. 
Anp = +0.251 (0.440) observed heterogeneity (iv) Interaction terms for 
which follows the one- women not shown in col-
factor structure. umn2. 
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Dolton et. al. Control group: Not con- (i) Dummy variable (i) Baseline hazard Women (i) Sample consists of per-
(l994a); unemployed trolled. Ex- which obtains a value not estimated. 1076 sons who left full time edu-
(England) Women periments with one if participated in (ii) One destination Men cation within March 1987 -
Aue = +0.386 (0. 126f** gamma distri- YTS. model based on 927 March 1989. 
Aue(gOOd) = +0.851 (0.245f** bution pro- (ii) Endogeneity not Cox's proportional (ii) The duration variable is 
Men duced similar allowed. hazard. the time taken to enter the 
Aue = +0.206 (0. 127f results. first job (Aue) or the first 
AUe(gOOd) = +0.419 (0.208f* good job (Aue(good). 
Control group: all (iii) Attempts are made 
women to correct the endogeneity 
Aue = -0.324 (0.045f** bias, see text. 
A (*** ue(good) = +0.442 0.071) 
men 
Aue = -0.333 (0.052f** 
Aue(good) = +0.048 (0.068) 
Ackum-Agell Labour market training: Not (i) Separate dummy (i) Baseline hazard 3980 (i) Choice based sample 
(1996); Aue = -0.935 (0. 147f** controlled. variable for labour not estimated. from the inflow to open 
table 5, column 3 Replacement scheme: market training, re- (ii) One destination unemployment and ALMPs 
(Sweden) Aue = -1.097 (0.205f** placement scheme and model based on in three points of time in 
Relief job: relief jobs. Cox's proportional 1993 - 94. 
Aue = -1.449 (0. 189f** (ii) Endogeneity not hazard. (ii) Duration variable is the 
allowed. time taken to enter a regu-
lar job. 
~~-
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Carling et. al. Aue = +0.082 (0.078) Not (i) Regional proportion (i) Baseline hazard 12098 (i) A sample from the in-
(1996); Aup = + 1.984 (0.115f** controlled. of programme partici- not estimated. flow to open unemploy-
Table 3 Aun = +0.276 (0.133f* pants to unemployed. (ii) Independent ment in three points of time 
(Sweden) (ii) Endogeneity not competing risks in 1991. 
allowed. based on Cox's pro- (ii) Duration variable is the 
portional hazard. time taken to end the first 
unemployment spell. 
Ham & LaLonde AUi = +0.024 (0.217) Controlled (i) Dummy variable for (i) Statistical model 541 (i) The sample consists of 
( 1996) Aei = -0.403 (0.156f** through two belonging to the treat- which allows for the the NSW experiment in 
table 4, columns 3 points of ment group which has last two cases in the 1976 - 77. The sample was 
and 5 support. obtained training. comments column. followed for 26 months af-
(USA) (ii) Endogeneity con- ter the baseline. 
trolled through experi- (ii) Duration variables de-
mental design. fined as time spent in em-
ployment / unemployment 
during the sample period. 
(iii) Endogenous left cen-
soring controlled. 
I (iv) Spells are allowed to 
i 
depend on each other. 
-
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Dolton & O'Neill Control group: Not (i) Dummy variable for (i) Baseline hazard 4728 (i) The sample based on the 
(1996); table 1 Aue = -0.284 (0. 124f* controlled. belonging to the treat- not estimated. experimental Restart data 
(Britain) Aup = -0.338 (0.216f ment group which par- (ii) Independent in 1989. 
Aun = +0.389 (0.282)* ticipated in the first competing risks (ii) Duration variable is the 
Restart interview: Restart interview based on Cox's pro- time taken to end the un-
Aun = +0.724 (0.357)** and portional hazard. employment spell. I 
Time varying covariate (iii) The treatment group 
which obtains a value got the Restart interview 
one after the Restart after being unemployed for 
interview. 6 months. The control 
(ii) Endogeneity con- group got their Restart in-
trolled through experi- terview after 12 months of 
mental design. unemployment. 
Mealli et. al. Alpe = +0.319 (0.119)*++ Controlled (i) Separate dummies (i) Baseline hazard 3113 (i) The sample of school 
(1996); A2pe = -0.195 (0.087f* through points for YTS place in cleri- Weibull. leavers in 1988 who joined 
table A2a A3 pe = +0.271 (0. 1 1 0) *** of support. cal occupation (AI), in (ii) Limited compet- the YTS before February 
(Britain) Alpu = -0.003 (0.243) technical/craft occupa- ing risks based on 1991. 
A2pu = -0.404 (0.169)*** tion (A2) and in another Cox's proportional (ii) Duration variable is the 
A3pu = +0.281 (0.207)* non-manual occupa- hazard. time spent in YTS. 
Alpo = -0.241 (0.294) tion (A3). (iii) Only data on training 
')..}po = -0.302 (0.194)* participants employed in 
A3po = +0.327 (0.235)* estimations. 
-
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Jensen & Jensen Women Not (i) Dummy variables (i) Baseline hazard Women (i) Sample of unemploy-
(1996); ').} - ( )** ue(old) - -0.11 0.06 controlled. for a training period up specified as the step 34949 ment spells from the period 
tables 2a and 3a ').} - ()*** ue(new) - +0.12 0.05 to a year before enter- function. Men 1981 - 87. 
(Denmark) A\p = +2.09 (0.10) *u ing unemployment (AI) (ii) Independent 34427 (ii) Duration variable is the 
A2 = +0 28 (0 06)*** 
ue(new) . . and for a training pe- competing risks spells time taken to enter an old 
A
2
ue(Old) = +0.02 (0.06) riod from one to two based on Cox's pro- job, a new job or training. 
A2up = -0.10 (0.14) years before entering portional hazard 
I 
Men unemployment (A2). 
Al - ( )*** 
ue(old) - -0.32 0.05 (ii) Endogeneity not 
Aiue(new) = +0.09 (0.04)** allowed. 
Alup = + 1.64 (0.07) *** 
A
2
ue(new) = +0.07 (0.05)* 
A
2
ue(Old) = +0.03 (0.04) 
A2up = +0.04 (0.09) 
Notes: * (**,***) = significant at the 10 (5, 1) per cent significance level. A, = the probability ofleaving a state in which the subscript gives the origin and the destination state. 
The states are defined as follows: e = employment; n = non-employment; p = programme participation; 0 = out of the labour force; i = terminating a spell for another state. 
YTS = Youth Training Scheme. NSW = National Supported Work Demonstration. 
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CHAPTER 4. 
Active Labour Market Programmes and Unemployment: 
a Macroeconometric Study 
Unemployment is one of the most serious problems facing modem society. Long 
lasting high unemployment tends to bring about extensive costs, not only unemployment 
benefits paid and income taxes lost, but also even more serious social costs, such as in-
creasing crime rates, wider social inequalities, and decreasing family stability. Active la-
bour market programmes (ALl'v1Ps) have been introduced to reduce these problems by 
improving the employment performance of the economy. As pointed out in chapter 2, 
this is also the principal aim of Finnish ALl'v1Ps. 
The discussion in chapter 3 highlighted that there are major controversies over the 
macroeconomic efficiency of active labour market policy in reducing unemployment. 
The results of cross-country studies have been generally favourable for active pro-
grammes; spending on active programmes is found to reduce unemployment and wages, 
and increase real wage flexibility. The orthodox view of the usefulness of ALl'v1Ps of-
fered by cross-country estimations has been challenged by studies that have employed 
time series data and focused on the impact of active programmes on wage-setting in the 
unionised labour market. According to these studies, active programmes increase union's 
fallback level leading to increased wage demands, which in turn implies lower employ-
ment and perhaps even deteriorating unemployment. Hence, despite the central position 
of active programmes in handling the unemployment problem (DEeD 1990, 1993), the 
outcomes of these programmes are, by and large, unclear and controversial. 
This chapter contributes to existing literature by combining two popular views of 
how ALMPs operate, through labour supply and through wage-setting, into a small sup-
ply side model that is estimated by employing Finnish time series data from the period 
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1980Q 1 - 1992Q4. The choice of the evaluation period is is purely based on the avail-
ability of data, see chapter 2. The objectives of the study are: (i) to generalise the model 
analysed in Calmfors & Forslund (1991) by incorporating labour demand and labour 
supply behaviour into analysis; (ii) to estimate theorised effects and to employ estimated 
parameter values in examining the impact of active labour market policy on aggregate 
unemployment. It turned out in chapter 3 that on theoretical grounds the effect of 
ALMPs on both wage-setting and labour supply is ambiguous, a priori. Empirical re-
suIts imply that in the long-run equilibrium more accommodative active labour market 
policies expand the size of the labour force, and increase both wages and open unem-
ployment when unemployment is low, whilst having a downward effect on wages and 
open unemployment in the high unemployment situation. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The theoretical model is set 
up in section 4.l. Section 4.2 discusses the empirical model and reports the estimations 
results. The aggregate impact of active labour market programmes on unemployment is 
examined in section 4.3. Finally, section 4.4 concludes the study. 
4.1. Theoretical Model 
4.1.1. Labour Demand 
A representative firm produces value-added output using labour input (E), capital 
(K), and raw materials (M) via the general production function 
(1) Y = f(E,K,M). 
It is assumed that the firm operates in imperfectly competitive product markets, where 
the downward sloping demand for its products is given by 
1 
(2) P = Y-li , 
11 being the elasticity of demand for the firms outputs. 
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The first order condition, which equates marginal revenue with marginal costs, 
gives the following relations 
(3) 
(3') 
(1- ~)Y-* = W(1 +s)g'(Y,K,M) 
f(E,K,M) = (1- ~)-1 W(~+s) , 
where g is the inverse of the production relation, and labour costs consist of gross 
wages (W) and payroll taxes (s). The first equation gives prices as a mark-up over 
wages, the mark-up factor being (1 - l/llyl. As noted in Layard & Nickell (1986), there 
is no reason to expect this mark-up factor as being constant, so it is modelled as a func-
tion of aggregate demand; and consequently, denoted by ",(AD). The exact dependence 
of the mark-up factor on aggregate demand, AD, is uncertain, but it is likely to behave 
countercyclically, see Layard et. al. (1991). 
According to the latter equation, the marginal product of labour is equal to total 
real labour costs times the mark-up factor. Given that prices have been set in advance, 
equation (3') determines the demand for labour as 
(4) E = jE(WIP, s, ",(AD), K, USRC,PmprIP) 
(-) (-) (-) (+) (+) (-) 
The general labour demand equation hypothesises the negative dependence of labour de-
mand on its own price, which consists of real wages (W/P) and payroll taxes (s). An in-
crease in the user cost of capital (USRC) is expected to have a positive impact on labour 
demand through the partial substitutability of labour and capital. Higher aggregate de-
mand, AD, leads to rising production levels, which in tum affects positively the demand 
for labour through the countercyclical mark-up factor, \}l(AD). Finally, an increase in the 
real price of raw materials (P mp/P) reduces labour demand. It is assumed that active 
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labour market programmes do not have any significant effect on labour demand directly, 
but they do have an indirect impact through their wage effect, which is discussed belowl. 
4.1.2. Wage Formation 
Since the unionisation rate in Finland (over 80%) is among the highest in the 
OEeD and wage negotiations are fairly centralised, the natural way for modelling wage 
formation is to adopt the union model. The union is assumed to have the utilitarian util-
ity function of the form 
(5) 
where \ is the probability of a union worker maintaining his union job, tl is the income 
tax rate, and A is the alternative wage obtainable to those union workers who are not 
able to keep their union jobs. The alternative wage is defined as the weighted average 
between the wage rate elsewhere, WA, and the income while out of work, B, 
(6) A = [1- 8(u,r)]WA + 8(u,r)B , 
where the weight, 8(u,r), is defined as the probability of NOT getting a hire. This prob-
ability depends positively on the unemployment rate, u, and negatively on the probability 
of participating in a labour market programme, r. According to equation (6), active pro-
grammes raise the alternative wage provided that WA > B. 
By building a standard Nash-bargaining problem assuming that under no agree-
ment, the union's payoff equals the utility gained from the alternative wage, and the firm 
has to stop production, the first order condition for the bargaining problem can be 
shown to be 
(7) 
co . u l (W(1 - t)) 1 - ~ 
lI(W(1- t)) -u(A) = Csw + -~-cnw 
I Job placement programmes could affect firms' labour demand through wage subsidies. ~ece~t stud-
ies which are summarised in chapter 3, suggest that these programmes can have substantIal dlsplace-
m;nt effects. which in turn implies that firms' labour demand is not significantly affected by ALMPs. 
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This familiar result says that in the negotiated wage equilibrium the percentage marginal 
benefit of the wage increase to union equals its marginal costs. Marginal costs consist of 
percentage reduction in the survival probability of a union worker due to wage increase, 
tsw' and percentage reduction in profits due to wage increase, t nw' The weight at which 
the profit reduction affects the negotiated outcome depends on union's bargaining 
strength, ~. 
Based on equation (7), wage setting is affected by all variables entering the utility 
function of the union, and all variables entering the profit function of the firm via the 
production function and demand specifications. This hypothesises the general wage rei a-
tion of the form 
(8) 
Pw =J¥C(1-/I), (1 +s), (1 +/2), Bp ' u, r, ~, K, AD). (+) (-) (-) (-) ? (+) (+) (+) (+) 
The signs of these effects are widely known. The income tax rate (t\), the payroll tax 
rate (s), and the indirect tax rate (t2) form the wedge between product and consumer 
W(1 +s)/Pp (1 +s)(1 +t2) hi h d . h· f hAn· 
wages, W(1-tl)/PCpi = (1-t\) ,w c etermmes t e SIgns 0 t ese terms. In-
crease in unemployment benefits, ~, rises union's fallback level introducing an upward 
pressures on wages. Unemployment, u, places downward pressures on union's wage de-
mands because of its adverse effect on an unemployed union worker to get a job else-
where. A rise in union power, ~, gives more strength to unions in wage negotiations 
which creates upward pressures on wages. An increase in capital stock, K, tends to raise 
union's wage demands because of the increased profitability of union workers. Finally, 
aggregate demand is allowed to have a positive effect on wages, but this variable is 
dropped out in empirical estimations. This is consistent with Layard & Nickell (1986) 
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who argued that the firm does not allow short-run fluctuations to affect longer term 
wage negotiations. 
To recall, more accommodative active labour market policy can affect wages 
through several channels which tend to counteract each other (see chapter 3). First, 
ALl\1Ps reduce the welfare loss of being out of work by offering compensation levels 
over unemployment benefits. This in turn tends to increase union's wage demands, see 
Calmfors & Forslund (1991). Second, provided that ALl\1Ps increase the size of the la-
bour force, the increased competition over existent jobs has a downward effect on 
wages. Third, substitution and dead-weight losses of active programmes have also a 
downward effect on wages, due to reduction in regular employment. Since the estimate 
for the impact of ALl\1P on wages captures all these effects, the sign remains ambigu-
ous, a priori. 
4.1.3. Labour Supply 
It is often argued that active programmes prevent hard-to-employ persons becom-
ing discouraged and thus help to keep those persons in connection with the labour mar-
ket. 2 By increasing the effective labour supply ALl\1Ps are expected to create a 
downward pressure on bargained wages through competition over existent jobs; compe-
tition forces insiders to keep their wage demands at the lower level. The impact of active 
programmes on an individual's labour force participation decision, and hence on the size 
of the labour force, can be modelled by the standard labour supply model. An individual 
chooses to consume goods, x, and leisure, 1, to maximise utility U(l,x) subject to the 
budget constraint x = E(W)IP + ZIP, where E(W)IP is the expected wage and ZIP is in-
come received while out of work. Real expected wages are assumed to be determined by 
<pelf, r) (1-;l)W, which says that the expected real wage for an unemployed person is 
See Layard (1986.1990), Layard et. al. (1991), OECD(1993). among others. 
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some fraction of prevailing real market wage. The fraction term, <p, reflects the probabil-
ity of becoming hired, depending negatively on unemployment and positively on 
ALMPs. In a period of high unemployment the competition over jobs is stronger lower-
ing the probability of employment, whilst human capital accumulation and the work ex-
perience offered by active programmes are likely to increase the employment probability. 
The first-order condition for this utility maximisation problem leads to the demand 
. E(W) Z E(W) z . . . 
functIonsl = l( p 'p) and x = x( p 'p)' which gIves a general functIon for labour 
force participation as 
(9) iL W Z L=J ((1-/1), P' u, r,p) 
(-) (-) (?) 
(+) (-) 
An increase in income received while out of work, ;, has a downward effect on partici-
pation by reducing the welfare loss of being out of work. A higher income taxation, 
(l-t1), reduces participation by making the corner solution more probable. The impact of 
unemployment and active programmes on labour supply work through the probability of 
an unemployed person of getting a hire. Since both the employed and the unemployed 
are registered as belonging to the labour force, the participation decision depends cru-
cially on unearned income, which does not include unemployment benefits, BIP. Accord-
ingly, an individual participates the labour force if his reservation wage is less than the 
weighted sum of market wages, W IP, and unemployment benefits, BIP, weighted by the 
employment probability, <p(u,r), i.e., less than (1-/l)[<p(u,r)~+(1-<p(u,r))~] = 
(1- 11)[~ + <p(u, r)( ~ - ~)] . Given that higher unemployment reduces the employment 
probability, <p(u,r), it reduces labour force participation (discouragement effect). Simi-
larly, provided that ALMPs rise the employment probability, they make the labour force 
participation more likely by increasing the required reservation wage for being indiffer-
ent between participation and non-participation. In addition to the preventing effect on 
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discouragement, ALMPs may also be used as a work test, which tends to reduce partici-
pation (see chapter 3). Since these two effects work in different directions, the net effect 
remains uncertain. 
4.2. Empirical Examinations 
As discussed in chapter 3, theoretical reasoning does not offer any clear prediction 
for the net effect of active programmes, so it remains an empirical question. The building 
blocks of our empirical model are theoretical relationships hypothesised in equations (4), 
(8), and (9). Instead of modelling the dynamics of the system through strict theoretical 
formulations, we use an autoregressive distributed lag model of the form 
I k m 
(10) Yt = LYiYt-i + L L 8jixj, t-i + Vt 
i=l j=l i=O 
where 1 and m denote the lag lengths of dependent variable and k exogenous variables, 
respectively. This can be written equivalently as 
I k m r+4 k 
(11) L14Yt = LYiL14Yt-i + L L 8jiL14Xj, t-i + L ai(Yt-i - L ~jiXj,t-i) + Vt , 
i=l ;:=1 i=l i=4 j=l 
h A 80 + 8 1 A 8 i-4 . 5 4 d (1 ) werea4=Y4-1,p4= ,ai=Yi-4, Pi=-y. ,1= , ... ,r+ ,an r=max ,m. 1 -Y4 1-4 
In estimations the error-correction terms, (yt-l - LJ=l ~jiXj,t-i) ,are collected into a sin-
gle error-correction term at lag r, [Y t - (t, 8ji )/( 1 - t, 11)x I-f" This simplification has 
two advantages: it produces results that are easier to interpret especially with respect to 
the long-run equilibrium relationship, and avoids the multicollinearity problem likely to 
be present when estimating trending variables in levels with generous lag lengths. What 
is more, this framework is correctly specified even when variables are non-stationaIj 
3 Preliminary data analysis by unit-root tests, spectral densities, and ARIMA models indicates the 
presence of non-stationarities in variables. For the results of unit -root tests, see appendix 4. I. 
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provided that they are co integrated as proved by the Granger representation theorem, 
see Engle & Granger (1987). 
Some moderations are needed between theoretical and empirical models. First, the 
labour supply effect of ALMPs is examined by employing the size of the labour force as 
a dependent variable. This variable is modified by subtracting the number of programme 
participants from the labour force variable in order to avoid spurious correlation. Sec-
ond, several combinations of demand side factors, such as real money supply, total con-
sumption and competitiveness, were tried in modelling aggregate demand without 
finding any meaningful effect. Our solution to this problem was to adopt the so called 
two sector Scandinavian model, Lindbeck (1979), which introduces the output of the 
closed sector as a demand shift variable into the analysis. Third, the real income while 
out of work, ZIP, is modelled as consisting of unemployment benefits, BIP, and non-
labour assets. However, non-labour assets had to be dropped from estimations because 
of its strong correlation with the wage variable. Fourth, the impact of the capital stock is 
allowed to enter the wage equation through the productivity term measured as capital 
stock per hours worked. This is consistent with Bean et. al. (1986) who argued that 
capital stock must increase faster than the labour input in order to affect real wages. 
Fifth, union power is approximated by union density measured as the ratio of union 
members to the labour force; even though, there are likely to be endogeneity problems 
with this variable, see Booth & ChatteIji (1993), Naylor & Raaum (1993). Estimations 
are carried out by employing seasonally unadjusted quarterly data over the period 
1980Q 1 - 1992Q4 collected from the data set of the Bank of Finland and from various 
publications of the Ministry of Labour. The choice of the estimation period is driven 
purely by the availability of the data. 
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4.2.1. Estimated Wage Equations 
Optimally a non-stationary system, formed from equations such as (11), is esti-
mated by some data-based estimation procedure, such as Johansen (1988). However, in 
the current setting the number of variables made an unrestricted V AR model unmanage-
able, i.e., we faced a trade off between omission of theoretically relevant variables and a 
priori restrictions based on theory. For that reason, we were forced to estimate the coin-
tegrating vectors by static OLS estimations which can be shown to be asymptotically 
consistent for the parameters in the current context. It has to noted, however, that this 
superconsistency property may require large amount of observations to introduce negli-
gible bias, see Banerjee et. ai. (1993). Since, the estimation procedure adopted in this 
study is inevitably the second best, we try to ease the problems connected to finite sam-
pIes (Banerjee et. aI., 1986) and endogeneitl (Banerjee et. aI., 1993) by experimenting 
with dynamic models and by instrumenting some potentially endogenous variables when 
estimating cointegrating vectors5. Dynamic models may also alleviate the problem of 
non-standard distributions of the coefficient estimates when modelling non-stationary 
variables with static regressions (Banerjee et. ai. 1993, p. 167 - 168). 
Due to super-consistency, endogeneity does not asymptotically affect the parameter estimates in 
static cointegrating regressions. However, it may be a problem in finite samples (Banerjee et. al. 1993). 
The results of the unreported estimations, in which instrumented variables were replaced by their unin-
strumented counterparts, are well in line with the results reported in tables 4.1 and 4.2. 
5 Some confidence on the results reported in tables 4.1 and 4.2 is gained by experiments with system 
estimation methods. The estimated parameter values for key variables obtained by employing 3SLS esti-
mation method are Ln(WfHPp) = -O.061n(UlL) - O.121n(RIL) + ZI; In(L) = -O.021n(U/L) + O.lOln(RIL) + 
O.20ln(WfHPp) + Z2; In(E/K) = -1.271n(WlHPp) + Z3. Notes: All parru.neter estin:ates are signifi.cant, ~.\:­
eluding the unemployment variable (UIL) in the labour supply equatIon; EquatIons pass all nu~spectfi­
cation tests as a system, but there are some indications of autocorrelation in single equatIOn test 
statistics; Unreported parameters (Zs) are also well in line with the results reported in tables 2 and 3. 
We also experimented with various dummies to represent the 1987 Employment Act. None of these en-
tered the cointegrating regressions reported in tables ~.l and 4.2. 
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Table 4.1 Estimated Wage Equations. 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) 
Ln(wlH) 
Pp 
Ln(wlH) 
Pp 
Ln(W/H) 
Pp 
Ln(W/H)a 
Pp 
Ln(W/H) 
Pp 
Ln(W/H) 
Pp 
Ln(W/H) 
Pp Ln(:;) 
Const -0.36 (0.32) 0.15 (0.15) 0.14 (0.15) -0.62 (0.70) -0.11 (0.37) 0.06 (0.35) 3.66 (0.30) 1.31 (0.47) 
Ln(: ) 0.27 (0.15) - -p 0.29 (0.37) 0.01 (0.16) -0.08 (0.14) 0.66 (0.13) 0.47 (0.22) 
[,n(~)* 
-0.22 (0.05) -0.16 (0.04) -0.15 (0.04) -0.17 (0.11) - - -0.40 (0.05) -0.29 (0.08) 
/,n( ¥r -0.04 (0.02) -0.05 (0.02) -0.05 (0.02) -0.09 (0.08) - -0.11 (0.01) -0.08 (0.02) -0.13 (0.03) 
Ln(L~U)* 0.03 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) - 0.03 (0.04) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.07 (0.01) 0.06 (0.02) 
Ln(1+s) -1.16 (0.77) -0.94 (0.78) -2.01 (0.47) -1.62 (3.10) -1.29 (0.93) -0.79 (0.90) -0.74 (0.36) -1. 90 (1. 1 ~ ) 
Ln(l+~) -0.91 (0.55) -0.63 (0.54) -0.56 (0.55) -0.50 (1.87) -0.58 (0.65) -0.65 (0.65) -0.96 (0.63) -1.13 (0.82) 
Ln(l-tJ -0.45 (0.27) -0.63 (0.54) -0.51 (0.22) -1.07 (0.94) -0.35 (0.33) -0.21 (0.32) -1.14 (0.32) -0.43 (0.41) 
Ln(~) 1.08 (0.08) 1.20 (0.05) 1.24 (0.05) 1.09 (0.17) 1.21 (0.10) 1.20 (0.09) 0.88 (0.10) 0.94 (0.13) 
Ln(R~U) 
- -
- -
-0.16 (0.03) - -
Ln(I-acc) - - - - -0.00 (0.07) - - -
Diagnostics 
------
R2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.95 
DW 1.5~ 1.52 1.56 2.01 1.27 1.32 2.26 1.28 
I 0.81 [0.52] 0.98 [0.42] 1.06 [OAO] 1.62 [0.19] 1.26 [0.30] 0.39 [0.81] AR\ 
I 
1.02 l().~OI 2A~ [0.061 
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Table 4.1 Estimated Wage Equations. 
ARCH4 l.36 [0.26] l.84 [0.14] 2.06 [0.10] 0.32 [0.85] 0.50 [0.73] 0.17 [0.94] 0.79 [0.54] 0.95 [0.44] 
J-B 0.35 [0.83] l.83 [0.40] 0.36 [0.83] 0.25 [0.87] l.05 [0.58] 0.41 [0.81] 0.49 [0.78] 0.31 [0.85] 
HET 0.41 [0.96] 0.40 [0.96] 0.42 [0.95] nla 0.40 [0.97] 0.76 [0.71] 0.75 [0.72] 0.33 [0.98] 
I 
RESET 9.88 [0.00] 3.24 [0.08] 4.85 [0.03] 0.02 [0.88] 15.86 [0.00] 15.18 [0.00] 5.88 [0.02] 8.00 [0.00] 
DFI -5.29++ -5.23++ -5.49++ -7.08++ -4.70++ -4.67++ -5.28++ -4.79++ 
DF 2 -5.24h -5.19++ -5.48++ -7.01++ -4.64++ -4.62++ -5.21++ -4.74++ 
DF3 -5.19++ -5.15++ -5.48++ -6.91++ -4.61 ++ -4.59++ -5.15++ -4.72++ 
ADF 1 -3.88++ -3.82++ -3.29++ -3.44++ -3.4r+ -3.09++ -2.93++ -3.66++ 
ADF2 -3.90+ -3.8Y+ -3.39+ -3.38+ -3.44++ -3.08++ -2.90 -3.71++ 
ADF3 -3.81+ -3.75+ -3.29 -3.21 -3.33 -2.94 -2.89 -3.63++ 
Notes: (a) Estimates are obtained as a long-run solution of the ADL(2,2) model. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Starred variables are instrumented. The instru-
ment set consists of the lagged values of variables introduced in the theoretical models in sections 4.1.1 - 4.l.3. Estimation method is OLS in which the fitted values of the in-
strumented variables are included as regressors. All the reported models include seasonal dummies which control for seasonal variation in quarterly data employed in 
estimations. Acc refers to the accommodative stance. The tests are as follows: DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic for the first order autocorrelation, ~ is the LM test for the ith 
order autocorrelation; ARCH, is the test statistic for the ith order autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity; J-B is the Jarque - Bera test statistic for normality; HET is the 
White's heteroscedasticity test; RESET is the test statistic for the functional form. P-values are reported next to test statistics. DF 1 (DF 2, DF 3) is the Dickey-Fuller test for 
the stationarity of residuals which does not include a constant (includes a constant, includes a constant and a trend). ADFs are the corresponding augmented Dickey-Fuller 
tests for the stationarity of residuals which are derived from the DF tests by adding five lagged differences into estimations. In stationarity tests one (five) per cent significance 
is marked bv ++ (+). The estimations were carried out by using PC-GIVE 8.0 (Doornik & Hendry, 1994). For variable definitions, please see the data appcndi:\. 
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The estimated long-run wage relations are reported in table 4.1. In terms of diag-
nostic tests all error terms are well behaved, and stationary, but some equations suffer 
from functional form problems as indicated by low p-values in the Reset test. However, 
since the estimated parameter values are well in line with a priori expectations, esti-
mated long-run wage relations are rather satisfactory. 
It is surprising to find that, regardless of the exact specification, active pro-
grammes seem to have a large, well determined, downward effect on wages. It is even 
more surprising that the downward pressure created by active programmes, R/L, ex-
ceeds that of open unemployment, U/L, being in strong contrast to Swedish time series 
studies which tend to give wage increasing effects for active programmes, see Calmfors 
(1993). Since the result is unexpected, we put it under scrutiny by several means. First, 
we examined whether the estimated impact of active programmes depends on other vari-
ables which might drive the results through their close connection to the decision to par-
ticipate a programme. This was modelled by excluding the unemployment benefits 
variable, BIP p' and the long-term unemployment variable, L TUIU, from the estimations 
in columns (b) and (c). There are some indications that these variables magnify the esti-
mated effect of ALl\1Ps on wages, but the qualitative outcome remains. Second, it may 
be that the sample period employed in this study is too short for estimating long-run re-
lations via static regressions, in which case the parameter estimates could be severely bi-
ased. Since the dynamic modelling strategy for estimating long-run relations is found to 
be less sensitive to small sample bias, we estimated an ADL(2,2) model in column (d). 
The long-run solution of this model also suggests that more accommodating labour mar-
ket policy has a wage reducing effect, but with a less pronounced parameter estimate. 
Third, instead of controlling for open unemployment and measuring active programmes 
as the ratio of participants to labour force, we estimated the wage equation by including 
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the total unemployment variable and the accommodative stance variable as regressors. 
The results reported in column (e) confirm that ALMPs have a downward effect on 
wages6, since it seems to be total unemployment rather than open unemployment which 
determines wages. Fourth, we experimented by estimating the wage equation without 
the ALMP variable. Even though, this specification indicates higher responsiveness of 
wages with respect to open unemployment, the effect remains smaller than any of the es-
timated impacts for the ALMP variable. Fifth, since the majority of participants in job 
placement programmes work in the public sector, we examined whether it makes a dif-
ference to estimate the wage equation for the private sector only. According to the re-
sults reported in column (g), the downward effect of ALMPs on wages is even greater 
in the private sector. Finally, because the dependent variable is measured as hourly 
wages, it is possible that the wage setting specification is picking up the situation where 
changes in working hours are driving the results. Especially, since the estimation period 
covers two OEeD recessions, when working hours per employee tend to become longer 
affecting labour demand, and hence also programme participation. This possibility is ex-
amined in column (h), and once again the negative parameter estimate for the active pro-
grammes variable remains. 
According to other parameter estimates, unemployment benefits, BIP, have a 
wage increasing effect. Unemployment rate, U/L, reduces union's wage demands, the 
long-run coefficient varying from -0.04 to -0.13. The estimates which indicate some re-
sistance of unemployment in union wage demands are higher than in previous Finnish 
studies which report the parameter estimates around -0.04, see Pehkonen (1991), being 
6 The discussion in chapter 3 revealed that if we denote the ALMP variable by r, and open unemploy-
ment variable bv u. the wage equation in column (e) becomes Ln(W)=aLn(r+u)+pLn(l-r/(r+u». This 
can be written ~quivalently as Ln(W)=(a-p)Ln(r+u)+pLn(u). The insignificance of the P coefficient 
implies that only total unemployment affects wages. which in turn indicates that open unemployment 
and ALMPs have the same effect on wages. 
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closer to the results reported for instance in Nickell (1987) and Calmfors & Forslund 
(1991). The third 'unemployment variable' used in estimations is the proportion of long 
term unemployed persons in open unemployment, LTUIU. There are some indications 
that an increase in long-term unemployment rises wages, but this effect is quite modest 
and not extremely well determined across different specifications. Finally, the results 
concerning taxation variables are well in line with previous studies. Higher income taxes, 
t1, add to wage pressures, the effect being around half of the initial impact, on average. 
More than half of a rise in employers' taxes, s, is shifted backwards to lower wages. In-
direct taxes, t2, contribute by lowering wages, whilst also raising labour costs as indi-
cated by parameter estimates below the unity, in absolute values. 
The discussion above suggests that active labour market policy reduces wage 
pressures, which in turn has a beneficial effect on employment. One has to notice, how-
ever, that the parameter values are end-point estimates for the period during which un-
employment more than quadrupled. Further doubts on the recursive stability of 
estimated parameters is cast by changes in economic policy, such as deregulation of 
credit markets and a general shift towards more disinflatory policies, both of which oc-
curred in the 1980s. For the above reasons, we estimated our most preferred wage equa-
tion, reported in column (b), recursively. The recursive parameter values of the key 
variables for this study, viz. the open unemployment variable and the ALMP variable, 
are presented in figure 4.1, together with their standard errors multiplied by tw07. 
7 Even though the parameter estimates are asymptotically unbiased. the reported standard errors ha~·e 
to be considered as tentative due to the presence of unit roots which typically induces non-standard dIS-
tributions of the coefficient estimates. 
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Figure 4.1 Recursive Estimates of Key Variables in the Wage Equation. 
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The finding that active programmes do not have any significant effect on wages 
during the era of low unemployment confirms the results reported in previous studies in 
which the relation between active programmes and wage setting in Finland has been ana-
lysed, see table A3.2 in chapter 3. The unimportant open unemployment effect on wages 
during the 1980s is not a total outlier either, see Pehkonen (1991). It is interesting to 
note that the time path for the AL:rv1P variable seems to depend negatively on the gen-
eral unemployment situation having the wage reducing effect when unemployment is 
high, whilst increasing wages when unemployment is low. This gives some support for 
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the views expressed in Calmfors (1993), according to whom active programmes may be 
more favourable at higher levels of unemployment. 
4.2.2. Estimated Labour Supply and Labour Demand Equations 
Table 4.2 reports the estimated labour supply equations in columns (i) - (1), and 
the estimated labour demand equations in columns (m) - (p). The static long-run labour 
force relations reported in columns (i) and (j) differ by the inclusion of total population 
at working age variable, N, which is included to control for demographic factors of la-
bour supply. The inclusion of this variable causes some changes both in static regres-
sions and in dynamic regressions which are reported in columns (k) and (1). However, 
dynamic regressions seem to be more robust to the inclusion, since the additional vari-
able turns out to be insignificant with an unrealistic parameter estimate of -4.09. 
When it comes to other parameters, the most robust result is the negative effect of 
unemployment benefits on the size of the labour force. The interpretation of this finding 
is by no means clear, given that labour force participation is a requirement for claiming 
unemployment benefits. One explanation for the strong presence of the unemployment 
benefit variable in the labour force equation may be connected to the practically unlim-
ited duration of unemployment assistance benefits in Finland, which might have length-
ened unemployment spells when higher compensation levels have been introduced. This 
in turn might have affected the labour force via the discouragement of the long-term un-
employed. Another fairly well established effect is that higher real wages expand the size 
of the labour force, hypothesising the upward sloping labour supply schedule. Finally, 
there are some indications that an increase in income taxation, t l , reduces the size of the 
labour force, but this effect is found only in static cointegrating regressions. 
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Table 4.2 Estimated Labour Demand and Labour Supply Equations. 
(i) (j) (k) (1) (m) (n) (0) (P) 
Ln(L) Ln(L) Ln(Lt Ln(Lt Ln(E/K) Ln(E/K) Ln(E/K)8 Ln(E/K)8 
Const. 4.90 (0.06) -2.59 (1.72) 4.96 (0.17) 22.81 (41.71) -2.48 (0.64) -1.55 (0.37) -1. 90 (0.55) -1.88 (0.35) 
Ln(:D) -0.26 (0.02) -0.12 (0.03) -0.29 (0.06) -0.91 (1.23) - - - -
Ln(¥)* -0.009 (0.004) 0.006 (0.01) -0.06 (0.03) -0.02 (0.05) - - - -
Ln(y)* 0.01 (0.01) -0.009 (0.01) 0.16 (0.07) 0.29 (0.50) - - - -
Ln(wlH) PD 0.24 (0.01) 0.02 (0.04) 0.12 (0.05) 0.83 (1.33) - - - -
t1 -0.67 (0.12) -0.25 (0.11) - -0.78 (l.40) - - - -
Ln(N) 
- 1.69 (0.35) - -4.09 (9.57) - - - -
Ln(W/~:+S» 
- - - - -1.18 (0.07) -1.11 (0.08) -1.05 (0.11) -1.05 (0.07) 
Ln(USRC) - - - - 0.008 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) 0.04 (0.02) 0.04 (0.01) 
Ln(Pmpr) 
- - - -
-0.18 (0.08) -0.29 (0.05) -0.20 (0.07) -0.20 (0.05) Pp 
LN(QrxIJ - - - - 0.11 (0.06) - 0.00 (0.06) -
I )iagnostics 
R2 0.82 0.91 0.93 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.99 0.99 
DW 1.35 1.54 2.20 2.10 1.25 1.25 1.62 1.64 
AR1 1.38 [0.25] 0.67 [0.61] 2.55 [0.06] 2.31 [0.04] 2.09 [0.10] 2.44 [0.06] 0.70 [0.59] 0.50 [0.131 
ARCII4 0.71 [0.58] 0.40 [0.80] 1.24 [0.31] 0.08 [0.98] 0.52 [0.72] 0.63 [0.64] 0.12 [0.97] 0.16 [0.951 
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Table 4.2 Estimated Labour Demand and Labour Supply Equations. 
J-B 0.80 [0.66] 0.81 [0.66] 3.33 [0.18] 0.48 [0.78] 6.19 [0.04] 7.60 [0.02] 0.48 [0.78] 0.69 [0.20] 
HET 0.88 [0.57] 0.72 [0.75] 0.56 [0.88] nJa 1.74 [0.11] 2.15 [0.05] nJa 0.22 [0.91] 
RESET 0.85 [0.36] nJa 0.14 [0.70] nJa 46.32 [0.00] 40.56 [0.00] 33.75 [0.00] 17.54 [0.00] 
DF 1 -5.54++ -5.25++ -7.44++ -7.54++ -4.30++ -4.36++ -6.90++ -6.85++ 
DF2 -5.67++ -5.27++ -7.36++ -7.63++ -4.25++ -4.31++ -6.81++ -6.77++ 
DF3 -6.36++ -5.61++ -7.28++ -7.55++ -4.22++ -4.32++ -6.73++ -6.69++ 
ADF 1 -4.07++ -4.27++ -4.41 ++ -4.13++ -2.29+ -1.99+ -2.66++ -2.16+ 
ADF2 -4.32++ -4.35++ -4.20++ -3.95++ -2.20 -1.93 -2.63 -2.13 
ADF3 -4.87++ -4.62+ -4.09++ -3.84+ -1.99 -1.62 -2.59 -2.08 
Notes: see table 4 .1. For variable definitions, please see the data appendix. The instrument set of Qpub consists of lagged values of the general government output, import prices, 
user cost of capital, general government employment, general government productivity, and general government hourly wages. 
89 
Turning next to the group of variables reflecting unemployment. The unemploy-
ment rate itself does not seem to have any great influence on labour force. Only the 
specification reported in column (k) gives a well determined downward effect of unem-
ployment on the size of the labour force. When it comes to the relatively unstudied as-
pect of active programmes, namely their role in determining the size of the labour force, 
the results are somewhat mixed. According to static specifications, ALMPs have not af-
fected the labour force. However, estimated dynamic models suggest that ALMPs have 
a quite substantial, statistically significant, labour force expanding effect. As discussed 
above, the dynamic regressions seems to be more robust to changes in specification. In 
what follows, both of these specifications are used in examining the effect of ALMPs on 
unemployment in section 4.3. 
The estimated labour demand equations are presented in columns (m) - (p) in ta-
ble 4.2. The standard assumption of constant returns to scale technology, which hy-
pothesises the unit elasticity of capital stock in the labour demand equation, is adopted 
also in this study. Estimated equations pass all diagnostic tests, excluding the test for 
functional form (Reset). This is explained by the rapid deterioration of employment 
which happened during the last two years of the estimation period, equations passing all 
misspecification tests when the last few observations are excluded from estimations. Pa-
rameter estimates are remarkably similar between static and dynamic models, excluding 
the variable which captures the effect of the closed sector output on labour demand. De-
spite this, the performance of the closed sector output variable dominates other demand 
shift variables. 
In each of the estimated labour demand equations, the real labour cost variable 
has a suspiciously large, one-to-one, impact on labour demand. The reason for this is the 
parameter instability caused by the extreme observations in the 1990s, as shown below 
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An increase in user cost of capital, USRC, seems to have a small beneficial effect on em-
ployment. Finally raw materials, approximated by the real import prices variable, 
P mp/Pp, have a downward effect on labour demand; the long-run coefficient being 
around -0.20. 
In order to examine the stability of parameters, we estimated the long-run labour 
supply and labour demand equations recursively. The time paths of the key variables for 
this study are graphed in figures 4.2 and 4.3 for the models reported in columns (k) and 
(m). 
Figure 4.2 Recursive Estimates of Key Variables in the Labour Force Equation. 
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Figure 4.2 Recursive Estimates of Key Variables in the Labour Force Equation. 
The Recursive Time Path of the wage variable, lo(W/HPP) 
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Figure 4.2 Recursive Estimates of Key Variables in the Labour Force Equation. 
The Recursive Time Path ofthe unemployment variable, In(U/L) 
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Figure 4.3 Recursive Estimates of the Wage Variable in the Labour Demand Equation. 
Tbe Recursive Time Patb of tbe wag. variable, W /H(l +S)Pp 
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The recursive estimates for the labour supply equation are quite stable, the esti-
mates staying within the two times standard error lines. Unemployment, U/L, seems to 
have a significant downward effect on the size of the labour force only after the year 
1992 when unemployment rate rose well above 10 per cent. This indicates that the dis-
couragement effect has been negligible during the late 1980s. Having said that, the re-
cursive time path for the ALMP variable, RIL, suggests that active labour market 
policies adopted in Finland have managed to increase the labour force, that is to prevent 
discouragement. It is interesting to note, that the beneficial effect of ALMPs has in-
creased in the late 1980s when the unemployment rate was unusually low. Finally, the 
positive wage effect on the size of the labour force is well established, the long-run coef-
ficient centring around 0.15. As a final remark on the recursive estimates for the long-
run labour force equation, we say that the dynamic estimates are superior to the static 
ones in terms of parameter stability, unlike in estimated long-run wage relations. 
If the recursive estimates for the labour force equation are stable, this is not the 
case for the estimated labour demand equations. In all specifications reported in columns 
(m) - (p), the key variable for our purposes, the elasticity of labour demand with respect 
to wages, is extremely stable during the 1980s, the long-run elasticity being -0.13 -
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-0. 14. After the unemployment situation started to deteriorate at the 1990s, the real 
wage elasticity of labour demand increased substantially, the latest observations indicat-
ing a one-to-one relation across different specifications. 
4.3. The Effect of Active Programmes on Open Unemployment 
To conclude the discussion so far. First, recursive estimates cast some doubts on 
fixed parameter assumptions. Second, there are some implications that active pro-
grammes have a downward effect on wages during the era of high unemployment. Dur-
ing the era of low unemployment this effect was negligible. Third, the results suggest 
that active labour market policies expand the size of the labour force. Fourth, the real 
wage elasticity of labour demand has increased considerably during the period of high 
unemployment. Hence, active programmes might have some beneficial effect on open 
unemployment in the 1990s through their wage resistance impact which in turn seems to 
have a substantial effect on labour demand. However, on the other side of the coin is the 
expanding impact of ALMPs on the size of the labour force, which tends to increase 
open unemployment. In order to examine the relative magnitudes of these effects, we re-
write the estimated long-run relations as 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
WIH R U Ln(p) =a1Ln(L)+a2Ln(L)+Zl 
p 
WIH Ln(E) =y1Ln(p)+Z3 . 
p 
The variables expressed in equations (12) - (14) are as follows: WIH is the real 
Pp 
U R hourly product wage; Land L denote the open unemployment rate and the programme 
participation rate, respectively; L is the labour force of which programme participants 
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have been subtracted out; E is total employment thought of reflecting labour demand; 
and finally Zs' include all other parameters used in estimations. After using the identity 
Ln(E) = Ln(1-VIL) + Ln(L), the elasticity of open unemployment with respect to active 
programmes can be obtained in two steps. First, employment and wage variables are 
substituted out from equation (13). Second, the total differential is taken with respect to 
the open unemployment rate (UIL = u) and the programme participation rate (R/L = r). 
After these steps the elasticity measure becomes 
(15) 
According to equation (15), the effect of active programmes on open unemploy-
ment depends on the responsiveness of both wages and labour force to changes in open 
unemployment and programme participants, together with the level of unemployment 
and the real wage elasticities of labour supply and labour demand. The evaluation of the 
elasticity measure is presented in figure 4.4 below. 
There are two evaluations of active programmes in figure 4.4: a 'pessimistic' one 
and an 'optimistic' one. In the latter specification (columns b, i & m) the labour force ex-
panding effect of ALMPs is estimated as being modest, whereas in the former specifica-
tion (columns b, k & m) it turned out to be substantial. The particular choice of other 
equations used in evaluation is immaterial due to the robustness of key variables across 
different specifications in wage and labour demand equations. The time paths, generated 
by different parameter estimates for the ALMP variable in static and in dynamic labour 
supply models~ illustrate well the conflict between different targets that active labour 
market policies can have. If the main interest is in preventing discouragement, the effect 
of ALMPs on unemployment deteriorates, and vice versa. 
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Figure 4.4 The Elasticity of Open Unemployment with Respect to Active Labour Mar-
ket Programmes. 
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Turning next to the main issue of interest, the results strongly suggest that Finnish 
active labour market policy has not helped to reduce open unemployment during the late 
1980s. The estimated elasticity of open unemployment with respect to active pro-
grammes varies from 0.05 to 0.5 according to the 'pessimistic view', the corresponding 
figures being 0.5 and 3 for the 'optimistic view'. Having said that, estimates tend to be-
come more and more favourable towards the end of the sample. At the last period both 
specifications suggest a downward effect of ALMPs on open unemployment, elasticity 
measures varying from -0.1 to -0.8. There are, however, some indications that the pace, 
at which ALMPs became more beneficial, started to slow down at the end of the estima-
tion period. One explanation for this may be connected to decreasing marginal returns 
for which active programmes are likely to be exposed, Calmfors (1994) . 
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All in all, figure 4.4 gives some support for the views expressed in Calmfors 
(1993, 1994), i.e. that active programmes are likely to be more effective in the high un-
employment situation than in the low unemployment situation. At the end of the 1980s, 
when the unemployment rate in Finland varied between 3 and 5 per cent, the results sug-
gest that active programmes worsened open unemployment. When unemployment 
started to increase in the 1990s, the results show some beneficial effects for active la-
bour market policies in reducing open unemployment. 
It is informative to employ end point elasticity estimates in evaluating the impact 
of active labour market policy on the number of persons openly unemployed. The exact 
number of participants in the fourth quarter of 1992 is 88610 persons, the level of open 
unemployment being 417 600. The results reported above imply that a 10 per cent in-
crease in the number of programme participants would reduce open unemployment by 8 
(1) per cent according to the 'optimistic' case, (,pessimistic' case). This in turn suggests 
that more accommodative policy reduces open unemployment by 4 000 - 33 400 per-
sons depending on the exact model employed in calculations. One has to consider these 
figures as tentative, but as such they indicate that an increase in programme participants 
has to be sizeable in order to have any significant effect on unemployment. It would be 
interesting to know how this finding compares with active labour market policies 
adopted in other countries, but this is left for further research. 
4.4. Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter we have examined the effect of active labour market programmes 
on wage-setting and labour supply. By this means, we have incorporated two popular 
views of active programmes into a small supply side model that we have employed in 
calculating indirectly the impact of active programmes on unemployment. The main 
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findings reported in this chapter can be summarised as follows: (i) some of the estimated 
equilibrium relationships indicate that active programmes increase labour supply giving 
some empirical support for the views of AL:rvtPs preventing discouragement among un-
employed persons expressed in Layard (1986, 1990) and Jackman et. al. (1990), among 
others. However, the finding has to be treated with caution due to large elasticity meas-
ures reported in figure 4.4; (ii) the impact of active programmes on wage-setting behav-
iour seems to depend on the level of unemployment, being positive when unemployment 
is low and negative when unemployment is high; (iii) based on parameter estimates, ac-
tive labour market programmes have only modest effect on total unemployment. Hence, 
it is easy to agree with Calmfors (1994), according to whom most countries in Western 
Europe could do better with more active programmes, but not a lot better. They are not 
a 'miracle cure'. 
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Appendix 4.1. The Results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests. 
Variable 1980 - 1992 1980 - 1989 
Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 Test 1 Test 2 Test 3 
Ln(WlHPp) -0.89 -3.73· -0.55 0.16 -2.52 0.06 
-1.16 -5.85· -0.52 -0.98 -5.67· -0.47 
Ln(BIPp) 0.95 -1.37 1.13 1.62 0.00 1.61 
0.62 -1.41 0.85 0.46 -0.75 1.68 
Ln(U/L) -1.80 -2.31 -1.97 -2.00 -1.10 -1.42 
0.93 0.29 2.17 -2.36 -2.86 0.26 
Ln(R/L) -1.87 -2.16 -l.35 -3.36· -3.22 -2.84 
-0.53 0.29 1.31 -3.84· -3.88· -2.11 
Ln(LTUIU) -3.05 -4.03· -2.89 -2.30 -1.66 -2.19 
-0.17 -2.03 -1.07 -1.54 -1.53 -1.47 
Ln(1+s) 0.41 -2.31 0.42 0.49 -1.77 -0.48 
0.33 -2.70 0.36 -0.55 -2.32 -0.53 
Ln(1 +t2) -0.90 -0.20 -0.87 0.64 -0.79 0.51 
-4.53· -4.43· -3.95· -3.13· -4.49· 
-2.86 
Ln(1-tj) -2.57 -3.10 -2.20 -1.90 -2.79 -1.34 
-1.78 -2.15 -1.74 -1.93 -2.34 -1.62 
Ln(K/H) 0.31 -1.96 0.78 0.75 -3.16 0.73 
1.07 -1.03 2.27 -0.05 -6.69· 0.37 
Ln( (R +U)/L) -1.21 -1.98 -1.34 -2.69 -1.92 -1.91 
1.74 0.98 2.11 -2.23 -2.41 -1.23 
Ln(l-acc) -0.72 -0.90 -0.98 -1.56 -1.43 -1.42 
-1.03 -1.50 1.01 -3.32" -3.66" -0.82 
Ln(L) -1.76 -0.85 -1.47 -2.15 -1.82 -2.01 
-1.37 -1.33 -1.55 -2.78 -2.73 -2.54 
Ln(EIK) 1.91 -0.02 1.85 1.83 -1.08 1.67 
5.85 1.59 5.86 1.14 -2.18 1.08 
Ln(USRC) -1.01 -1.79 -1.54 -1.54 -1.62 -1.45 
-1.01 -1.95 -1.59 -1.71 -1.76 -1.66 
Ln(P mp/Pp) -1.95 -l.34 -1.61 1.42 -1.22 1.30 
-1.66 -1.78 -1.32 -0.11 -2.95 1.00 
Ln(Qpub) -1.88 -1.69 -l.81 0.76 -1.63 0.35 
-2.17 -0.61 -3.82" -0.39 -3.16" -0.29 
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Ln(N) -0.17 -2.65 -0.43 -2.85 -1.42 -2.61 
-0.35 -1.00 -0.85 -5.13* -1.82 -5.13* 
Notes: Test 1 (Test 2, Test 3) refers to the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test in which a constant (constant 
and trend, constant and seasonal dummies) are included among the regressors. All test are implemented 
by adding five lagged differences among the regressors. The test statistics in italics refer to the corre-
sponding Dickey-Fuller tests in which the lag length is zero. The critical values are based on the re-
sponse surfaces in MacKinnon (1991). Five per cent significance is marked by *. 
100 
Data Appendix 
Data source: The data set of the Bank of Finland ifnot otherwise mentioned. 
W: Wages and salaries, FIM millions. 
H: Perfomed working hours, millions of hours. 
P p: Valued added deflator at factor costs. 
B: The level of unemployment benefits, an index was made available to me by Hannu Tanninen. 
R: The number of persons in ALMPs, R = persons employed with selective measures + Persons 
on employment training, Finnish Labour Review, Ministry of Labour. 
U: Unemployment, 1000 persons. 
L: Labour force, L = Labour force - the number of participants in job placement programmes, 
1000 persons. 
acc: Accommodative stance, R/(R+U). 
LTU: Long-term unemployment, duration of unemployment exceeded 1 year, Finnish Labour Re-
view, Ministry of Labour. 
SOCC: Employers' social security contributions, FIM millions. 
s: Employers' tax rate, s = SOCCIW. 
t1: Average income tax rate. 
GDPF: GDP at factor costs, millions of 1985 FIM. 
TIN: Indirect taxes minus subsidies, millions of 1985 FIM. 
t2: Indirect tax rate, t2 = GDPFiTIN. 
K: Net stock offixed capital, millions of 1985 FIM. 
N: Population of working age (15-74 years), 1000 persons. 
E: Employment, 1000 persons. 
USRC: User cost offixed capital. 
P mpr: Import prices of raw materials. 
Qpub : Production at factor cost, general government, millions of 1985 FIM. 
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CHAPTERS 
The Impact of Active Labour market Programmes on 
Repeat Unemployment Incidence 
One of the most worrying aspects of unemployment is that the unemployed who 
manage to get hired have a high risk of returning to unemployment. This is highlighted 
in Layard, Nickell & Jackman (1991) who report that 41 per cent of British men in the 
1987 cohort who found a job within the first 9 months also experienced a repeat unem-
ployment spell within that time. The study by Zweimuller & Winter-Ebmer (1996) re-
ports similar results for Austria; 46 per cent of unemployment leavers returned back to 
unemployment within 12 months in 1986. The instability of early work careers is further 
confirmed by the finding that employees who have been in a job less than a year are 
some six times more likely to become unemployed than average workers, Stem (1983). 
Since the proportion of unemployment leavers renewing their unemployment within 
a relatively short period of time is substantial, the phenomenon is not likely to arise 
from the pure optimising behaviour of individuals. The study by Stern (1986) lends sup-
port to the view that individuals suffering from unstable work careers are likely to have 
some unfavourable characteristics which worsen their labour market possibilities. If this 
is the case, then public sector intervention through active labour market policy may be 
effective in reducing the participants' risk of returning to unemployment, provided that 
active labour market programmes increase human capital and/or improve the work hab-
its of hard-to-employ persons. 
As discussed in chapter 3, there is a large literature evaluating the effects of active 
labour market programmes on earnings, and less extensive examining the employment 
status impact of active programmes. However, their impact on repeat unemployment 
incidence has remained relatively unexplored!. In a few studies the hazard function 
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approach has been adopted in modelling the effect of training programmes on the dura-
tion of employment (Ridder 1986, Card & Sullivan 1988, Gritz 1993, Ham & LaLonde 
1996). These studies report some beneficial effects of active programmes, but this view 
is by no means universal. A rival approach is adopted in Zweimuller & Winter-Ebmer 
(1996) who employed cross-sectional methods in examining the stability of a work ca-
reef. According to their findings training programmes have a substantial beneficial effect 
on the stability of the participants' work career within the first 12 months. 
This chapter adopts the probabilistic framework in evaluating the impact of ALJ\..1Ps 
on job stability. The starting point for the analysis is the bivariate probit model employed 
in Zweimuller & Winter-Ebmer (1996). The standard bivariate probit model is then gen-
eralised by loosening the assumptions of homoskedasticity and constant programme ef-
fect across individuals. In addition, the reliability of the results is put under scrutiny by 
constructing various misspecification tests including the test for the distributional as-
sumption of bivariate normality. Our main reason for preferring cross-sectional analysis 
to more sophisticated hazard function estimations is the ability to deal with self-
selectivity within the well established framework. In hazard function estimations the en-
dogenous selection of programme participants requires strong assumptions to produce 
analytically convenient models unless analysis is based on experimental data, see chapter 
32 . Another advantage of the adopted framework arises from the possibility of construct-
ing a test for the distributional assumptions. We believe that these two gains more than 
outweigh the loss of being able to assess active programmes only at some single point of 
time. 
I There is, however, a large literature examining repeat unemployment incidence through state de-
pendence, see Heckman & Borjas (1980), Narendranathan & Elias (1993), and Belzil (1995), among 
others. 
2 Recent examples of hazard function analyses in which experimental data is employed in controlling 
for endogenous selection are Ham & LaLonde (1996) and Dolton & O'Neill (1996). 
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The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In section 5.1, two ways of 
modelling the programme effect are discussed. Section 5.2 introduces the data. Section 
5.3 reports the estimates of programme participation and repeat unemployment inci-
dence. Section 5.4 takes a closer look at the possible gains of active labour market pro-
grammes. Finally, section 5.5 concludes the study. 
5.1. Empirical Model 
The problem with non-experimental evaluation studies is one of missing informa-
tion; we do not observe the participants' counterfactual outcomes. To overcome this 
problem one needs a control group which is thought of as representing the labour mar-
ket outcome of participants had they not participated in a programme. What makes the 
estimation of the programme effect more involved is that the decision to participate in a 
programme is endogenous to a given individual, see Bassi (1983), Bjorklund & Moffitt 
(1987), Dolton et. al. (1994b), Gritz (1993), inter alia. Unless this individual behaviour 
is incorporated in evaluation models, the estimated effects of active labour market pro-
grammes are potentially biased. The direction of bias depends on unobservable charac-
teristics influencing both the participation decision and the outcome under evaluation. If 
participants are more motivated and/or more capable than controls, the estimated pro-
gramme effect is biased upwards. In the contrary case the programme effect is biased 
downwards. Below we present two ways of taking individual self-selectivity into ac-
count. The difference between the models arises from the assumptions required in mod-
elling the programme effect. 
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5.1.1. The Bivariate Probit Model 
There are underlying response variables p'" and u "', which measure the propensity to 
participate in a programme (p"'), and the propensity to renew unemployment (u"'). Our 
information consists only of whether or not some particular event occurred, so we ob-
serve mere signs of these latent variables via indicator functions Ui = 1 u· >0 and 
I 
Pi = 1 p; >0 . In a usual manner, variables explaining the participation decision and the re-
peat unemployment incidence are introduced into the model via linear index functions 
x~ and Zy. If we further assume that the programme effect, a, is invariant across indi-
viduals the bivariate latent variable model can be written as 
(1) U; = Xi~ + api + Ci 
P; =ZiY+lli . 
The endogeneity of individuals' participation decisions results in the correlation be-
tween the programme dummy, Pi' and the error term, ci' in the repeat unemployment 
equation. In terms of Heckman & Hotz (1989) this dependence can arise either from se-
lection on observables or from selection on unobservables. In the former case the selec-
tion bias can be removed from parameter estimates by controlling for the determinants 
of the participation decision. In the latter case, however, inference based on mere repeat 
unemployment equation is biased due to the correlated error terms, ci and lli. In the cur-
rent setting the problem of selection on unobservables cannot be solved by the standard 
Heckman method (Heckman, 1979) due to non-linearities, see O'Higgins (1994). An at-
tractive alternative is to model the joint distribution of error terms. The bivariate probit 
model analysed in Zweimuller and Winter-Ebmer (1996) is then specified by assuming 
standard bivariate normality of disturbance terms3. 
3 The bivariate probit model has been employed in other contex1s for instance in Van de Ven et. al. 
(1981), Ham (1982), Tunali (1986), Dolton and Makepeace (1993), and Zweimuller et. a1. (1996). 
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The standard bivariate probit model may suffer from limited information on de-
pendent variables. Since we can only observe the signs of latent variables, the error vari-
ances, 0'£ and 0'1]' remain unidentified, Maddala (1983). This in tum means that one is 
able to estimate mere ratios P/O'£, a/O'£ and Y/O'1]' The standardisation of error variances 
to one is perfectly legitimate provided that error variances remain constant across indi-
viduals, that is under the assumption of homoskedasticity. As pointed out in Davidson & 
MacKinnon (1984) uncorrected departures from homoskedasticity bias both the esti-
mated standard errors and the estimated parameters. To incorporate heteroskedasticity 
in the model error terms are specified as ci - NID[O,Exp(2Wiub)] and lli - NID[O, 
Exp(2Wip8)], where the W matrices include the variables affecting error variances, band 
8 being the additional parameter vectors. Normalised error terms follow the standard 
bivariate normal distribution, in which case the log-likelihood function for the heteroske-
dastic bivariate probit model becomes 
where <1>2 stands for the standard bivariate normal cumulative distribution function. In 
this setting the heteroskedastic model can be tested against its homoskedastic alternative 
by any classical testing procedure. Another issue of interest, namely selection on unob-
servables can be tested through the correlation coefficient, p. Low values of test statis-
tics imply that the assignment on active programmes is random, at least as regards the 
unobservables, and the model can be consistently estimated by single equation probit 
models. These tests are, however, conditional on the distributional assumption of bivari-
ate normality. Clearly the violation of this assumption results in inconsistent parameter 
estimates. Since the distributional assumption is hardly ever tested in applied work, the 
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appendix reports the score contributions needed in testing normality both in the het-
eroskedastic bivariate probit model and in the heteroskedastic switching bivariate pro bit 
reported below. 
5.1.2. The Endogenously Switching Bivariate Probit Model 
An unattractive feature of the bivariate probit model is that it restricts the estimated 
programme effect to be equal for all participants. O'Higgins (1994) loosens these restric-
tions by formulating the switching bivariate probit model of the form 
(3) u; =Xi~l + Eli 
u; = Xi~2 + E2i 
p; =Z/Y+Tli 
iffp; > 0 
iffp; ~ 0 
The switching model consists of the same participation equation, Pi *, as the bivari-
ate probit model but it allows separate parameter vectors for the participants, Pi * > 0, 
and the non-participants, Pi* < O. The selection into different groups is endogenously 
determined through the latent participation equation. Unlike in the bivariate probit 
model, the programme effect is allowed to vary across individual characteristics, that is 
across the observed variables included in the model. Since the first two equations define 
marginal distributions, O'Higgins (1994) imposes the restriction Eli = E2i, which essen-
tially assumes the equality of variances in two subgroups. By assuming bivariate normal-
ity O'Higgins estimated the following heteroskedasticity corrected log-likelihood 
function 
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The drawback of this model is a substantial increase in the number of parameters 
that makes the user specified likelihood function rather time consuming to maximise. An 
alternative way of estimating the switching model arises from the restriction C = cli = c2i 
which ensures that the distribution is well defined on the whole population. To show 
this, we change the notation by writing the non-participants' parameter vector as ~2 = ~. 
If we further allow the programme effect to vary across individual characteristics 
through the parameter vector t, we can rewrite the participants' parameter vector as ~l = 
~ + 'to Under these notations the first two equations of the switching model (3) can be 
combined to 
(5) 
This says that it is possible to estimate the switching model used by O'Higgins (1994) by 
introducing interaction terms PiXi into the bivariate probit4. 
5.2. Data Description 
It was pointed out in chapter 2 that Finnish active labour market policy has two ex-
plicit aims connected to repeat unemployment incidence, viz. permanent work and re-
ducing the risk of unemployment. To put the achievement of these targets under scrutiny 
this chapter employs data based on a random sample of 180 000 individuals (around 5 
per cent of the working age population) drawn from the 1990 population census. Statis-
tics Finland has expanded the data set by merging individual information from various 
official registers, such as tax registers and registers of employment service offices. This 
offers rich information on different income sources, labour market status, occupations, 
changes between labour market states etc. What is especially interesting for this study, 
4 lowe this point to Wiji Arulampalam. 
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the data set contains all information collected by employment service offices about the 
unemployed and the programme participants5. 
Since the focus of this study is on the effect of active programmes on the probabil-
ity of repeating unemployment, the sample used in the analyses consists of a representa-
tive sample of persons who obtained a job in open labour markets after the first 
unemployment or programme participation spell during the year 19896. In order to con-
centrate on actually unemployed persons, the following selection criteria are used: age 
between 16 and 50, not a student, pensioner, or in the army. Since the attachment of en-
trepreneurs to labour markets is likely to differ from that of wage-earners, we decided to 
exclude persons whose income derives mainly from entrepreneurial activities. Finally, 
temporarily laid-off persons are excluded from the sample since their transition prob-
abilities between labour market states are likely to be affected by the lay-off. 
As a further modification of the sample, we employed the available data to track 
down those persons who ended their employment spell by a transition out of the labour 
force. This transition is treated as a repeat unemployment incidence, i.e., the repeat un-
employment dummy takes the value 1 if a person has experienced a transition to non-
employment within 12 months after starting the first job in 1989. Otherwise it takes the 
value 0. A person is defined as a programme participant if (a) he has experienced a tran-
sition from a programme to open employment or (b) he has participated in a programme 
during the year 1988. The actual sample used in estimations consists of 1553 pro-
gramme participants and 2963 non-participants. Within 12 months after starting the first 
Since the main interest of this chapter is on assessing the differences in programme effects across 
individuals, all programmes had to be combined together. Accordingly, the estimated programme ef-
fects have to interpreted as average impacts of various programmes. The effects of different pro-
grammes are examined in chapter 6. 
6 Since we have information only on the latest participation spell, we have to assume that those 98 
cases with more than one programme period do not have any employment spells between the first and 
the last programme period. Similarly we have to assume that the sample selection is exogenous, i.e. un-
observables between the employment probability (prerequisite for entering the sample is to become em-
ployed) and repeat unemployment equations are uncorrelated. 
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employment spell 58.6 per cent of the participants, and 58.9 per cent of the controls, ex-
perienced a transition to non-employment. 
It is informative to examine different transition patterns between labour market 
states, and how these patterns are related to the sampling procedure. All individuals in 
the sample have become employed in non-subsidised labour markets during the year 
1989. Participants in training programmes or selective employment measures who return 
back to unemployment immediately after a programme participation, and who do not be-
come openly employed during the year 1989, are not included in the sample. That is to 
say, both unemployment and programme spells are treated as time spend outside open 
labour markets. 
Some hypothetical transition patterns are presented in figure 5. 1. Subsequent work 
histories under examination, i.e. 12 months after becoming employed in open labour 
markets in 1989, are presented by dashed lines. Individuals 1 and 2 have got a job in 
open labour markets (E) during the year 1989 either after a period of unemployment (U) 
or after a period of programme participation (P), and stayed in their job longer than 12 
months. Accordingly, the repeat unemployment dummy takes the value 0 in these cases. 
Individuals 3 and 4 have also got hired in open labour markets in 1989, but they have 
experienced a transition either to unemployment or out of the labour force (L) within 12 
months of starting a job. They are recorded as repeat unemployment cases, i.e., the re-
peat unemployment dummy takes the value 1. Those who have not experienced a transi-
tion to open employment during the year 1989 do not enter the sample (individual 5). 
Finally, individuals 6 and 7 have continued their unemployment spell which was tempo-
rary interrupted by a programme participation. They have, however, managed to get a 
job in open labour markets in 1989, in which case they enter the sample. 
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Figure 5.1 The transition chart. 
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5.3. Empirical Results 
There are three groups of variables explaining the participation decision and the re-
peat unemployment incidence. The first group of variables consists of individual charac-
teristics which control for observable differences in individuals' social status, human 
capital accumulation, family background and work ability. These are allowed to affect an 
individual's labour market possibilities as well as his decision whether or not to partici-
pate in a programme. 
The second group of variables relates to local labour markets, individuals' labour 
market experience and occupation. The unemployment rate in a travel-to-work area is 
one of the reasons for targeting active programmes to a region. This clearly affects the 
III 
probability of participating in an active programme, whilst also having a potential effect 
on repeat unemployment incidence. Dummy variables for the type and the location of a 
living community reflect the size of the labour market which can be expected to affect 
the labour market outcome. Union membership and previous unemployment experience 
are also among potential factors influencing individuals' labour market possibilities and 
programme participation decisions. Since we are examining a future event, i.e., repeat 
unemployment incidence within the next 12 months, we have to be careful when measur-
ing the past labour market experience. Clearly, the decision to terminate the latest unem-
ployment spell is influenced by received work offers. The acceptance probability can be 
expected to be higher, and the subsequent probability of returning to unemployment 
lower, if an offer is considered as 'a good one'. This indicates the endogeneity of the lat-
est unemployment spell, and for this reason it is subtracted from the unemployment ex-
perience variable7. The final group of labour market variables consists of occupational 
dummies. It is evident that individuals working in seasonal occupations, such as agricul-
ture and construction, have higher risk of experiencing a repeat unemployment spell that 
calls for the inclusion of occupational controls in the repeat unemployment equation. 
These are also entered in the participation equation since the lack of occupation is likely 
to characterise hard-to-employ individuals to whom ALl\1Ps are primarily targeted. 
Finally, the model includes several income variables. The replacement ratio is speci-
fied as two separate terms; unemployment benefits and wage income. The financial inde-
pendence of an individual may also affect his/her labour market behaviour. This is 
It is possible that the subtraction of the latest unemployment spell is not sufficient for removing the 
endogeneity bias due to some uncontrolled factors affecting both past unemployment experiences and 
the repeat unemployment probability. The correction of this potential bias would, however. lead to tri-
variate normal integrals and it is not undertaken here. Accordingly, we have to assume that after sub-
tracting the latest unemployment spell this bias becomes negligible. 
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captured by two separate variables; (i) the sum of individual's income from other sources 
than unemployment benefits or wage income, and (ii) the sum of spouse's income. 
Turning next to identification issues. As discussed in Davidson and MacKinnon 
(1984), the parameters of heteroskedasticity correction terms are identified provided 
that there is no constant term in W matrices. The real difficulty arises, however, when 
estimating the parameters of the participation and repeat unemployment equations. As 
pointed out in Maddala (1983) p. 122 - 23, the framework set up in section 5.1 belongs 
to the class of mixed structured models. To identify the parameters of the repeat unem-
ployment equation there has to be at least one exclusion restriction in it. In this study the 
main instrument for the programme participation is produced by the local supply of 
ALMPs which is measured as the proportion of participants to working age population 
in a labour market district. The supply of active programmes affects the probability of 
participating in a programme but there is no clear reason why it should have any effect, 
over and above the programme effect itself, on the repeat unemployment incidence8. 
Furthermore, the chosen instrument is consistent with the aims of improving the func-
tioning of labour markets in less advantaged regions through active labour market pol-
icy. Another identifying restriction is obtained by measuring the union status variable in 
different years in the two equations. However, due to the strong correlation of individu-
als' union membership over time the identification based merely on the union variable is 
likely to be weak. 
8 Employing the local supply of ALMPs as an instrument is not without caveats. It may depend on lo-
cal repeat unemployment incidence ,ia political pressure. The possible endogeneity problem is, how-
eyer. likely to be smaller when examining individuals' probabilities of renewing unemployment than in 
aggregated data sets. 
113 
5.3.1. The Determinants of Programme Participation 
Before analysing the estimated participation equations it is worth recalling the aims 
and the target groups of active labour market programmes discussed in chapter 2. Fin-
nish labour market training has twofold aims. The first aim is to improve the employ-
ment performance of the economy by increasing labour market flexibility and eliminating 
labour shortages. The second aim is more individually oriented focusing on preventing 
unemployment, and reducing the risk of unemployment. Selective employment meas-
ures, on the other hand, are more directly targeted to disadvantaged individuals. These 
are aimed at: (i) helping hard-to-employ persons in the labour market; (ii) preventing 
long-term unemployment; and (iii) reducing regional unemployment differences. Since a 
single participation equation combines the factors affecting the behaviour of both poten-
tial participants and the administrators, the aims above are expected to show up in the 
results. 
Table 5.1 reports a selected sample of participation equations from the estimated 
bivariate models. Differences across models arise from two sources; the specifications 
of error terms (homoskedastic vs. heteroskedastic) and the programme effect (constant 
vs. varying). The parameter estimates show that the exact specification of the pro-
gramme effect does not have any significant effect on the inference concerning the deter-
minants of participation. On the contrary, the parameter estimates of the heteroskedastic 
bivariate pro bit model given in column 2 seem to be poorly defined compared to other 
models. This is not surprising given that the participation equation suffers from non-
normality, cumulants Ko3 and ~ being highly significant (see also the test statistics re-
ported for the general heteroskedastic model in table 5.2, column 3t Closer 
9 For the score contributions employed in normality tests and for the definition of cumulants, please 
see appendix 5.1. 
114 
examination uncovered that the problem was connected to the monthly earnings variable 
employed in the heteroskedastic function. Column 3 reports the results of the specifica-
tion in which the monthly earning variable has been removed from correction terms. This 
also eliminates the problem of non-normality and produces the results which are more 
in line with other specifications. 
Table 5.1 The determinants of programme participation. 
Estimated model 
Homo- Hetero- Hetero- Switching Switching 
skedastic skedastic skedastic Bivariate Bivariate 
Bivariate Bivariate Bivariate probit probit 
probit probit probit (homosked) (heterosked) 
Intercept -0.285 0.046 -0.108 -0.284 -0.122 
(0.347) (0.036) (0.161) (0.349) (0.173) 
Individual 
characteristics 
Gender 0.012 -0.003 -0.002 0.011 -0.004 
(0.054) (0.002) (0.024) (0.054) (0.026) 
Age 0.018 0.000 0.006 0.018 0.006 
(0.020) (0.000) (0.008) (0.020) (0.009) 
Age2 x 10-3 -3.631 -0.059 -0.662 -3.690 -0.851 
(3.082) (0.113) (1.290) (3.100) (1.409) 
~umber of children 0.013 0.000 0.004 0.015 0.005 
under 7 years of old (0.066) (0.002) (0.032) (0.067) (0.034) 
Age of the youngest child 0.065 0.002 0.010 0.063 0.006 
0- 1 years (0.123) (0.004) (0.060) (0.124) (0.064) 
Age of the youngest child -0.044 -0.000 -0.018 -0.047 -0.020 
2 - 4 years (0.113) (0.004) (0.053) (0.114) (0.056) 
Age of the youngest child 0.011 -0.000 -0.014 0.013 -0.015 
5 - 7 years (0.105) (0.003) (0.049) (0.106) (0.052) 
Education 0.109 0.003 0.043 0.108 0.047 
(0.030)*** (0.002) (0.015)*** (0.030)*** (0.016)*** 
Home ownership -0.020 -0.000 -0.015 -0.022 -0.017 
(0.043) (0.001) (0.019) (0.043) (0.021) 
Disability 0.274 0.009 0.123 0.275 0.132 
(0.074)*** (0.005)· (0.040)**- (0.074)*** (0.043(* 
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Table 5.1 The determinants of programme participation. 
Broader job seeking 
-0.l17 -0.081 -0.774 -0.113 -0.734 
(0.089) (0.111) (0.777) (0.089) (0.714) 
Spouse's education -0.036 -0.000 -0.018 -0.037 -0.019 
(0.029) (0.000) (0.012) (0.029) (0.014) 
Marital status -0.094 -0.001 -0.048 -0.096 -0.054 
(0.059) (0.002) (0.030) (0.059) (0.032)* 
Head of a family -0.071 -0.003 -0.038 -0.069 -0.040 
(0.058) (0.002) (0.024) (0.059) (0.026) 
Labour market 
travel-to-work 0.043 0.001 0.022 0.042 0.023 
Unemployment rate (0.011)*** (o.ooof (0.006)*** (0.011)*** (0.007)*** 
Urban area -0.055 -0.002 -0.028 -0.057 -0.030 
(0.045) (0.002) (0.020) (0.045) (0.022) 
Unemployment duration 0.096 0.003 0.041 0.095 0.044 
before the latest spell x 10-2 (0.010)*** (0.001)* (0.009)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** 
Southern Finland -0.232 -0.006 -0.084 -0.228 -0.087 
(0.079)*** (0.004) (0.039)** (0.080)*** (0.042)** 
Central Finland -0.093 -0.002 -0.026 -0.088 -0.024 
(0.071) (0.002) (0.033) (0.072) (0.035) 
Occupation: 
Technical -0.874 -0.031 -0.436 -0.872 -0.465 
(0.120)*** (0.016f (0.092)*** (0.l21)**· (0.100)*** 
Health care -0.664 -0.024 -0.300 -0.670 -0.329 
(0.102)*** (o.o12f (0.067)*** (0.102)*** (0.074)*** 
Administrative -0.263 -0.011 -0.151 -0.266 -0.162 
(0.088)*** (0.006)* (0.045)*** (0.088)*** (0.049)*** 
Mercantile -0.631 -0.027 -0.324 -0.630 -0.347 
(0.l06)*** (0.014f (0.068)*** (0.106)*** (0.074)*** 
F am1ing/F orestry -0.836 -0.034 -0.430 -0.835 -0.456 
(0.104)*** (0.017)* (0.086)*** (0.105)*** (0.092)*** 
Transport -0.954 -0.039 -0.502 -0.952 -0.534 
(0.126)*** (0.020)* (0.102)*** (0.126)*** (0.110)*** 
Manufacture -0.570 -0.025 -0.304 -0.571 -0.326 
(0.068)*** (0.012)* (0.059)*** (0.068)*** (0.064(* 
C onstmction -0.863 -0.035 -0.430 -0.874 -0.463 
(0.090(* (0.018)* (0.082)··· (0.091)*** (0.089)**· 
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Service 
-0.516 -0.022 -0.278 -0.522 -0.301 
(0.078)*** (0.011)· (0.056)*** (0.079)*** (0.061)*** 
Income variables 
Ln(monthly unemployment -0.027 -0.001 -0.017 -0.027 -0.017 
benefits) (0.005)*** (0.000)· (0.004)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)*** 
Ln(monthly earnings) -0.031 -0.007 -0.016 -0.031 -0.017 
(0.011)*** (0.005) (0.006)** (0.011)*** (0.007)** 
Ln( other income) -0.015 -0.000 -0.004 -0.015 -0.005 
(0.006)** (0.000) (0.002)* (0.006)** (0.002)* 
Ln(spouse's income) 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.001 
(0.005) (0.000) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) 
Identification 
Union member in 1988 0.103 0.009 0.125 0.114 0.144 
(0.044)** (0.000)· (0.032)*** (0.045)** (0.036)*** 
Local supply of ALMP 0.072 0.002 0.026 0.074 0.030 
(0.015)*** (0.001)* (0.008)*** (0.015)*** (0.009)*** 
III eteroskedasticity 
correction terms No Yes Yes No Yes 
Age -0.019 -0.025 -0.022 
(0.004f·· (0.004)*** (0.005)*** 
Broader job seeking 1.661 1.320 1.247 
(1.068) (0.771)* (0.723)* 
Ln(monthly unemployment 0.028 0.021 0.014 
benefits) (0.011)·· (0.011)** (0.011) 
Union member in 1988 -0.285 -0.387 -0.404 
(0.096f++ (0.095)*** (0.097)*** 
Marital status 0.163 0.157 
(0.091)** (0.093)* 
Unemployment duration 0.043 0.048 
before the latest spell x 10-2 (0.022)** (0.023)" 
Ln(monthly earnings) -0.310 
(0.058f++ 
Spouse's education -0.089 
(0.045)· 
P 0.322 0.396 0.394 0.112 0.169 
(0.219) (0.095)·" (0.102)*** (0.298) (0.184) 
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Log -likelihood 5206.505 5153.582 5162.062 5175.141 5139.707 
[Diagnostics 
W ALD test for -0.001 0.006 0.006 -0.016 -0.012 
identifying restriction [p=0.925] [p=0.633] [p=0.661] [p=0.287] [p=0.437] 
LR test for 133.14 27.29 44.25 70.86 n/a 
heteroskedasticity [p=O.OOO] [p=0.746] [p=0.091] [p=O.OOO] 
LM test for normality 15.60 23.49 7.13 10.25 7.34 
(joint test) [p=0.075] [p=0.005] [p=0.623] [p=0.330] [p=0.601] 
LM tests for the 
significance of cumulants: 
1<:30 3.57 0.00 0.00 1.49 0.53 
[p=0.058] [p=0.957] [p=0.942] [p=0.222] [p=0.466] 
KzI 0.44 0.33 0.11 0.19 0.36 
[p=0.507] [p=0.565] [p=0.740] [p=0.718] [p=0.548] 
1<:12 0.17 0.12 0.14 2.42 0.68 
[p=0.680] [p=0.729] [p=0.708] [p=0.1l9] [p=0.409] 
1<:03 0.99 9.43 0.55 2.14 0.44 
[p=0.319] [p=0.002] [p=0.458] [p=0.143] [p=0.507] 
1<:40 1.96 0.01 0.07 4.50 2.36 
[p=0.161] [p=0.920] [p=0.791] [p=0.033] [p=0.124] 
1<:31 1.20 0.24 0.25 0.95 0.85 
[p=0.273] [p=0.624] [p=0.617] [p=0.329] [p=0.356] 
Kz2 0.00 1.31 0.46 4.19 2.09 
[p=0.993] [p=0.252] [p=0.497] [p=0.040] [p=0.148] 
1<:13 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.63 
[p=0.982] [p=0.920] [p=0.823] [p=0.823] [p=0.427] 
1<:04 0.00 10.49 1.27 0.09 2.17 
[p=0.995] [p=O.OOl] [p=0.259] [p=0.764] [p=0.140] 
N 4516 4516 4516 4516 4516 
Notes: * (**,***) = significant at the 10 (5, 1) per cent significance level; All variables refer to the year 
1989 if not othenvise stated; For the definitions of variables, please see appendix 5.2; For the discussion 
of diagnostic tests, please see the text and appendix 5.1: Parenthesis following test statistics report the 
p-values; Test statistics which are significant at the 10 per cent significance level are written in bold. 
All estimations are carried by using LIMDEP 7.0 (Greene, 1995). 
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As regards other diagnostic tests, there are some indications that terms in het-
eroskedastic functions ease the distributional misspecification of the repeat unemploy-
ment equation. This is implied by cumulants lSo and 1(40 which are estimated of being 
significant in homoskedastic models reported in columns 1 and 5. The need to correct 
for heteroskedasticity is further confirmed by the massive test statistics produced by ho-
moskedastic models1o. Finally, we put the identifying restriction under scrutiny. This in-
direct test is implemented in two steps: first, we removed all insignificant variables from 
the repeat unemployment equations; and second, we re-estimated the models with the 
local supply of ALl\1Ps variable included in both equations. The reported test statistic is 
based on the estimated t-value of the local supply of ALl\1Ps variable in the repeat un-
employment equation. In all cases the t-value of the identifying variable is far from con-
ventional significance levels strengthening the confidence on the adopted instrument. 
Turning next to the determinants of programme participation on which all models 
in table 5.1 seem to paint a similar picture. The aims of ALl\1Ps show up nicely in the re-
sults, the participation probability being increased if an individual is disabled, without 
occupation (omitted category) or he has experienced long spells in unemployment. 
These individuals may also be more prone to apply for programmes either because they 
benefit the most or because their opportunity costs are low, or both. The target of re-
ducing regional unemployment differences via active programmes is also reflected in the 
results; individuals living in high unemployment areas outside the southern Finland are 
more likely to end up in a programme. Having said that, there are also some implications 
of creaming as indicated by the well determined positive impact of education on the 
10 Reported tests for heteroskedasticity are implemented against the general heteroskedastic model which in-
cluded all variables, excluding occupational dummies, as correction terms. Due to the large number of controlled 
factors the heteroskedasticity correction in the switching bivariate probit model is based on the model reported in 
coltmll 3. 
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participation probability. This result is in line with Greenhalgh & Stewart (1987), ac-
cording to whom higher educated persons obtain more retraining than those with lower 
educational levels. 
Turning next to the group of variables representing social status, namely other in-
come sources, earnings and occupation. These variables enter the participation equation 
with negative parameter estimates implying lower participation probability for an indi-
vidual with higher social ranking. This finding can be explained in one of two ways; ei-
ther individuals with higher social status have better connections to labour markets 
which increases their transition probabilities out of unemployment before any participa-
tion decisions or they can afford to wait longer before participating in a programme. 
Finally we focus on the identifying variables, namely the union status and the local 
supply of active programmes variables. It is interesting to note that union members are 
more likely to participate in programmes. The positive union effect is a usual finding in 
studies of private sector training, see Booth (1991), Lynch (1992), Tan et. al. (1992), in-
ter alia. One explanation for the finding that union membership increases also the prob-
ability of participating in public sector programmes is that their greater attachment to 
labour markets is characterised by greater willingness to acquire working skills through 
active labour market programmes. When it comes to the other identifying variable, its 
presence in the participation equation is confirmed by all specifications. Moreover the 
positive-parameter estimate is well in line with a priori expectations, with the greater 
supply of programmes increasing the participation probability. 
5.3.2. Repeat Unemployment Incidence 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 below give the estimated repeat unemployment equations; the 
former for the constant programme effect and the latter for the varying one. 
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Encouragingly all models paint a fairly similar picture of the factors affecting repeat un-
employment incidence. Unlike in the participation equations the exact specification of 
hetero- skedasticity correction terms does not have any great impact on the parameter 
estimates. This is not surprising given that non-normality was found only in the partici-
pation equation. Otherwise diagnostic tests follow the same lines as above. There are 
signs of non-normality in homoskedastic specifications which can be eased by heteroske-
dasticity correction terms. All homoskedastic models are rejected against their het-
eroskedastic alternatives; also in single equation pro bit estimations which are reported in 
appendix 5.2. And finally, identifying restrictions are clearly accepted in all cases. 
As can be expected, characteristics reflecting disadvantaged individuals, viz. low 
education, long unemployment spells and disability, seem to increase the risk of renew-
ing unemployment. An opposite effect is found for the group of variables representing 
individuals' social status, namely variables capturing differences in home ownership, 
spouse's income, education, and family status. Provided that social ranking also reflects 
individuals' motivation/capabilities, the greater stability of their work careers is to be ex-
pected, a priori. The results also suggest the similar outcome for another motivation 
variable measured as a job seeker's willingness to accept a job outside his home commu-
nity (broader job seeking). 
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Table 5.2 The repeat unemployment incidence; Invariant programme effect. 
Estimated model 
Hetero- Homo- Hetero- Hetero- Hetero-
skedastic skedastic skedastic skedastic skedastic 
Probit Bivariate Bivariate Bivariate Bivariate 
Probit Probit Probit Probit 
Intercept 0.352 0.565 0.619 0.847 0.717 
(0.312) (0.369) (0.424) (0.399)** (0.392)* 
Individual 
characteristics 
Gender 0.009 0.030 0.014 0.009 0.017 
(0.049) (0.053) (0.066) (0.063) (0.062) 
Age 0.008 0.012 0.017 0.021 0.021 
(0.017) (0.019) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) 
Age2 x 10-3 -l.299 -l.454 -2.763 -3.103 -3.196 
(2.633) (2.966) (3.505) (3.392) (3.378) 
lNumber of children under 0.048 0.052 0.047 0.035 0.035 
7 years of old (0.060) (0.065) (0.072) (0.075) (0.075) 
Age of the youngest child 0.012 0.024 0.025 0.058 0.051 
0- 1 years (0.114) (0.120) (0.138) (0.142) (0.141) 
Age of the youngest child -0.076 -0.080 -0.079 -0.057 -0.067 
2 - 4 years (0.102) (0.110) (0.127) (0.128) (0.127) 
Age of the youngest child -0.039 -0.044 -0.057 -0.032 -0.040 
5- 7 years (0.094) (0.104) (0.111) (0.121) (0.120) 
Education -0.120 -0.088 -0.126 -0.116 -0.111 
(0.034)*·· (0.031)*** (0.055)** (0.038)*** (0.038)*** 
Home ownership -0.073 -0.077 -0.091 -0.098 -0.096 
(0.041)* (0.042)* (0.058) (0.049)** (0.049)* 
Disability 0.101 0.190 0.265 0.207 0.210 
(0.076) (0.082)** (0.145)* (0.093)** (0.093)** 
Broader job seeking -0.140 -0.179 -0.178 -0.199 -0.209 
(0.085)· (0.089)** (0.121) (0.107)* (0.107)* 
Spouse's education -0.007 -0.006 -0.013 -0.019 -0.020 
(0.026) (0.027) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) 
Marital status -0.068 -0.105 -0.079 -0.095 -0.095 
(0.054) (0.059)* (0.073) (0.067) (0.067) 
Head of a family -0.102 -0.130 -0.147 -0.156 -0.146 
(0.054f (0.055)"" (0.082)* (0.067)"" (0.067)** 
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[Labour market 
~ravel-to-work 0.014 0.039 0.032 0.038 0.039 
Unemployment rate (0.010) (O.012f** (0.015)"* (0.013)"*- (o.o13f** 
Union member -0.139 -0.181 -0.l92 -0.201 -0.l97 
(0.049)*** (0.048)"** (0.082)"* (O.056f** (0.056)**-
Urban area -0.010 -0.011 -0.031 -0.023 -0.020 
(0.042) (0.045) (0.056) (0.053) (0.053) 
Unemployment duration 0.138 0.130 0.177 0.157 0.160 
before the latest spell xl 0-2 (0.030)*** (o.o13f** (0.057)"** (o.020f** (o.020f** 
Southern Finland 0.041 -0.056 -0.011 -0.052 -0.052 
(0.058) (0.086) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077) 
Central Finland 0.012 -0.051 -0.019 -0.048 -0.045 
(0.056) (0.072) (0.075) (0.074) (0.074) 
Occupation: 
Technical 0.005 -0.195 -0.174 -0.258 -0.265 
(0.114) (0.155) (0.157) (O.155f (O.157f 
Health care 0.033 -0.115 -0.093 -0.127 -0.122 
(O.lOl) (0.137) (0.137) (O.l35) (0.135) 
Administrative -0.046 -0.130 -0.154 -0.147 -0.149 
(0.081) (0.092) (0.115) (0.104) (0.104) 
Mercantile -0.146 -0.350 -0.331 -0.352 -0.346 
(0.093) (0.123)"** (0.150)"* (0.120)"** (0. 120f** 
F arming/F orestry 0.419 0.302 0.350 0.347 0.343 
(0. 125f** (0.163)* (0. 176f* (0.148)"* (0.151)"* 
Transport 0.099 -0.081 -0.082 -0.l33 -0.131 
(0.111) (0.166) (0.151) (0.153) (0.155) 
Manufacture 0.049 -0.123 -0.074 -0.115 -0.117 
(0.066) (0.102) (0.092) (0.091) (0.092) 
Construction 0.578 0.429 0.518 0.476 0.477 
(0. 133f** (0. 156f** (0.211)"* (0.140)"*- (0. 142f** 
Service 0.178 0.029 0.112 0.056 0.055 
(0.080)** (0.107) (0.109) (0.100) (O.lOl) 
Income variables 
Ln(monthly unemployment 0.085 0.082 0.104 0.101 0.099 
benefits) (O.015f** (o.008f** (0.032)"** (O.012f*- (0.013)"*" 
Ln(monthlyearnings) -0.079 -0.094 -0.098 -0.122 -0.109 
(0.018)*** (0.015)"*- (0.025)"" (O.019f** (O.019f-· 
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Ln( other income) 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.006 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Ln(spouse's income) -0.015 -0.015 -0.018 -0.017 -0.017 
(0.005)+++ (0.005) (0.008)** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** 
Participation 
Participation dummy -0.069 -0.594 -0.645 -0.827 -0.826 
(0.044) (0.361)* (0.226)*** (0.187)*** (0.198)*** 
III eteroskedasticity Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
correction terms (21 terms; 
travel-to-work -0.043 not shown) -0.023 -0.024 
Unemployment rate (o.o13f*+ (0.012)*+ (0.012)** 
Education 0.117 0.120 0.119 
(0.042)*++ (0.039)++* (0.039)*** 
Ln(monthly unemployment 0.049 0.053 0.053 
benefits) (0.015)** (0.012)*** (0.012)*** 
Ln( other income) -0.022 -0.017 -0.016 
(0.009)* (0.008)** (0.008)** 
Age -0.008 
(0.004)** 
Union member 0.169 
(0.077)** 
Unemployment duration 0.041 
(0.019)** 
P n/a 0.322 0.296 0.396 0.394 
(0.219) (0.092)*** (0.095)*** (0.102)*** 
Log-likelihood 2597.836 5206.505 5139.933 5153.582 5162.062 
Diagnostics 
W ALD test for n/a -0.001 0.002 0.006 0.006 
identifying restriction [p=0.925] [p=0.866] [p=0.633] [p=0.661] 
LR test for 7.22 133.14 n/a 27.29 44.25 
heteroskedasticity [p=0.925] [p=O.OOO] [p=0.746] [p=0.091] 
LM test for normality 2.77 15.60 73.99 23.49 7.13 
(joint test) [p=0.250] [p=0.075] [p=O.OOO] [p=0.005] [p=0.623] 
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LM test for nonnality 0.89 
(Pred"2) [p=0.345] 
LM test for nonnality 2.76 
(Pred"3) [p=0.096] 
LM tests for the 
significance of cumulants: 
~o 3.57 0.08 0.00 0.00 
[p=0.058] [p=0.777] [p=0.957] [p=0.942] 
~1 0.44 0.03 0.33 0.11 
[p=0.507] [p=0.862] [p=0.565] [p=0.740] 
K12 0.17 0.25 0.12 0.14 
[p=0.680] [p=0.617] [p=0.729] [p=0.708] 
K03 0.99 39.92 9.43 0.55 
[p=0.319] [p=O.OOO] [p=0.002] [p=0.458] 
K40 1.96 0.09 0.01 0.07 
[p=0.161] [p=0.764] [p=0.920] [p=0.791] 
K31 1.20 0.65 0.24 0.25 
[p=0.273] [p=0.420] [p=0.624] [p=0.617] 
~2 0.00 0.99 1.31 0.46 
[p=0.993] [p=0.319] [p=0.252] [p=0.497] 
K13 0.00 0.35 0.01 0.05 
[p=0.982] [p=0.554] [p=0.920] [p=0.823] 
K04 0.00 16.12 10.49 1.27 
[p=0.995] [p=O.OOO] [p=0.001] [p=0.259] 
N 4516 4516 4516 4516 4516 
Notes: See table 5.1; Normality test for the heteroskedastic probit model is a RESET-like test for nor-
mality presented in Pagan & Vella (1989), p. S43. 
One variable of considerable interest when studying the unemployment incidence is 
the replacement ratio. In this study it is specified as two separate variables; monthly un-
employment benefits received during unemployment, and wage income in a subsequent 
job. According to search theory, a higher compensation level out of work reduces inc en-
tives to work which in tum increases the probability of renewing unemployment. The 
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results lend some support for this hypothesis, the benefits variable having a well deter-
mined downward effect on job stability. Before pushing this interpretation too far, it is 
worth noting that the single unemployment benefit variable reflects the whole unemploy-
ment benefit system, for a thorough discussion see Atkinson & Micklewright (1991)11. 
Moreover, the effect of unemployment benefits on the repeat unemployment probability 
is affected by its downward effect on the participation probability, which in tum may re-
flect the duration of unemployment and not unemployment benefits, per se. After all, the 
short-term unemployed, who are less likely to participate in a programme, are still under 
the higher compensation VI scheme. 
An increase in the denominator of the replacement ratio, i.e. in monthly earnings, 
seems to reduce the repeat unemployment probability. The finding is in line with the 
Krueger & Summers (1987) study, according to which industrial wage differentials are 
associated with lower quits. This in turn implies that differentials reflect rents to better 
quality jobs. Accordingly, as far as wages can be used as an indicator of job quality, indi-
viduals in high quality jobs are less likely to experience a repeat unemployment spell 
than individuals in low quality jobs. This can be interpreted in one of two ways. Either 
individuals are less willing to quit a better paid job due to greater opportunity costs or 
firms put more effort into a hiring decision when filling a higher paid vacancy that im-
proves the matching process. In contrast to other income variables, an increase in non-
labour income does not seem to have any significant effect on the repeat unemployment 
probability 
It is interesting to note that the union status variable, which is measured in the year 
1989 (1988) in the repeat unemployment (participation) equation, seems to have a 
II As discussed in chapter 2, lmemployment compensation can be obtained either under the means tested unem-
ployment assistance (UA) scheme or under the earnings related unemployment insurance (UI) scheme, normally 
limited to 500 days. 
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substantial downward effect on the repeat unemployment probability. This result has 
similarities with the studies which report a downward effect of the presence of unions on 
the turnover rate, see Freeman & Medoff (1984) and Miller & Mulvey (1993), inter 
alia. One explanation for this is that, instead of quitting an unsatisfactory job, unionised 
workers can voice their complaints to management. A rival explanation could be that, 
together with the earnings variable, the union status variable is an indicator of job qual-
ity. The rationale behind this follows from a large body of empirical work indicating the 
existence of union wage gap (for a survey, see Pencavel 1991). A likely response of 
management to higher union wages is to upgrade the quality of their workforce by re-
cruiting more productive workers. 
In addition to the reported estimates, insignificant variables are of interest in their 
own right. The results suggest that neither age nor gender has any significant impact on 
programme participation/repeat unemployment incidence. The likely reason for the lack 
of age profile is the age criteria used in choosing the sample. When it comes to gender 
differences, it is possible that a single dummy variable is not sufficient to capture the 
complicated nature of women's labour market behaviour. If this is the case, it could be 
fiuitful to concentrate separately on men and women by estimating different parameter 
vectors for both sexes, which could uncover some interesting differences between men 
and women. A rival explanation for the lack of gender differences could hinge behind 
the welfare state which increases women's labour market possibilities, for instance by 
providing child care and legal protection during the motherhood leave. 
Turning next to the main issue of interest, namely the impact of active labour mar-
ket programmes. The results of bivariate probit models shown in table 5.2 suggest a 
quite substantial, statistically significant, decline in participants' probability of experienc-
ing a repeat unemployment spell. In addition, the significant parameter estimate of the 
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correlation coefficient, p, implies that the selection into the controls and the treatments 
is endogenously determined. Positive correlation between the error terms uncovers the 
role of unobservable characteristics; they make participation more likely whilst also in-
creasing the individuals' risk of renewing unemployment. Due to these unobservables 
programme participants' initial labour market possibilities, in terms of the repeat unem-
ployment incidence, are inferior to that of controls. 
What happens if we loosen the implicit assumption of an invariant programme ef-
fect of bivariate probit models? The estimates reported in table 5.3 show that this does 
not affect the inference concerning non-programme related factors. There are, however, 
two rather important changes in the parameter estimates of ALMP variables. First, cor-
relation between error terms turns out to be insignificantly different from zero, i.e. the 
selection bias can be eased, at least in this study, by introducing interaction terms in the 
probit model. This implies that omitted interaction terms cause there to appear to be en-
dogenous selection. A likely explanation for the finding is that, due to a large number of 
control variables, additional terms reduce considerably the unexplained part of repeat 
unemployment incidence. This in turn is reflected in the estimated correlation coefficient 
between the error terms in the repeat unemployment and participation equations. Sec-
ond, the significance levels of programme participation dummies fall. Unlike the impact 
on correlation coefficients, the introduction of interaction terms affects mainly the stan-
dard errors of programme dummies, not their absolute values. Hence, provided that dif-
ferences in programme effects across individual characteristics more or less cancel each 
other out, it is possible to estimate the mean programme effect by employing bivariate 
probit models. 
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Table 5.3 Repeat unemployment incidence; Varying programme effect. 
Estimated model 
Homoskedastic Heteroskedastic 
Switching Bivariate Switching Bivariate 
Probit Model Probit Model 
Interaction Interaction 
Terms Terms 
Intercept 0.349 0.582 
(0.476) (0.469) 
Individual characteristics 
Gender -0.015 0.106 -0.030 0.104 
(0.068) (0.114) (0.074) (0.126) 
Age 0.022 -0.002 0.020 0.013 
(0.024) (0.044) (0.025) (0.048) 
Age2 x 10-3 -2.182 -0.938 -2.398 -3.043 
(3.601) (6.739) (3.753) (7.403) 
Number of children under 0.058 -0.061 0.065 -0.108 
7 years of old (0.080) (0.147) (0.084) (0.158) 
Age of the youngest child 0.021 0.093 0.010 0.159 
0- 1 years (0.152) (0.260) (0.167) (0.284) 
Age of the youngest child -0.058 0.030 -0.064 0.065 
2 - 4 years (0.134) (0.250) (0.142) (0.269) 
Age of the youngest child -0.037 0.025 -0.010 0.000 
5 - 7 years (0.130) (0.225) (0.141) (0.242) 
Education -0.077 -0.068 -0.090 -0.087 
(0.034)*** (0.066) (0.045)** (0.082) 
Home ownership -0.011 -0.153 -0.029 -0.160 
(0.053) (0.093)* (0.056) (0.102) 
Disability 0.081 0.185 0.046 0.222 
(0.111) (0.165) (0.118) (0.182) 
Broader job seeking -0.188 -0.002 -0.173 -0.055 
(0.109)* (0.205) (0.118) (0.234) 
Spouse's education -0.008 0.003 -0.015 -0.008 
(0.032) (0.062) (0.038) (0.071) 
Marital status -0.073 -0.076 -0.053 -0.098 
(0.073) (0.127) (0.077) (0.138) 
Head of a family -0.125 -0.010 -0.125 -0.043 
(0.068)* (0.126) (0.075)* (0.138) 
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~abour market 
~ravel-to-work 0.039 -0.020 0.029 -0.003 
Unemployment rate (0.016)** (0.022) (0.015)* (0.025) 
Union member 
-0.107 -0.194 -0.105 -0.218 
(0.059)* (0.102)* (0.063)* (0.114)· 
Urban area 0.000 -0.035 -0.020 0.015 
(0.057) (0.100) (0.062) (0.109) 
Unemployment duration 0.150 -0.074 0.171 -0.079 
before the latest spell xl 0-2 (0.019)*** (0.025)*** (0.026)*** (0.030f* 
Southern Finland 0.093 -0.189 0.100 -0.203 
(0.110) (0.130) (0.099) (0.142) 
Central Finland 0.039 -0.078 0.048 -0.097 
(0.096) (0.130) (0.093) (0.140) 
Occupation: 
Technical -0.298 0.456 -0.311 0.406 
(0.188) (0.278) (0.183)* (0.319) 
Health care -0.152 0.191 -0.121 0.170 
(0.168) (0.249) (0.156) (0.269) 
Administrative -0.251 0.252 -0.236 0.243 
(0.125)** (0.185) (0.130)* (0.201) 
Mercantile -0.461 0.418 -0.430 0.435 
(0.154)*** (0.223)* (0.145)*** (0.238f 
FarmingiF orestry 0.218 0.450 0.291 0.329 
(0.190) (0.270)* (0.179) (0.278) 
Transport -0.146 0.441 -0.145 0.435 
(0.196) (0.308) (0.182) (0.317) 
Manufacture -0.250 0.393 -0.210 0.379 
(0.130)* (0.156)** (0.116)* (0.166f* 
Construction 0.426 0.032 0.483 0.012 
(0.179)** (0.218) (0.165)*** (0.228) 
Service -0.017 0.180 0.039 0.142 
(0.134) (0.176) (0.124) (0.184) 
Income variables 
Ln(monthly unemployment 0.065 0.062 0.079 0.051 
benefits) (0.008)*** (0.013)*** (0.012)*** (0.021f* 
Ln(monthlyearnings) -0.110 0.041 -0.119 0.046 
(0.020)*-- (0.032) (0.024)**- (0.035) 
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Ln( other income) 
Ln(spouse's income) 
Participation 
Participation dummy 
If[ eteroskedasticity 
correction terms 
trave1-to-work 
Unemployment rate 
Education 
Ln(monthly unemployment 
benefits) 
Ln( other income) 
P 
Log-likelihood 
Diagnostics 
W ALD test for 
identifying restriction 
LR test for heteroskedasticity 
LM test for normality 
Goint test) 
LM tests for the 
significance of cumulants: 
K30 
~1 
K12 
K03 
K40 
K31 
K" 
K 13 
0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.018 
(0.006)"-
-0.420 
(0.900) 
No 
0.006 
(0.014) 
0.004 
(0.011) 
0.112 (0.298) 
5175.141 
-0.016 [p=0.287] 
70.86 [p=0.000] 
10.25 [p=0.330] 
1.49 [p=0.222] 
0.13 [p=0.718] 
2.42 [p=0.1l9] 
2.14 [p=0.143] 
4.50 [p=0.033] 
0.95 [p=0.329] 
4.19 [p=0.040] 
0.05 [p=0.823] 
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0.001 
(0.008) 
-0.020 
(0.007)"** 
-0.830 
(0.870) 
Yes 
0.013 
(0.015) 
0.006 
(0.012) 
-0.027 (0.013)** 
0.118 (0.041)*** 
0.043 (0.013)"** 
-0.023 (0.010)"* 
0.169 (0.184) 
5139.707 
-0.012 [p=0.437] 
n/a 
7.34 [p=0.601] 
0.53 [p=0.466] 
0.36 [p=0.548] 
0.68 [p=0.409] 
0.44 [p=0.507] 
2.36 [p=0.124] 
0.85 [p=0.356] 
2.09 [p=0.148] 
0.63 [p=0.427] 
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K04 
N 
0.09 [p=0.764] 
4516 II 
2.17 [p=0.140] 
4516 
Notes: See table 5.1; The second column gives the parameter estimates of interaction tenns 
which are obtained by multiplying the variable in question with the programme dummy. 
5.4. Assessing the Effects of Active Labour Market Programmes 
It is difficult to get a comprehensive picture of the determinants of repeat un em-
ployment incidence from the parameter estimates alone. The signs of slope estimates in-
dicate the direction of the impact but the magnitude remains unclear due to indirect 
effects via the participation equation and the terms in heteroskedastic functions. For that 
reason it is informative to take a closer look at our main issue of interest; the impact of 
active labour market programmes on repeat unemployment incidence. Table 5.4 shows 
the predicted repeat unemployment probabilities and the estimated marginal programme 
effects for three types of individuals; disadvantaged, standard and advantaged. Column 1 
gives the results of the heteroskedasticity corrected pro bit model which has to be 
thought of as a baseline specification due to selection bias. The next five columns report 
the results of more convincing models; two bivariate probit specifications and three 
switching specifications. 
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Table 5.4. Estimated Repeat Unemployment Probabilities and Marginal Programme 
Effects. 
Model 
Hetero- Homo- Hetero- Switching Switching Switching 
sked. sked. sked. Hetero- Homo- Hetero-
Probit Bivariate Bivariate sked. sked. sked. 
Probit Probit Probit Bivariate Bivariate 
Probit Probit 
Selection correction No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Estimated Repeat 
Unemployment 
Probabilities 
Disadvantaged participant 84.13 66.04 68.00 81.02 63.97 65.32 
Standard participant 64.76 36.73 38.54 70.56 40.34 38.66 
Advantaged participant 34.55 3.46 10.60 34.96 4.l2 8.49 
Estimated Marginal 
Programme Effect 
Disadvantaged participant -2.37 -11.61 -11.14 -6.94 -9.97 -8.03 
Standard participant -2.86 -10.90 -11.65 0.83 -3.76 -4.57 
Advantaged participant -1.48 -3.47 -3.84 0.79 -0.39 -1.83 
Notes: (i) A standard participant is unmarried and evaluated at the means of continuous variables by 
setting all dummy variables to zeros. (ii) A disadvantaged participants is disabled with less than upper 
secondary education. His unemployment experience exceeds the average value by one standard devia-
tion (s.d). He lives in the high unemployment area (mean + I s.d.) where the local supply of ALMPs ex-
ceeds the average by I s.d. His unemployment benefits and monthly earnings are 1 s.d. below the 
average and he does not have any non-labour income. (iii) An advantaged participant is married with a 
standard spouse. He lives in the southern Finland in a low unemployment area (mean - 1 s.d.) where the 
local supply of ALMPs is 1 s.d. below the average. He has a university degree and works in a merchan-
dise occupation, owns a home, belongs to a union and was willing to accept a job offer outside his 
home community. His unemployment experience is 1 S.d. below the average. And finally, his unemploy-
ment benefits, earnings and non-labour income are 1 S.d. above the average values. 
The actual values of the estimated repeat unemployment probabilities cannot be 
given too much weight given that they have been calculated for very specific individuals. 
It is more interesting to examine the variation between individuals which is estimated as 
being some 46 - 68 percentage points. To get some idea of the economic significance of 
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active labour market policy, post-programme differences in the risk of renewing unem-
ployment should be compared to the marginal programme effect of disadvantaged par-
ticipants that centres around 10 percentage points. These two figures suggest that 
disadvantaged participants benefit considerably from participation but the gain is far 
from eliminating the differences in labour market outcomes due to their initially inferior 
labour market possibilities. 
All models agree that an advantaged participant benefits the least from active pro-
grammes. Depending on a model this result arises from different sources. In the het-
eroskedastic probit model (column 1) it follows from the non-linearity of the model, the 
constant programme dummy having smaller effect on the probability value in the lower 
end of the cumulative distribution function than in the middle parts of it. The non-
linearity plays a role also in constant effect bivariate probit models (columns 2 and 3), 
but the larger role is played by the participation equation. An advantaged person has 
characteristics which reduce the probability of participating in an active programme and 
this in turn is reflected in the marginal programme effect via the estimated positive cor-
relation coefficiene2. Finally in switching models the gain difference arises from individ-
ual characteristics. The flexibility of switching models in assessing ALMPs is particularly 
pronounced when comparing the marginal programme effects between disadvantaged 
and standard participants. 
The results reported in table 5.4 give some insight to the question of who benefits 
the most from ALMPs, but the analysis can be more detailed than that. To find out 'pure' 
differences across individual characteristics, we calculated marginal programme effects 
by adding specific characteristics, one at a time, to a standard participant defined in table 
5.4. After calculating marginal programme effects for newly defined persons, we 
12 If the characteristics of an advantaged individual are removed from the participation equation the 
estimated marginal programme effect increases nearer to 9 percentage points. 
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subtracted the ones reported for a standard participant in table 5.4 from them. These de-
viations are given in table 5.5. 
Even though the heteroskedastic bivariate probit model reported in column 1 does 
not allow the programme effect to differ across individual characteristics, there are some 
fairly large departures from the estimated mean programme effect. The discussion above 
reveals that this arises from two sources, viz. non-linearity and the determinants of par-
ticipation. The participation equation has some effects also on switching models, par-
ticularly on the magnitudes of programme effects across occupations. This is caused by 
the strong presence of occupation variables in the participation equation which seems to 
level out the differences in bivariate switching models. Having said that, it is encourag-
ing to note that the switching model is otherwise fairly robust to changes in 
specification. 
Table 5.5. The marginal programme effect according to individual characteristics; devia-
tions from the mean programme effect. 
Estimated deviation from the mean programme effect 
Heterosked Switching Switching Switching 
Bivariate Heterosked Homosked Heterosked 
Probit Probit Bivariate Bivariate 
Probit Probit 
Individual 
characteristics 
Age + 5 years -0.46 -0.40 -0.57 -0.31 
Education + 1 category -0.61 -2.02 -2.04 -1.57 
Home ownership -0.50 -5.83 -2.71 -2.80 
Disability -0.56 6.53 3.57 3.53 
Broader job seeking 3.86 -1.41 -0.09 0.67 
Head of a family -0.39 -1.57 -0.28 -0.78 
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Labour market 
Local unemployment rate -0.69 -1.42 -1.09 -0.48 
+ 1 s.d. 
Union member -5.83 -7.19 -5.19 -7.16 
South l.12 -6.66 -2.44 -2.35 
Unemployment duration 0.45 -2.89 -1.25 -1.00 
+ 3 months 
Unemployment duration l.06 -5.15 -2.40 -1.86 
+ 6 months 
Occupation: 
Technical 6.14 15.l6 5.97 5.48 
Health care 4.59 4.40 3.79 3.50 
Administrative l.78 7.69 4.73 4.04 
Mercantile 4.00 14.67 6.54 6.11 
F armingIF orestry 8.31 9.68 5.22 5.80 
Transport 7.49 14.85 5.43 5.42 
Manufacture 4.68 12.68 6.l5 5.49 
Construction 8.77 l.44 2.98 3.32 
Service 5.l3 4.00 3.59 3.28 
Income variables 
UNt benefits + 1 s.d. 4.03 5.86 4.16 3.50 
Other income + 1 s.d. 0.03 0.61 0.60 0.69 
Notes: Figures in bold indicate larger than average programme gains. 
If we loosen the restriction that the programme effect is equal for all participants, 
the results differ in two important respects. First, the estimates show that the pro-
gramme effect is about 4 - 6 percentage points lower for the disabled participants with 
other characteristics equal. Second, long unemployment experience increases the mar-
ginal programme effect in switching models. The latter is in line with the results reported 
in table 5.4, justifying the targeting of active programmes on hard-to-employ individuals. 
This is further confirmed by the finding that individuals without occupation (the omitted 
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category) have more than average gains from participation with all other characteristics 
equal. 
It is also evident that the mere comparison between disadvantaged and advantaged 
participants hides some interesting factors affecting the magnitude of the programme ef-
fect. Many characteristics, which cannot be thought of as describing disadvantaged per-
sons, bring about larger than mean benefits from active programmes. Regardless of the 
exact estimation method, factors connected to higher social status, such as education, 
home ownership and family status, increase the programme gain by some 1 - 5 percent-
age points each. In addition, individual motivation/closer attachment to labour markets, 
measured by broader job seeking and union membership variables, increases the benefi-
cial effect of active programmes. Finally, the results cast some doubts over the aim of 
reducing regional unemployment differences through active labour market policy. Par-
ticipants living in the southern part of Finland benefit some 2 - 6 percentage points more 
than participants in other parts of Finland with other characteristics equal. 
5.5. Conclusions 
In this chapter the effect of active labour market programmes on repeat unemploy-
ment incidence has been examined, the main technical issues of interest being (i) the 
specification of error processes, (ii) the specification of the programme effect and (iii) 
misspecification testing of micro econometric models. The estimations suggest that het-
eroskedasticity correction, despite the massive rejections of homoskedastic specifica-
tions, does not have any significant effect on the inference concerning ALMPs. This is 
an interesting result in its own right since it lends some support to the results of conven-
tional evaluation studies based on the assumption of homoskedastic disturbances. Unlike 
heteroskedasticity, the specification of the programme effect has some implications both 
137 
for the modelling strategy and for the policy recommendations. Conventional invariant 
programme effect specifications call for the estimation of a bivariate system, whereas the 
results indicate that the varying programme effect model can be estimated within a single 
equation framework. The greatest differences due to the specification of the programme 
effect arise when assessing the impacts of individual characteristics on programme gains. 
More precisely, policy recommendations concerning the use of active labour market pol-
icy in helping the disabled and the long-term unemployed in labour markets were found 
to differ drastically. 
Unlike the bulk of previous studies the estimated models were put under scrutiny 
by various misspecification tests. The implemented tests show that homoskedastic speci-
fications suffer from non-normalities which can be eased by proper specification of terms 
in the heteroskedastic function. Distribution tests proved to be valuable in constructing 
alternatives for homoskedastic models. Furthermore, misspecification tests lend some 
support on the estimated programme effects. Preferred specifications pass the imple-
mented tests, most notably the ones for distributional assumptions and for identifying 
restrictions. 
To summarise the effects of active programmes, it seems reasonable to hypothesise 
the following. First, the targeting of active programmes on hard-to-employ persons is 
justifiable. The results imply that disadvantaged participants benefit from an active pro-
gramme by a 7 - 11 percentage points reduction in the risk of renewing unemployment. 
Closer examination revealed notable differences across different groups of disadvan-
taged individuals. More precisely, the results of the switching models imply that active 
programmes do not improve the labour market possibilities of disabled participants. This 
lends some support to the views expressed in Blanchflower et. al. (1995), according to 
whom the public sector should help disabled persons by other means than active labour 
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market policy. Second, there is no clear evidence that advantaged individuals benefit 
from programmes. Switching models estimate the marginal programme effect being 
close to zero, the constant programme effect models implying moderate gains. Interest-
ingly the closer examination of individual characteristics shows that some factors con-
nected to higher social status, such as education, home ownership and family status, 
increase the mean programme effect by some 1 - 5 percentage points each. Third, the re-
sults cast considerable doubt on the aim of reducing regional unemployment differences 
through active labour market policy. Fourth, individuals' attachment to labour markets 
brings about greater programme benefits with union members' programme gain exceed-
ing that of non-members by some 6 percentage points with other characteristics being 
equal. 
Finally, active labour market policy can help disadvantaged participants only so far. 
Even though they benefit considerably from participating in an active labour market pro-
gramme, their post-programme risk of repeat unemployment remains some 50 - 60 per-
centage points higher than that of advantaged participants. Accordingly, the programme 
gain is far from removing the differences in labour market outcomes arising from initially 
inferior labour market possibilities of disadvantaged participants. This is well in line with 
the macroeconomic conclusion of the previous chapter which argued that active labour 
market policy helps to reduce open unemployment, at least in the high unemployment 
situation, but it is not a miracle cure. 
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Appendix 5.1. Diagnostic Tests for Bivariate and Endogenously Switching Bivariate 
Probit Models. 
In order to simplify expressions, we employ the following notation: 
Subscripts u and p refer to repeat unemployment and participation equations, respec-
tively. The subscript j = 1,2 denotes separate parameter vectors of participants (~1) and 
non-participants (~2) in the repeat unemployment equation of the switching model. In 
bivariate probit models the parameter vectors are equal for both groups, i.e., ~1 = ~2 = ~. 
By adopting the notations above, log-likelihood functions for the bivariate probit 
model (A2) and for the switching bivariate probit (A2') can be written as 
N 
(A2) InL = Lin <D2(qiuh iu , qiphip , p;) 
i=l 
N 
(A2') InL = L {piln <D2(qiuhiul, qiphip , p;) + (1 - Pi)ln <D2(qiuhiu2, qiph ip , p;)} . 
i=l 
Note the notational convention. Since participants and non-participants have the same 
parameter vector in the bivariate probit model, the subscript j= 1,2 does not enter equa-
tion (A2). The subscript 2 refers to the standard bivariate cumulative distribution when 
used in <D2, otherwise it refers to non-participants in the switching model. 
LM-test for heteroskedasticity can be based on the log-likelihood functions above. 
However, if we want to construct a test for the distributional assumption of bivariate 
normality, we have to allow local departures from normality. Lee (1984) constructed an 
alternative by expanding the joint density by a series of derivates of the standard bivari-
ate normal density. An attractive alternative to Lee's bivariate marginals is given in Mur-
phy (1994) who based a series expanSIOn on univariate marginals, i.e. a series of 
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derivates of the standard normal density, which simplifies calculations considerably. In 
constructing a series expansion one needs orthogonal polynomials corresponding to the 
marginals. The general procedure for doing this has been set up by Cameron & Trivedi 
(1990). For normal densities, however, the generating function is known to consist of 
Hermite polynomials, which are tabulated in Kendall & Stuart (1969, p. 155), inter alia. 
Formulas for constructing an alternative to bivariate normality are given in Ord (1972) 
and Murphy (1994), so they are not repeated here. If an expansion is up to the fourth 
order, it is straightforward to show that the normality test can be based on the log-
likelihood function in which the following expansion term is added to joint densities, cI>2 
(A3) 
In equation (A3), HI's are Hermite polynomials of the lth order; cI> and <I> denote the 
standard normal cumulative distribution and the standard normal probability distribution, 
respectively; and KS refer to cumulants. Expansion term for testing the distributional as-
sumption of the bivariate probit model is obtained by setting hiu) = hiu2 = hiu. As a final re-
mark, the resulting log-likelihood functions account for all necessary sign changes 
needed in calculating different probabilities. 
The LM test statistics reported in this paper all take the form 
(A4) 
where 1 is an n-dimensional vector of ones and C is a n X k - matrix, each column of 
which contains individual score contributions corresponding to k parameters of the gen-
eral model. In other words, the elements of C - matrix consist of the first order partial 
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derivates of the log-likelihood function for the alternative that are evaluated under the 
null hypothesis. It has to be noted that the test statistic can also be calculated through 
the explained sum of squares from an uncentered artificial regression of the column vec-
tor 1 on each column ofC. 
Normality test 
Under the null hypothesis of bivariate normality all expansion terms in equation (A3) 
are zero, which can be tested through 1<30= lSI = ... = K04 = O. In the switching model the 
score contributions needed in constructing the ith row of the C - matrix are follows 
(AS) 
d InL Piqiuqip$2(qiuhiul, qiph ip , p7) 
~ = CP2(qiuhiul, qiphip , p7) 
dlnL = ( PiqiU$(hiUl)CP(biUd* (XiBl)+ 
dB CP2(qiuhiul, qiphip , Pi) 
(1 - Pi)qiU$(hiU2)CP(b~U2) (XiB2))exp( -WiuB)( -WiU ) CP2(qiuhiu2, qiphip , Pi) 
dlnL = ( PiqiP$(hiP)CP(biPl)* + 
de CP2(qiuhiul, qiphip , Pi) 
(1 - Pi)qiP$(hiP)CP(bi~2) (Ziy))eXP(-Wipe) ( -Wip ) CP2(qiuhiu2, qiphip , Pi) 
d InL = l(PiqiU(( -h iu1 )2 - 1)$(hiu1 )~(qiphiP) + 
dK 30 6 CP2(qiuhiul, qiphip , Pi ) 
(1-Pi)qiU(( -h iu2 )2 - 1)$(hiu2}CP(qiphiP)) 
CP2(qillh iu2 , qiph ip , Pi ) 
d InL = l(PiqiuqiP( -hiUd$(hiUd$~hiP) + 
dK 21 2 CP2(qiuhiul, qiphip , Pi) 
(1 - PI)qiuqip( -hiU2)$(hiU2}$(hiP)) 
CP2(qlllh iu2 , qiph ip , Pi) 
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d InL = 1 !PiqiUq ip<!>(h iu1 )( -hip)<!>(hip ) (1 -pi )qiuqip<!>(hiu2 )( -hip ) <!>(h ip ) ) 
dK 12 2 <fh(qiuhiul,qiphip,P~) + cI>2(qiuhiu2,qiphip,P~) 
d InL = .l...(PiqipcI>(qiuhiul )(( -hip) 3 - 3( -~iP»<!>(hiP) +. 
dK o4 24 cI>2(qiuhiul, qiphip , Pi ) 
(1 - Pi)qipcI>(qiuhiu2)(( -hip) 3 - 3*( -hiP»<!>(hiP» 
cI>2(qiuh iu2, qiphip , Pi ) 
Under the null the test statistic is asymptotically X2-distributed with 9 degrees of free-
dom. Instead of the joint test one can also test each cumulant (K) in turn, each test being 
X2 -distributed with 1 degree of freedom. The score contributions for testing normality in 
bivariate probit models are obtained by setting ~l = ~2 = ~, which indicates that hiu1= hiu2 
Heteroskedasticity test 
When testing for heteroskedasticity under the assumption of bivariate normality, 
the C - matrix does not include the score contributions of expansion terms, 
dlnL dlnL dlnL An h d"fi" d d . " (A5)' h h 
-- -:'1-, ... , -:'1- . ot er mo 1 catIon nee e m equatIOns IS t at t e pa-dK 30' oK2I oK04 
rameter vectors of heteroskedasticity correction terms, 8 and 8, are zeros when evaluat-
ing the score contributions under the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. The 
corresponding test statistic is then asymptotically X2 - distributed with degrees of free-
dom equalling the number of excluded heteroskedasticity correction terms. 
Independence test 
As above, under bivariate normality the C - matrix does not include partial deri-
. dlnL dlnL dlnL " " 
vates of expanSIOn terms, -:'1-, -:'1-, ... , -:'1-. Under the null hypothesIs of mde-
oK30 oK21 oK04 
pendence the correlation term is zero, i.e. P = O. It can be easily shown that the score 
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contributions evaluated under the null become the generalised residuals of the probit 
model. The resulting test statistic is asymptotically X2 - distributed with one degree of 
freedom. 
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Appendix 5.2. The Determinants of the Repeat Unemployment Incidence; Probit 
Specifications. 
Estimated model 
Homosked Heterosked Heteroske Heteroskedastic 
astic astic dastic Switching 
Probit Probit Probit Probit 
Interaction 
Terms 
Intercept 0.325 0.298 0.352 0.292 
(0.344) (0.352) (0.312) (0.366) 
Individual ehareteristies 
Gender 0.029 0.014 0.009 -0.026 0.075 
(0.053) (0.057) (0.049) (0.059) (0.106) 
Age 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.014 0.010 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.020) (0.040) 
Age2 x 10-3 -0.738 -1.694 -1.299 -1.721 -2.237 
(2.995) (3.014) (2.633) (3.007) (6.093) 
Number of children under 0.054 0.054 0.048 0.051 -0.083 
7 years of old (0.065) (0.064) (0.060) (0.070) (0.132) 
Age of the youngest child 0.011 -0.002 0.012 0.017 0.134 
0- 1 years (0.120) (0.118) (0.114) (0.138) (0.241) 
Age of the youngest child -0.073 -0.085 -0.076 -0.056 0.039 
2 - 4 years (0.110) (0.112) (0.102) (0.116) (0.226) 
Age of the youngest child -0.048 -0.053 -0.039 -0.019 0.011 
5 - 7 years (0.103) (0.104) (0.094) (0.114) (0.196) 
Education -0.110 -0.140 -0.120 -0.089 -0.051 
(0.026f** (0.056f* (0.034f** (0.034f** (0.063) 
Home ownership -0.074 -0.069 -0.073 -0.011 -0.140 
(0.042)* (0.050) (0.041f (0.046) (0.087) 
Disability 0.147 0.123 0.101 0.019 0.177 
. (0.080)* (0.106) (0.076) (0.094) (0.152) 
Broader job seeking -0.163 -0.144 -0.140 -0.152 -0.034 
(0.090f (0.111) (0.085)* (0.097) (0.188) 
Spouse's education -0.000 -0.003 -0.007 -0.007 -0.012 
(0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.030) (0.057) 
Maritia! status -0.090 -0.060 -0.068 -0.043 -0.081 
(0.057) (0.063) (0.054) (0.062) (0.114) 
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Specifications. 
Head of a family 
-0.124 -0.115 -0.l02 -0.096 -0.038 
(0.056)*· (0.072) (0.054)* (0.060) (0.112) 
Labour market 
travel-to-work 0.028 0.013 0.014 0.021 -0.014 
Unemployment rate (0.010)··· (0.011) (0.010) (0.012)· (0.019) 
Union member -0.l95 -0.168 -0.139 -0.059 -0.190 
(0.046)··· (0.073)·· (0.049)·" (0.052) (0.095)*+ 
Urban area -0.005 -0.019 -0.010 -0.010 -0.005 
(0.045) (0.049) (0.042) (0.050) (0.091) 
Unemployment duration before 0.116 0.153 0.138 0.179 -0.087 
the latest spell xl 0-2 (0.012)*·· (0.053)··· (0.030)··· (0.039)·" (0.032)··· 
Southern Finland 0.035 0.052 0.041 0.115 -0.169 
(0.061) (0.067) (0.058) (0.073) (0.121) 
Central Finland 0.006 0.020 0.012 0.055 -0.074 
(0.061) (0.064) (0.056) (0.072) (0.117) 
Occupation: 
Technical -0.041 0.022 0.005 -0.168 0.387 
(0.113) (0.126) (0.114) (0.135) (0.265) 
Health care 0.009 0.054 0.033 -0.063 0.109 
(0.104) (0.110) (0.101) (0.120) (0.223) 
Administrative -0.080 -0.066 -0.046 -0.169 0.183 
(0.087) (0.095) (0.081) (0.106) (0.168) 
Mercantile -0.238 -0.162 -0.l46 -0.299 0.343 
(0.101)·· (0.116) (0.093) (0.117)·· (0.204)· 
FarminglF orestry 0.466 0.449 0.419 0.246 0.364 
(0.112)*·· (O.l72)"· (0.125)*·· (0.133)* (0.232) 
Transport 0.082 0.l07 0.099 -0.055 0.418 
(0.119) (O.l27) (0.111) (0.126) (0.266) 
Manufacture -0.015 0.061 0.049 -0.l28 0.325 
(0.070) (0.074) (0.066) (0.085) (0.145)++ 
Construction 0.598 0.649 0.578 0.440 0.067 
(0.095)·" (0.223)*·· (0.133)*·· (0.135)*" (0.191) 
Scnicc 0.130 0.211 0.178 0.081 0.112 
(0.080) (0.103)·· (0.080)*· (0.094) (0.153) 
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Specifications. 
Income variables 
Ln(monthly unemployment 0.089 0.096 0.085 0.061 0.057 
benefits) (0.005)*** (0.031)*** (0.015)*** (0.012)*** (0.014f** 
Ln(monthly earnings) 
-0.092 -0.075 -0.079 -0.087 0.026 
(0.015)*** (0.021f** (0.018)*** (0.022f** (0.029) 
Ln( other income) 0.011 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.004 
(0.006)* (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) 
Ln(spouse's income) -0.016 -0.017 -0.015 -0.017 0.004 
(0.005f** (0.007)** (0.005f** (0.006)*** (0.010) 
[participation 
Participation dummy -0.063 -0.076 -0.069 -0.324 
(0.045) (0.053) (0.044) (0.681) 
ill eteroskedasticity correc- No Yes Yes Yes 
tion terms (21 terms; 
travel-to-work not shown) -0.043 -0.031 (0.013)** 
Unemployment rate (0.013)*** 
Education 0.117 0.100 (0.042f* 
(0.042)*** 
Ln(monthly unemployment 0.049 0.036 (0.014)** 
benefits) (0.015)** 
Ln( other income) -0.022 -0.021 (0.010)** 
(0.009f 
Age -0.008 -0.009 (0.004)** 
(0.004f* 
Union member 0.169 0.160 (0.077)** 
(0.077)** 
Unemployment duration 0.041 0.058 (0.020)*** 
(0.019f* 
p n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Log-likelihood 2614.806 2594.224 2597.836 2566.569 
Diagnostics 
LR test for heteroskedasticity 41.16 n/a 7.22 n/a 
[p=O.OO5] [p=0.925] 
LM test for normality 7.13 4.10 2.77 1.12 [p=0.571] 
(joint test) [p=O.028] [p=0.128] [p=0.250] 
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Specifications. 
LM tests for nonnality 1.06 1.79 0.89 0.97 [p=0.324] 
(PredA 2) [p=0.303] [p=0.180] [p=0.345] 
LM tests for nonnality 6.10 3.83 2.76 0.65 [p=0.420] 
(PredA 3) [p=0.013] [p=0.050] [p=0.096] 
N 4516 4516 4516 4516 
Notes: See tables 5.1 and 5.2. 
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Data Appendix. Means and Definitions of the Variables. 
Variables 
Individual characteristics 
Gender (= 1 if female) 
Age# 
Number of children under 7 years of old# 
Age of the youngest child 0 - 1 years 
Age of the youngest child 2 - 4 years 
Age of the youngest child 5 - 7 years 
Education# (ranges between 0 = less than upper secon-
dary education and 5 = more than master's degree) 
Home ownership 
Disability 
Broader job seeking (= 1 if willing to accept a job offer 
outside a home community) 
Spouse's education# (as education) 
Marital status (= 1 if married) 
Head of a family 
Labour market 
Travel-to-work Unemployment rate# 
Union member 1988 
Union member 1989 
Urban area (= 1 if lives in an urban area) 
Unemployment duration before the latest spell# (days) 
Southern Finland 
Central Finland 
Occupation 
Technical 
Health care 
Administrative 
Mercantile 
F armingiF orestry 
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Mean 
0.47 
31.66 
0.29 
0.08 
0.08 
0.04 
0.86 
0.56 
0.07 
0.05 
0.52 
0.35 
0.22 
5.95 
0.54 
0.64 
0.53 
138.88 
0.53 
0.25 
0.05 
0.05 
0.10 
0.05 
0.05 
Transport 
Manufacture 
Construction 
Service 
Income variables 
Ln(Monthly unemployment benefits t 
Ln(Monthly earnings)# 
Ln( Other income)# 
Ln(Spouse's income t 
0.03 
0.23 
0.09 
0.13 
5.26 
8.26 
2.22 
6.18 
Notes: # denotes that a variable is not a dichotomous one. The variable names are largely self-
explanatory but for some variables definitions are given. 
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CHAPTER 6. 
The Impact of Active Programmes on Employment 
in the Eras of High and Low Unemployment 
The point made strongly in earlier chapters is that active labour market policy is 
useful in combating unemployment but its effect is rather limited. To get a fuller picture 
of the functioning of Finnish active labour market policy at the individual level, this 
chapter aims to shed some light on the relative efficiency of different programmes. By 
this means it complements the previous chapter which focused on variations in pro-
gramme effects across different individuals according to their characteristics. 
Chapter 4 raised the question of the effectiveness of active labour market policy in 
different unemployment situations. Whether or not the macroeconomic conclusions hold 
also at the individual level is an interesting issue in its own right. For that reason, this 
chapter examines active programmes through their impact on participants' months of 
employment in the eras of low and high unemployment with the open unemployment 
rates of 4.5 and 15.5 per cent, respectively. The choice of the dependent variable is mo-
tivated by the possibility of incorporating both the employment probability and the job 
stability aspects of active programmes into a single outcome variable. By this means the 
chapter also broadens the view taken in chapter 5 in which the focus was purely on job 
stability. 
A number of interesting questions are raised by examining various types of pro-
grammes in different unemployment situations. Surely high unemployment worsens em-
ployment prospects, but does it have the same effect on programme participants and 
non-participants? Do participants in selective employment measures have a better 
chance of becoming hired given that they can demonstrate their ability to a potential em-
pI oyer? Is labour market training useless in the high unemployment situation when 
151 
vacancies are low? These are questions about which we know desperately little and 
which cannot be fully answered by official statistics. After all, the fact that the propor-
tion of programme participants who are employed after some time since terminating a 
programme is inversely related to unemployment, does not tell us much about the effec-
tiveness of programmes. 
6.1. Modelling Self-Selection and Employment Months 
The focus of this chapter is on modelling annual working months. The dependent 
variable is measured as the number of months in open employment during one calendar 
year, i.e. subsidised working months have not been included in the dependent variable. 
This results in the censored dependent variable, observed months in employment being 
constrained between 0 and 12 months. Since the rapid increase in unemployment in the 
early 90s the proportion of relatively short, fixed term contracts of new recruits l has in-
creased, we allow for multiple employment periods in the dependent variable. In this set-
ting, conditional on normality and exogenous selection on programmes, ALMPs can be 
assessed by the two-limit tobit model which is reported, for instance, in Maddala (1983) 
and used in Stewart & Swaffield (1997). Chapter 3 revealed, however, that several stud-
ies have reported non-random selection of programme participants and non-participants. 
The endogeneity of individuals' programme participation decisions can be modelled 
through the following two equation system 
(1) y; = ~Xi + api + Ci; y = 0 if y'" < L; Y = y'" if L ~ y'" ~ U; Y = U if i > U 
(2) p = 0 ifp'" ~ 0; p = 1 ifp'" > O. 
I The proportion of fixed term contracts of all new contracts has increased from 40 to 60 per cent be-
twccn the years 1989 and 1993 (parjanne, 1997). 
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The observed employment months, y, and the observed participation status, p, are 
realisations of the underlying latent variables y. and p*. In the usual manner, the variables 
determining employment (Xi and p) and programme participation (Z) are connected to 
the latent variables via linear indicator functions. The information about the limited de-
pendent variables differs between equations. The observed employment months variable 
gives some quantitative information between the limits Land U, whereas the participa-
tion variable, p, reveals merely the sign of the underlying latent variable. In this setting 
the second equation can be interpreted as the propensity to participate in an active pro-
gramme. If the latent employment variable y* is analogously interpreted as 'desired' 
months in employment, the model has similarities to second generation labour supply 
models, see Killingsworth (1983). The analogy cannot be pushed too far given that 
working months are constrained at the upper limit by the research design, not by the 
economic environment which affects individuals' labour supply decisions. Accordingly, 
the exact specification of the employment equation is motivated by the search theoretic 
framework below. 
Active programmes have a potential impact on the probability of working exactly 
the limit number of months in a year, together with the effect on the expected number of 
employment months between the censoring points Land U. If we further allow the en-
dogeneity of the individual participation decision, the likelihood function becomes 
(3) L = TI Pr(y* ~L, p* ~ 0) TI Pr(y* ~L, p* > 0) 
NI N2 
TIPr(L<y* < U, p* ~O)!(y I L<y* < U, p* ~O) 
N3 
TIPr(L <y* < U, p* > O)!(y I L <y* < U, p* > 0) 
N4 
TI Pr(y* > U, p* ~ 0) TIPr(y* > U, p* > 0) . 
Ns N6 
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Equation (3) divides the two dimensional plane into six parts; two censored regions and 
one uncensored region both for the participants (p. > 0) and for the non-participants (p. 
< 0). The number of observations in each of the regions is denoted as Nj , j running from 
one to six. It is easily seen that the likelihood function reduces to Amemiya's (1984) type 
2 tobit model when the upper limit goes to infinity and only observations from, say, pro-
gramme participants are in hand. If, on the other hand, the selection is purely based on 
observables, as defined in Heckman & Hotz (1989), the likelihood function reduces to 
the 2-limit tobit model. 
O'Higgins (1994) has pointed out that in the bivariate probit model the self-
selection bias arising from the non-random selection of programme participants cannot 
be consistently corrected by the standard Heckman procedure (Heckman, 1979) due to 
non-linearities. In the current setting, this rules out the two-stage estimation method in 
which the correction terms are based on the probit estimates of participation equation. 
The reason for this is that the four censored regions (Nl' N2, Ns, N6) in the likelihood 
function (3) correspond to the bivariate probit model under the assumption of normality. 
Let us now concentrate on the two regions in which the employment months vari-
able is uncensored, i.e. the regions N3 and N4. We can rewrite the third component of 
the likelihood function as 
(4) ITPr(L<y* < U, P~O)x{p (L .1 U <0/ Uj'f'JtE,l])drtdE}. 
N3 r <y < ,p - L-l3Xi --00 
It is assumed that the joint density f( £, 11) is bivariate normal with the correlation coefIi-
cient p and standard deviations cr and cr . Since we only observe the sign of the latent y p 
participation variable, we normalise crp = 1. After this modification the joint density 
becomes 
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(5) 
where <1>2 denotes for the standard bivariate normal density function for ~= clay and ll. 
To write down the likelihood function, we employ the joint density (5) and the 
correspondence of limit observation probabilities with the bivariate probit model. All 
necessary sign changes due to different participation status can be taken into account by 
defining q = 2p - 1. If we further define the standardised censoring points as a l = (U -
~Xi - ap)/ay and b l = (L - ~Xi - ap)/ay, the likelihood function (3) can be rewritten as 
al -yZ; 
(6) L = IT tl>2(b 1,qxyZ i,-qXP) IT d J J <1>2(~, ll, p) drt~ 
Nl+N2 N3 Y b1 --00 
al 00 
IT d J J <1>2(~, ll, p) drt~ IT tl>2(-al,qxyZ i,qxP)· 
N4 Y b1 yZ/ Ns+N6 
The non-standard distribution of employment months shown in figures 6.1 a and 
6.1 b below suggests an alternative to the likelihood function above. Since the limit ob-
servations contain the bulk of information, the empirical part of the paper reports also 
the results of the model which merely employs information about whether observations 
are at the standardised censoring points or between these limits. This is a straightfor-
ward extension of the two-limit probit model reported in Rossett and Nelson (1975), see 
also Maddala (1983) p. 162, to a bivariate case. Under the assumption of normality, the 
likelihood function of the limit observation model becomes 
(7) L= IT tl>2(b 1,qxyZi,-qXP) IT {tl>2(al,qxyZi,-qxP)-
Nl+N2 N3+N 4 
tl>2(b 1, q X yZi, -q X p)} IT tl>2(-al, q X yZi, q X p) 
Ns+N6 
It has to be noted that the procedure is not fully efficient, since it merely employs 
information about the number of observations at the standardised censoring points and 
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between these limits. However, it offers an interesting alternative to the likelihood func-
tion (6), since the massive number of limit observations may result only in modest effi-
ciency loss2. 
6.2. Data Description 
The analyses in the study are based on two separate random samples originating 
from the longitudinal data set which has been constructed from the 1990 population cen-
sus by the Statistics Finland. As discussed in the previous chapter, the population census 
is based on various registers including tax registers, pension and benefit registers, stu-
dent registers, and registers collected by employment service offices. The main benefit of 
register data is that analyses are not subject to recall bias which may be a problem in sur-
vey based data sets. Having said that, register based data sets tend to be standardised, 
lacking characteristics which are likely to affect individual decisions. Fortunately the 
trade-off between reliability and information tends to become less pronounced greater 
the number of data sources. 
In evaluation studies the problem of modelling arises from the fact that we do not 
have observations of the same individuals in different states, i.e. participating in a pro-
gramme and non-participating. For that reason one needs a comparison group which is 
thought of presenting the labour market outcome under evaluation had participants not 
participated in programmes. In this chapter the programme participation dummy obtains 
the value one if an individual has entered and terminated an active programme between 
January 1 and December 31 in 1988 (1991 when the era of high unemployment is under 
consideration). A natural control group for assessing the effectiveness of ALMPs con-
sists of eligible non-participants. The eligibility criteria is deemed to be fulfilled if a 
2 In what follows. we use the name full information model when referring to the likelihood function 
(6) and the limited information model "hen referring to the likelihood function (7). 
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person has been registered as an unemployed job seeker at the employment agency in 
1988 (1991 when the era of high unemployment is under consideration). The dependent 
variable measures the annual working months of these persons in open employment in 
1989 (1992 when the era of high unemployment is under consideration). The choice of 
the dependent variable is motivated by the possibility of incorporating both the employ-
ment probability and the job stability aspects of active programmes into a single out-
come variable, i.e. getting a hire is not the prerequisite for entering the sample as it was 
in chapter 5. Finally, to concentrate on persons truly unemployed, we excluded pension-
ers, students and men in military service. For the same reason, only persons who have 
finished the comprehensive school, i.e. over 16 years of old, are included in the sample. 
One objective of the study is to examine possible differences in the effectiveness 
of active labour market programmes in different unemployment situations. Finland offers 
an ideal 'natural experiment' for trying to answer this question since open unemployment 
rose from 4.5 to 15.5 per cent during the sample years 1988 - 92, see chapter 2. This is 
shown in the inflow figures of the two separate samples, the sample size doubling in 
three years from 5975 to 10915 observations3. To shed some light on the largely ne-
glected issue of repeat programme participation, figure 6.1 b reports regular working 
months for subsamples excluding recurrent programme participants. There are 855 
(1903) persons who participated in a programme in 1989 (1992), of which 46 (29) per 
cent participated in a programme also in the previous year. Clearly a programme partici-
pation in 1989/1992 reduces regular employment months used in assessing the effective-
ness of ALMPs. In the current context it is not possible to allow two endogenous 
participation decisions without considerably increasing the complexity of the model. 
In drawing the samples the original data of some 180000 individuals has been randomly divided to 
two. roughly equally sized parts. Accordingly. the same individuals do not contribute to unemployment 
in different eras. 
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Given this restriction, we can either exclude recurrent participants or introduce an ex-
ogenous dummy variable into estimations. In both cases we are able to control observ-
able factors affecting the 'subsequent' programme participation decision. 
The first thing to notice from figures 6.1a and 6.1b is that expanding unemploy-
ment has a strong impact on the number of censored observations. In both groups the 
percentage share of persons having no regular employment months has increased by 
some 20 percentage points. Interestingly, deteriorating employment prospects have 
mainly affected the non-participants observed as upper limit cases. The control group 
has experienced a 20 percentage points drop in individuals working full twelve months 
whereas the corresponding proportion of programme participants has remained more or 
less equal between the two eras. It is somewhat surprising that programme participants 
seem to polarise into limit observations, the phenomenon requiring closer examination. 
This is done in table 6.1 which shows the number of participants in censoring points 
across different programme categories. 
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Figure 6.1a The Percentage Shares of Individuals According to Their Employment 
Months; Full Sample. 
Employment months in 1989 (N=5975) 
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Figure 6.1h The Percentage Shares of Individuals According to Their Employment 
Months; Subsample. 
Employment months in 1989 (N=5120) 
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The first column of table 6.1 reports the number of participants in the years 1988 
and 1991. These figures are well in line with the figure 2.7 in chapter 2 which showed 
the number of participants in labour market training and in selective employment meas-
ures. Finnish ALM policy has a strong emphasis towards selective employment meas-
ures, even though the share of participants in training programmes increased at the 
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beginning of the 1990s. A substantial increase in the actual number of trainees shown in 
table 6.1 is consistent with the official figures (Finnish Labour Review) according to 
which the number of trainees completing a training course increased from 1900 to 3600 
between December 1988 and December 1991. The introduction of the 1987 Employ-
ment Act is also reflected in table 6.1, the proportion of job placements offered as a last 
resort increasing sharply between the years 1988 and 1991. 
Table 6.1 Proportions of Participants in Censoring Points. 
1988 Number of Full sample Subsample 
participants 
(full sample) Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Job placement 924 347/37.6% 143/15.5% 207/36.1% 141/24.6% 
Job placement in the 152 40/26.3% 47/30.9% 27/24.8% 47/43.1% 
private sector 
Half-time job placement 124 44/35.5% 16/12.9% 23/27.7% 16/19.3% 
Job placement as a last 392 188/48.0% 29/7.4% 109/52.2% 27/12.9% 
resort 
Labour market training 301 44/14.6% 115/38.2% 32/l3.1% 114/46.7% 
ALMPs in total 1205 388/32.2% 256/21.2% 238/29.3% 253/31.2% 
1991 Number of Full sample Subsample 
participants 
(full sample) Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Job placement 1216 824/67.8% 66/5.4% 560/68.6% 66/8.1% 
Job placement in the 217 96/44.2% 19/8.8% 58/40.9% 19/ l3.4% 
private sector 
Half-time job placement 36 19/52.8% 2/5.6% 15/48.4% 2/6.5% 
Job placement as a last 832 646/77.6% 17/2.0% 443/80.4% 17/3.1% 
resort 
Labour market training 738 194/26.3% 304/41.2% 121/20.9% 294/50.8% 
161 
Training offered to laid- 361 20/5.5% 236/65.4% 11/3.5% 227/71.8% 
off persons 
ALMPs in total 1920 1000/52.1% 368/19.2% 669/48.6% 358/26.0% 
.. Notes: The first column reports the number of partIcIpants across programme categories. The next two 
columns show the number of participants/the percentage share of participants in specific programme 
categories observed as limit cases when the whole sample is employed. The last two columns give the 
corresponding figures when recurrent programme participants are excluded from the sample. 
Table 6.1 suggests that increasing unemployment affects participants in different 
programmes in different ways. The proportion of labour market training participants, 
who have been employed for 12 months, has remained well above 30 per cent regardless 
of the sample. Even though the share of training participants having no employment 
months has increased substantially, a rise has remained some 20 percentage points 
smaller than the one experienced by participants in selective employment measures. Fol-
lowing the discussion in chapter 2, one obvious explanation for the finding is the differ-
ence in target groups of labour market training and selective employment measures. 
It is possible to identify one group of trainees which is relatively advantaged com-
pared to other programme participants, namely persons in laid-off training. These per-
sons form almost a half of all labour market trainees in 1991 and only some 30 per cent 
of them have reported unemployment periods in 1990 - 91. Despite the superior employ-
ment record of laid-off trainees, we have included them in the analysis for two reasons. 
First, the advantage does not seem to be universal, some laid-off trainees having no em-
ployment months. Second, chapter 2 revealed that this increase in the number of training 
places offered to laid-off persons was a temporary phenomenon. Nevertheless, there is a 
clear case for controlling participation in laid-off training when analysing the data from 
the early 1990s. 
As a part of the data analysis, we fitted simple bivariate probit models for limit ob-
servation probabilities. The estimated models consist of two equations; one for the 
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participation decision and the other one either for the probability of having no employ-
ment months (Lower) or for the probability of working a full twelve months (Upper). 
Table 6.2 reports the estimated coefficients of participation variables together with the 
correlation coefficient4. For the sake of completeness the results are given both for the 
whole sample and for the subsample excluding recurrent participants. 
The results are largely consistent with the figures given in table 6.1. Participation 
in an active programme has a beneficial effect on the probability of working the whole 
year regardless of a sample. When it comes to the lower limit, different eras of unem-
ployment produce different results. The participation dummy has a well determined 
negative parameter only in the era of high unemployment. The estimated differences 
across programme categories are also in line with the figures reported in table 6.1. Most 
of the beneficial effects of ALMPs are produced by training programmes. Placements in 
the private sector seem to yield greater benefits than job placements in the public sector, 
even though its effect on the probability of working full twelve months has dropped be-
tween the eras of unemployment. This may reflect the impact of relatively short fixed 
term contracts which have become more common in the early 1990s. The results also in-
dicate that the obligation to employ the long-term unemployed was unsuccessful, this 
group of programme participants showing the worst record in terms of limit observa-
tions across different programme groups. 
4 Other variables included in estimations are the same as used in estimating likelihood fun~tions (6) 
and (7), see table 6.3 for the employment equation and appendix 6.3 for the participation equatIOn. 
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Table 6.2 The results of the Bivariate Pro bit Models for Limit Probabilities. 
1989 Whole sample Recurrent participants 
excluded 
Lower Upper Lower 11ppg 
Placement in the private sector 0.097 0.395 0.035 0.421 
(0.13) (0. 14Y" (0.15) (0.14)"" 
Half-time placement 0.018 -0.391 
-0.167 
-0.372 
(0.14) (0.18)"' (0.18) (0.18)"' 
Placement as a last resort 0.527 -0.305 0.613 -0.384 
(0.09Y" (0.13)"' (0.13)"" (0.14)"" 
Programme participation in 1989 0.261 -2.045 n/a n/a 
(0.05)"" (0.18)*" 
Participation dummy 
-0.016 0.538 0.555 0.562 
(0.32) (0.32Y (0.32)" (0.36) 
p -0.079 -0.143 -0.338 -0.158 
(0.17) (0.17) (0.16)"" (0.19) 
1992 Whole sample Recurrent participants 
excluded 
Lower Upper Lower Upper 
Placement in the private sector -0.057 -0.361 0.020 -0.328 
(0.10) (0.14)*' (0.13) (0.14)"' 
Half-time placement 0.151 -0.511 0.037 -0.474 
(0.24) (0.26)" (0.25) (0.26)" 
Placement as a last resort 0.709 -0.824 0.882 -0.779 
(0.07Y" (0.13)"" (0.09)*" (0.13)"" 
Programme participation in 1992 0.440 -l.604 n/a n/a 
(0.03)"" (0.11)"" 
Participation dummy -l.011 l.881 -l.170 l.939 
(0. 17Y" (0. 12Y" (0.18)"" (0.12)"" 
p 0.370 -0.610 0.448 -0.640 
(0.09Y" (0.06Y" (0.09)"" (0.06)"" 
Notes: * = significant at the 10 per cent significance level; ** = significant at the 5 per cent signifi-
cance level; *** = significant at the 1 per cent significance level. The first two columns refer to whole 
sample estimates when recurrent programme participation is controlled by an exogenous dummy vari-
able. The last two columns give the results when recurrent participants have been omitted from estima-
tions. p is the estimated correlation coefficient. 
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Finally it is interesting to note that unobservable factors are more pronounced in 
the era of high unemployment. The signs of the estimated correlation coefficients reveal 
that programme participants have some unobservable factors which make the participa-
tion more likely and increase (reduce) the probability of working zero months (twelve 
months). Statistically significant correlation coefficients in the early 1990s may indicate 
that the control group has become relatively more advantaged compared to programme 
participants. A sharp increase in inflow rates has also affected advantaged workers who 
usually are immune to unemployment, whereas programme participants might have been 
selected according to old, e.g .. the length of unemployment, rules. 
6.3. Empirical Results 
The actual participation in an active programme is a complicated process which 
consists of several stages as discussed in Raaum et. al. (1995). Accordingly a single par-
ticipation equation should include the factors affecting both individual decisions and pro-
gramme administrators' decisions. Broadly speaking, active programmes are offered to 
hard-to-employ persons. This calls for inclusion of variables, such as education, disabil-
ity, occupational status, and previous labour market experience, all of which can be 
thought of as characterising disadvantaged individuals. In addition to supply side effects, 
these factors are also likely to affect the demand of active programmes by lowering the 
opportunity cost of participation. Another objective of Finnish active programmes is to 
reduce regional unemployment differences. To embody this aim into the programme par-
ticipation equation, characteristics of a living community, such as travel-to-work unem-
ployment rate and the dummy variable for urban communities, are included in 
estimations. Since the local supply of ALMPs affects the participation probability, we 
have followed Torp (1994) and included the local programme participation rate variable 
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in the participation equation. Other potential determinants of participation decision in-
cluded among regressors consist of various individual characteristics together with dif-
ferent income sources and spouse's characteristics. 
The outcome variable, that is working months, is composed of two elements, viz. 
the employment probability and the work stability. One way of thinking about the prob-
ability of employment is within the search theoretical framework surveyed by Pissarides 
(1985) and Devine & Kiefer (1991), inter alia. Unemployed persons are searching for a 
job which offers compensation equalling, at least, their reservation wage and employers 
are sampling applicants to fulfil vacancies up to the point where the marginal costs of re-
cruitment equal marginal benefits. This determines the demand side and the supply side 
of labour markets through factors affecting the reservation wage and the firms recruiting 
decision. The impact of labour market training on job stability has been studied empiri-
cally in Zweimuller & Winter-Ebmer (1996). Their study, which uses many of the vari-
ables motivated by the discussion below, is quite successful in predicting recurrent 
unemployment probabilities. This indicates that in addition to the probability of becom-
ing hired, evaluations in this study are also likely to capture the job stability aspects in-
corporated in the outcome variable. 
In the stylised sequential search model an optimising job hunter maximises the net 
benefit from search which is the difference between the expected wage conditional on 
successful search (plus the conditional expected return from further search if unsuccess-
ful) and the cost of searching. In this setting the greater the reservation wage the lower 
is the probability of success. The main determinant of the reservation wage is non-labour 
income, the effect of which is captured by unemployment benefits, other non-wage in-
come, and spouse's income. The impact of these variables on regular working months is 
by no means clear, a priori. Even though they may reduce the employment probability, 
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they may also provide means for searching for a better match and hence contribute posi-
tively to job stability. Other factors affecting the heterogeneity of reservation wages are 
captured by human capital variables, spouse's education, and individual characteristics. 
Variables representing individuals' accumulated human capital, such as education and 
previous work history, tend to increase both the reservation wage and the number 
and/or the quality of job offers. Individual characteristics on the other hand control for 
observable differences in marital status, age, children etc. These factors are also likely to 
be relevant for employers' recruitment decisions. 
When it comes to the demand side, the number of, and the competition over, va-
cancies clearly has an impact on the employment probability and hence on months spent 
in employment. In the search theoretic framework this is modelled through the probabil-
ity of getting a job offer which is likely to be positively correlated with the reservation 
wage. The tightness of local labour markets is measured through the unemployment rate 
and the geographical position of a living community. Another variable capturing differ-
ences in labour demand is occupational status. Together with the union status it also 
works as a supply side proxy as far as they characterise the closer attachment to labour 
markets. 
In the search theory framework ALMPs can be introduced into analyses through 
Spence's (1973) signalling theory which considers firms hiring decisions as investments 
under uncertainty. An employer is uncertain about an applicant's true productivity and 
for this reason employs a signalling device(s) in the recruitment decision. Provided that 
active programmes improve participants' productivity and work habits, and employers 
are aware of that, participation may increase the employment probability and hence the 
number of working months. Another route to beneficial effects could be through a re-
duction in turnover provided that ALMPs contribute to a better match. There are also 
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studies, according to which active programmes make wage expectations of young par-
ticipants more realistic which in tum tends to increase the employment probability 
through lower reservation wages, see Main (1987a) and O'Higgins (1995). Accordingly 
ALMPs operate both in the supply and in the demand side of labour markets. Since dif-
ferent programmes are likely to give different signals and have different effects on reser-
vation wages, empirical equations include various AL:MP variables, such as laid-off 
training, job placement in the private sector, half-time placement and placement as a last 
resort. The last variable consists of programme participants to whom the labour authori-
ties have been obliged to offer a job placement, as stated in the 1987 Employment Act. 
Next a word on identification. In estimating the selection corrected models of 
equations (6) and (7) one needs at least one instrument in the selection equation which 
does not affect employment. In this study the identification restriction is provided by 
omitting the local AL:MP supply variable from the employment equation. It is evident 
that the ratio of programme participants to unemployed persons in a labour district af-
fects individuals' participation probability whereas there are no clear reasons why it 
should have any effect on participants subsequent employment record. To examine the 
validity of the instrumental variable we included it among the regressors in single equa-
tion models given in the first four columns. In all cases the parameter estimate of the lo-
cal ALMP supply variable turned out to be insignificant giving some support to the 
selection corrected estimations. Especially since the parameter estimate of the local 
ALMP supply variable is correctly signed and highly significant in participation equa-
tions reported in appendix 3. Other 'identification restrictions' consist of unemployment 
rate, other income, and spouse's income variables which are measured in different years 
depending on whether they are included in the participation or in the employment 
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equation. However, since these variables are highly correlated over time the identifica-
tion based merely on these variables would be unsatisfactory. 
Having presented the variables and the theoretical underpinnings underlying equa-
tions (1) and (2), we tum next to the empirical results which are reported in tables 6.3 
and 6.4. These correspond to the full sample estimates which are well in line with the 
unreported results based on subsamples in which recurrent programme participants have 
been omitted. The first column in both tables reports the baseline least squares estimates 
which are inconsistent even if the selection is based purely on observables. The next two 
columns give the results of 2-limit tobit models which differ by the inclusion of het-
eroskedasticity correction terms in column three. The heteroskedasticity correction 
terms consist of seven continuous variables employed in the analyses. The likelihood ra-
tio test produces test statistics of 72.8 and 5l. 3 for the years 1989 and 1992, respec-
tively, clearly rejecting the homoskedastic model (the critical value at the 5 per cent 
significance level is 14.07). The fourth column shows the results of the type 2 tobit 
model, see Amemiya (1984). These estimates cannot be given too much weight given 
that the estimations use information only about programme participants and the upper 
limit is set to infinity. However, it is interesting to compare the estimated correlation co-
efficients between this model and the two selection corrected models reported in col-
umns 5 and 6. 
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Table 6.3. The results of employment months estimation; The dependent variable is the number of employment months in 1989. 
Estimation method 
OLS 2-limit tobit 2-limit tobit Type 2 tobit Equation 6 Equation 7 Means 
Constant 7.385 (0.65)'" 8.803 (1.35)"" 8.569 (1.33)"" 11.251 (2.76)"" 6.792 (1.64)"" 7.563 (0.80)"" 
Woman -0.637 (0.14)"" -1.424 (0.28)"" -1.325 (0.27)"" -1.461 (0.42)"" -1.776 (0.30)"'· -1.403 (0.14)"" 0.443 
Age -0.090 (0.03)"' -0.181 (0.07)"' -0.179 (0.07)"' -0.320 (0.12)"' -0.117 (0.08) -0.112 (0.04)"" 34.850 
Age squared/1000 0.189 (0.49) 0.351 (1.01) 0.445 (1.00) 3.531 0.70)"' -0.293 (1.14) -0.166 (0.54) 1.335 
Married 0.045 (0.15) 0.080 (0.32) 0.121 (0.32) 0.335 (0.52) 0.184 (0.35) 0.074 (0.17) 0.406 
Education in 1988 0.173 (0.07)"' 0.365 (0.14)"' 0.623 (0.16)"" 0.799 (0.24)"" 0.284 (0.15)" 0.236 (0.07)"" 0.806 
Number of children -0.623 (0.14)"" -1.17l (0.27)"" -1.020 (0.31)"" -0.131 (0.39) -0.925 (0.28)"" -0.774 (0.13)*'· 0.251 
Youngest child 0-3 years 0.089 (0.27) -0.048 (0.52) -0.382 (0.57) 0.027 (0.95) -0.246 (0.56) -0.395 (0.26) 0.079 
Youngest child 4-6 years 0.511 (0.23)"' 0.945 (0.47)"' 0.819 (0.49)" -0.341 (0.72) 0.708 (0.50) 0.596 (0.24)"' 0.071 
Youngest child 7-16 years 0.274 (0.16)" 0.625 (0.33)" 0.624 (0.31)"' 0.339 (0.48) 0.647 (0.35)" 0.501 (0.17)*" 0.159 
House owner 0.428 (0.11)"" 0.815 (0.23)"" 0.761 (0.23)"" 0.023 (0.35) 0.768 (0.26)"-- 0.639 (0.12)"" 0.594 
Spouse's education -0.000 (0.07) 0.038 (0.14) 0.159 (0.15) 0.160 (0.23) 0.088 (0.15) 0.060 (0.07) 0.529 
Disability -1.302 (0.23)"'- -2.951 (0.48)"" -2.843 (0.44)"" -1.669 (0.70)"- -3.394 (0.54)"" -2.397 (0.26)"" 0.061 
Union member in 1988 1.649 (0.11)"" 3.280 (0.24)"-- 3.182 (0.23)"" 0.949 (0.37)"' 4.310 (0.25)"" 3.762 (0.12)"" 0.:,\~2 
Unemployment rate -0.066 (0.02)"- -0.161 (0.05)"" -0.154 (0.05)"" -0.126 (0.10) -0.303 (0.06)"" -0.209 (O.OJ)"-' :'\.799 
Ln( I1lonthl~ unemployment benefits in 88) -0.097 (0.01)"" -0.226 (0.02)"" -0.246 (0.02)"" -0.154 (0.03)"" -0.253 (0.02)"'- -0.212 (0.01)"" ~.5X~ 
170 
Table 6.3. The results of employment months estimation; The dependent variable is the number of employment months in 1989. 
-0.034 (0.00)"" -0.065 (0.01)*" -0.049 (0.01)"" -0.061 (0.02)"' -0.055 (0.01)'" -0.048 (0.00)"" 1.259 
n(Spouse's income) 0.034 (0.00)"" 0.069 (0.01)"" 0.063 (0.02)"" 0.065 (0.03)"' 0.054 (0.02)"' 0.042 (0.01)"" 4.421 
rban living community -0.070 (0.11) -0.139 (0.24) -0.146 (0.24) 0.034 (0.40) -0.115 (0.27) -0.220 (0.13) 0.526 
. ddle Finland 0.229 (0.13)" 0.472 (0.28) 0.434 (0.28) 0.488 (0.49) 0.257 (0.32) 0.305 (0.15)" 0.299 
INorthern Finland 0.239 (0.17) 0.447 (0.36) 0.466 (0.36) 0.855 (0.68) -0.096 (0.46) 0.255 (0.22) 0.192 
Technical occupation in 1988 1.032 (0.30)"" 2.371 (0.61)"" 2.356 (0.65)"" 1.681 (1.10) 2.955 (0.69)"" 2.071 (0.33)"" 0.055 
Health care occupation in 1988 1.016 (0.29)"" 2.454 (0.58)"" 2.703 (0.57)"" 2.017 (1.02)"' 3.056 (0.63)""' 2.073 (0.30)"'" 0.055 
Administrative occupation in 1988 0.991 (0.26)"" 2.112 (0.52)"" 1.995 (0.51)"" 1.089 (0.70) 1.966 (0.53)""' 1.465 (0.25)*"" 0.075 
Mercantile occupation in 1988 1.269 (0.28)"·· 2.759 (0.56)"" 2.840 (0.52)"" 2.668 (0.92)'" 2.990 (0.60)"·' 2.122 (0.28)"·· 0.056 
Farming/forestry occupation in 1988 1.239 (0.26)·" 2.537 (0.55)""" 2.581 (0.53)"·' 1.786 (0.77)" 2.424 (0.63)""" 1.711 (0.30)"" 0.057 
Transport occupation in 1988 1.879 (0.31)"" 3.537 (0.64)"" 3.383 (0.64)"" 4.080 (2.09)" 3.692 (0.79)"" 2.617 (0.38)"" 0.038 
manufacture occupation in 1988 1.114 (0.17)""" 2.205 (0.37)*" 2.205 (0.35)"" 1.475 (0.62)"' 2.282 (0.43)"" 1.568 (0.21)"" 0.379 
Service occupation in 1988 1.259 (0.22)""' 2.512 (0.45)"" 2.509 (0.44)"" 1.473 (0.78)" 2.633 (0.52)"" 1.840 (0.25)""' (>.1 11 
Employ'mcnt months in 1987 0.150 (0.01)"" 0.276 (0.02)"" 0.274 (0.02)"" 0.231 (0.06)"" 0.308 (0.03)"" 0.244 (0.01)"" 5.932 
Unemploymcnt months in 1987 -0.128 (0.01)"" -0.277 (0.04)"" -0.264 (0.03)"" -0.193 (0.07)"" -0.322 (0.04)"" -0.226 (0.02)"" 3.128 
PI:lccmcnt in the private sector 0.605 (0.40) 1.131 (0.78) 1.148 (0.68)" 0.573 (0.53) 0.939 (0.81) 1.001 (0.40)"' 0.025 
Ilalr-time placement -0.451 (0.36) -1.167 (0.83) -0.843 (0.83) -0.648 (0.59) -1.226 (0.96) -0.770 (0.48) 0.020 
Placemcnt as a last resort -1.38~ (0.26)"" -2.913 (0.58)"" -2.425 (0.53)"" -2.194 (0.46)"" -3.185 (0.65)"" -2.367 (0.32)"" O.O()S 
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Table 6.3. The results of employment months estimation; The dependent variable is the number of employment months in 1989. 
!Days in 1988 I 0.003 (0.00)""" 0.008 (0.00)"" 0.008 (0.00)"" 0.002 (0.00) 0.010 (0.00)"" 0.008 (o.oor" 238.400 
~ecurrent participation in 1989 -3.289 (0.13)"" -5.420 (0.33)"" -5.170 (0.35)"" -2.507 (0.38)"" -4.587 (0.41)"" -4.166 (0.21)"" 0.143 
I 0.623 (0.20)"" l.611 (0.41)"" l.329 (0.40)"" nJa 5.382 (l.82)"" l.655 (0.96)" 0.201 rogramme partIcIpatIOn (J 4.080 7.661 (0.11)"-- 6.963 (0.45)"" 5.213 (0.20)"" 7.948 (0.16)*** 4.727 (0.03)"" 
P I nJa nJa nJa -0.078 (0.27) -0.240 (0.12)*' -0.011 (0.11) logL R2adj = 0.30 12183.030 12146.610 5343.055 7939.664 12877.480 
Heteroskeciasticity corrected Standard errors No Yes No No No 
Notes: * (**,***) = significant at the 10 per cent (5 per cent, 1 per cent) significance level. (J = the estimated standard error. p = the estimated correlation coefficient. Exclud-
ing programme dummies (measures in the year 1988) all variables are measured in the year 1989 if not otherwise stated. The recurrent participation variable refers to a period 
of programme participation in 1989. All estimations are carried out by using LIMDEP 7.0 (Greene, 1995). 
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Table 6.4. The results of employment months estimation; The dependent variable is the number of employment months in 1992. 
Estimation method 
OLS 2-limit tobit 2-limit tobit Type 2 tobit Equation 6 Equation 7 Means 
Constant 4.344 (0.51)"" 2.878 (1.28)*' 2.295 (1.28)" 6.802 (3.34)" 3.812 (1.37)*" 3.543 (0.67)*" 
Woman 0.172 (0.09)" 0.422 (0.22)" 0.446 (0.21)" 0.121 (0.37) 0.318 (0.23) 0.094 (0.11) 0.380 
Age -0.100 (0.02)"" -0.287 (0.06)"" -0.293 (0.06)'" -0.224 (0.11)" -0.374 (0.07)"" -0.227 (0.03)"" 36.090 
Age squaredl1000 0.448 (0.34) 1.522 (0.86)" 1.639 (0.84)" 1.673 (l.48) 2.702 (0.93)"" 1.288 (0.46)"" 1.424 
Married 0.359 (0.11)"" 0.805 (0.27)*" 0.840 (0.26)"" 0.947 (0.40)*' 0.697 (0.28)"' 0.510 (0.13)"" 0.407 
Education in 1992 0.375 (0.04)*" 0.893 (0.11)*" 0.888 (0.12)*" 0.635 (0.19)*" 0.813 (0.11)"" 0.662 (0.05)*" 0.886 
N umber of children 0.099 (0.09) 0.235 (0.22) 0.219 (0.23) 0.332 (0.32) 0.173 (0.23) 0.152 (0.11) 0.225 
Youngest child 0-3 years -1.197 (0.15)"" -3.068 (0.36)*" -3.000 (0.36)"" -1.933 (0.57)*" -2.933 (0.39)"" -2.238 (0.18)*** 0.135 
Youngest child 4-6 years -0.816 (0.21)"" -1.918 (0.51)*" -1.851 (0.49)"" -1.327 (0.70)" -1.637 (0.52)*" -1.221 (0.25)*" 0.064 
Youngest child 7-16 years 0.124 (0.11) 0.223 (0.28) 0.248 (0.29) -0.385 (0.47) 0.298 (0.31) 0.237 (0.15) 0.152 
HOllse owner 0.502 (0.08)"" 1.299 (0.21)""' 1.316 (0.20)"" 0.965 (0.32)"" 1.099 (0.22)"" 0.786 (0.10)"" 0.613 
Spouse's education 0.029 (0.05) 0.016 (0.11) 0.023 (0.11) -0.077 (0.18) 0.038 (0.11) 0.048 (0.11) 0.521 
Disability -0.919 (0.15)"" -3.232 (0.48)"'" -3.229 (0.44)"" -1.695 (0.51)"" -3.421 (0.48)"" -2.298 (0.24)"" 0.052 
lJlllon member in 1991 1.191 (0.09)"'" 2.988 (0.21)""" 2.974 (0.21)"" 0.801 (0.44)" 5.295 (0.22)""" 4.313 (0.11)""" 0.553 
Unemploylllent rate -0.005 (0.01) 0.000 (0.03) 0.043 (0.03) 0.016 (0.06) -0.105 (0.03)""" -0.035 (0.0 I r' 19.360 
Ln( monthly unemployment benefits in (1) -0.178 (0.00)""" -0.390 (0.01)"" -0.391 (0.01)"" -0.349 (0.03)"" -0.376 (0.02)"" -0.327 (0.0 I )"" 4.916 
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Table 6.4. The results of employment months estimation; The dependent variable is the number of employment months in 1992. 
ILn(Other income) -0.003 (0.00) 0.014 (0.01) 0.008 (0.01) 0.044 (0.02)" 0.043 (0.01)"" 0.026 (0.00)"" 0.555 
Ln(Spouse's income) 0.046 (0.00)"" 0.113 (0.01)'" 0.114 (0.01)'" 0.075 (0.02)"" 0.090 (0.01)"" 0.070 (0.00)"" 4.489 
frban living community -0.176 (0.08)"' -0.505 (0.20)"' -0.490 (0.20)"" -0.154 (0.34) -0.370 (0.22)" -0.375 (0.10)"" 0.561 
,Middle Finland 0.185 (0.09)* 0.424 (0.23)* 0.398 (0.23)" 0.084 (0.39) 0.049 (0.25) 0.215 (0.12)" 0.281 
Northern Finland 0.167 (0.12) 0.557 (0.31)" 0.489 (0.31) -0.152 (0.48) 0.173 (0.34) 0.249 (0.16) 0.157 
Technical occupation in 1991 -0.163 (0.21) -0.248 (0.51) -0.311 (0.52) 0.088 (1.18) 0.899 (0.60) -0.453 (0.31) 0.069 
Health care occupation in 1991 1.099 (0.23)'" 2.414 (0.54)"" 2.298 (0.52)"" 1.740 (1.08) 3.081 (0.61)"" 1.427 (0.31)"" 0.043 
Administrative occupation in 1991 0.084 (0.19) 0.076 (0.46) 0.040 (0.45) -0.986 (0.90) 0.907 (0.51)" -0.154 (0.27) 0.080 
Mercantile occupation in 1991 0.678 (0.19)"" 1.503 (0.47)"" 1.449 (0.46)"" 1.951 (1.06)" 2.576 (0.55)"" 1.009 (0.29)"" 0.069 
Farming/forestry occupation in 1991 0.831 (0.19)'" 2.079 (0.51)"" 2.019 (0.53)"" 1.135 (0.88) 3.075 (0.61)"" 1.441 (0.32)"" 0.048 
Transport occupation in 1991 1.067 (0.22)"" 2.457 (0.54)"" 2.391 (0.55)"" 1.732 (1.19) 3.711 (0.66)'" 1.752 (0.34)'" 0.043 
manufacture occupation in 1991 0.226 (0.12)" 0.487 (0.35) 0.474 (0.34) 0.528 (0.90) 1.437 (0.46)"" 0.028 (0.25) 0.462 
Service occupation in 1991 0.257 (0.22) 0.604 (0.56) 0.654 (0.54) 0.035 (0.92) 1.553 (0.63)"' 0.209 (0.32) 0.040 
Employment months in 1 <)<)0 0.170 (0.01)"" 0.407 (0.02)"" 0.401 (0.02)"" 0.377 (0.04)"" 0.381 (0.02)"" 0.295 (0.0 I)"" 7.344 
Unemployment months in 1990 -0.065 (0.01)"" -0.179 (0.05)"" -0.166 (0.04)"" -0.214 (0.12)" -0.390 (0.06)"" -0.127 (0.03)"" 1.451 
Placement in the private sector 0.147 (0.29) 1.262 (0.80) l.140 (0.79) l.034 (0.50)"' 0.992 (0.85) l. 1<)5 (0.45)"" 0.0 I!) 
Half-time placement -0.709 (0.62) -1.541 (1.70) -1.181 (1.68) -0.024 (0.96) -2.216 (1.92) -1.55<) (1.02) 0.001 
Placement as a last resort -1.250 (0.20)"" -4.465 (0.62)"" -4.006 (0.59)"" -2.543 (0.41)"" -4.883 (0.62)"" -3.IIX (0.33)"" 0.076 
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Table 6.4. The results of employment months estimation; The dependent variable is the number of employment months in 1992. 
~aid-<>ff training 2.585 (0.28)"'· 6.476 (0.74)"" 6.486 (0.73)"0' l.900 (0.55)"" 4.535 (0.79)"" 4.171 (0.40)"·' 
ays in 1991 0.005 (0.00)"" 0.012 (0.00)"·· 0.011 (0.00)"0' 0.002 (0.00) 0.013 (0.00)"" 0.011 (0.00)"'· 200.300 
Recurrent participation in 1992 -2.579 (0.07)"" -5.712 (0.27)"" -5.537 (0.28)"" -l. 900 (0.32)"·' -5.181 (0.28)"" -4.319 (0.15)"'· 0.174 
Programme participation l.023 (0.19)"'· 2.271 (0.46)"·' 2.122 (0.45)"·' nJa 8.693 (1.26)"" 2.431 (0.77)"'· 0.175 
cr 4.017 8.502 (0.10)"" 11.085 (0.86)"" 5.150 (0.26)"" 8.672 (0.13)"'· 5.089 (0.03)"·' 0.388 
P nJa nJa nJa -0.260 (0.19) -0.368 (0.06)"" -0.024 (0.07) 
LogL R2adj = 0.27 19926.530 19900.880 717l.880 13198.990 21134.040 
Heteroskedasticity correction Standard errors No Yes No No No 
Notes: * (**,***) = significant at the 10 per cent (5 per cent, 1 per cent) significance level. cr = the estimated standard error. p = the estimated correlation coefficient. Exclud-
ing programme dummies (measured in the year 1991) all variables are measured in the year 1992 if not otherwise stated. The recurrent participation variable refers to a period 
of programme participation in 1992. 
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All models paint a similar picture of the determinants of employment months that 
is fairly consistent between the two eras of unemployment. As can be expected, charac-
teristics reflecting hard-to-employ persons, i.e. low education, no occupation (left-out 
category), disability and poor employment record in 1987/90, reduce employment 
months5. The employment prospects become even fainter if an individual does not be-
long to a union, lives in a high unemployment area or had little time for searching a job. 
The last variable, days in 1988 (1991), controls for differences in the time for search for 
a job after becoming unemployment or terminating a programme6. 
The well determined downward effect of unemployment benefits on subsequent 
employment record implies that an increase in received monthly unemployment benefits 
reduce annual working months. As discussed in chapter 2, in Finland an unemployed 
person is eligible for higher compensated unemployment insurance allowance for the 
first 500 days (provided that he is a member of an insurance fund and the employment 
condition is satisfied). Hence, the negative parameter estimates give some support to the 
reservation wage hypothesis which connects higher reservation wages to lower employ-
ment probabilities7. A rival explanation is that higher unemployment benefits make it 
possible for an unemployed person to search longer for a suitable vacancy. These benefi-
ciallonger term effects on job stability may not be visible within a span of one year. 
The changes in parameter estimates are of interest in their own right. Unlike other 
factors reflecting individuals' social status, marital status and non-wage income have 
positive well determined coefficients only in the high unemployment situation. This 
5 We have omitted employment/unemployment months during the years 1988/91 since the.ir e:xogene-
ity is somewhat questionable. The decision to terminate the latest unemployment spell IS likely to de-
pend on job offers received. This clearly affects subsequent employment record. . . . . 
6 Unfortunately, we do not have information on days actually searched for a Job. This ,·anable IS em-
ployed merely to control for differences in potential time for job searc~ before the ~espo~se penod. Le. 
before the year 1989 (1992) when the era oflow (high) unemployment IS under conSIderatIOn.. . 
? The re~ult is robust across different samples, i.e. recurrent programme participation does not e:'<.l'lam 
fewer employment months. 
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implies indirectly that the deteriorating impact of unemployment on employment pros-
pects was more pronounced among individuals in the lower categories of social status. 
The rapid deterioration of employment prospects is also highlighted by the variables 
which control the age of the youngest child. The results show that having a child under 
the age of seven reduces employment months in the era of high unemployment, the im-
pact being negligible at the end of the 1980s. That is to say, parents with under school 
age children have chosen to stay at home after becoming unemployed; possibly due to 
the difficulties in returning back to working life after the maternity leaveS. Finally, ex-
panding unemployment improved women's employment record relative to that of men's. 
The finding is well in line with the improvement in women's relative unemployment rate 
shown in figure 2.1 in chapter 2. 
Next we turn to the main interest of the study namely the impact of active pro-
grammes on subsequent employment record. Regardless of the exact estimation method, 
the results show a well determined positive impact of ALM participation on subsequent 
working months. The effect is, however, almost totally offset if an individual has partici-
pated in a placement programme offered as a last resort, the obligation which was intro-
duced in the 1987 Employment Act. The most likely explanation for the finding is the 
coexistence of active and passive measures. It was hypothesised in chapter 2 that some 
individuals' search incentives might have been worsened by the automatic eligibility for 
another obligated job placement after 12 months in unemployment (3 months for the 
youth). A rival explanation is that last resort placements are targeted to persons with 
great difficulties in labour markets. However, since last resort placements do not seem 
to increase participants human capital, or to work as a positive signalling device. the 
8 In Finland all mothers are eligible for the maternity leave of eleven months during which they re-
ceive earnings-related maternity allowances. After 11 months it is possible to get. child home .care al-
lowance which is aimed at facilitating the day care arrangements, as an alternatIve to mUnICipal day 
care. of children under three years of old. 
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results casts considerable doubts on the usefulness of large scale obligations, at least 
when the outcome is measured in terms of subsequent employment record. When it 
comes to other selective employment measures, the results suggest that job placements 
provided by the private sector yield greater benefits than public sector placements. 
Another issue of interest in evaluation studies is the selection bias. This can be ex-
amined through selection corrected estimations given in columns 5 and 6. The different 
specifications agree on the sign of the correlation coefficient, p, but its magnitude varies 
across models, the results of the full information model showing substantially smaller, in-
significant parameter estimates. The negative signs of correlation coefficients indicate 
that programme participants, as a whole, are initially in a worse labour market position 
than non-participants. They have some unobservable characteristics which both increase 
their participation probability and deteriorate their subsequent employment record. The 
evidence of significant selection bias is, however, produced only by the limited informa-
tion model. This implies two things. First, the inefficient use of information in estima-
tion, i. e. using merely the information about the number of individuals between the limits 
and not their exact months in employment, makes it appear that there is endogenous se-
lection. Second, the variables included in participation equations, which are reported in 
appendix 6.3, manage to control for endogenous selection in the full information model. 
6.4. Closer Examination of the Programme Effect 
The aim of this section is to give some insight into the economic significance of 
active labour market policy in improving participants' subsequent employment record. 
Table 6.5 gives the expected employment months for three different types of individuals, 
and marginal programme effects for the standard person, implied by single equation 
methods. Because the focus is both on programme participants and on non-participants, 
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the figures shown in the upper panel of table 6.5 are based on the unconditional expecta-
tion formula for the 2-limit tobit model reported in Maddala (1983) p. 161. The lower 
panel reports the programme effects which are calculated as the difference between a 
standard programme participant's expected employment months and his expected work-
ing months had he not participated in a programme. These are also based on uncondi-
tional expectations that is perfectly legitimate given the assumption of selection process 
being purely determined by observable factors. 
Table 6.5 Expected Employment Months and the Estimated Marginal Programme Ef-
fects in Single Equation Models 
1989 1992 
OLS 2-limit 2-limit OLS 2-limit 2-limit 
tobit tobit tobit tobit 
Expected employment months 
Advantaged person 11.10 10.79 10.35 9.59 9.88 9.32 
9.67 10.01 9.42 
Disadvantaged person 1.69 1.67 1.36 0.06 0.58 0.46 
-0.07 0.58 0.48 
Standard person 5.39 5.28 5.36 3.27 2.96 2.93 
3.39 3.19 3.19 
Marginal programme effect 
Placement in the private sector 1.23 1.55 1.44 1.17 1.62 1.48 
1.34 1.36 1.69 
Half-time placement 0.17 0.25 0.28 0.32 0.31 0.40 
0.68 0.66 0.76 
Placement as a last resort -0.76 -0.71 -0.63 -0.22 -0.86 -0.71 
-0.09 -0.78 -0.67 
Laid-off training n/a n/a n/a 3.61 4.29 4.22 
nG nG nG 
Rest of ALlVlPs 0.62 0.91 0.79 1.03 l.01 0.93 
2.00 2.21 2.0-
Heteroskedasticity corrected No No Yes No No Yes 
. h laid-off trainin is not included Notes' Figures reported In ltahc are based on estlmatlOns In whic g.. 1 
. me dumml'es (these estimations are reported in the first four columns of appendIx 6. - ) among program 
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(i) A standard person is evaluated at the means of continuous variables by setting dummy 'a . bl 
equal to null. (ii) A disadvantaged person has a disability, lives in a community where the '~e~;lo~~ 
ment rate exceeds the mean by one standard deviation, has been unemployed the whole year ~f 
198711.990 and he has completed only ~he compulsory education. (iii) An advantaged person 'owns a 
house m a low unemployment commuruty (mean - standard deviation), he is married with a standard 
spouse, has a university degree, belongs to a union, and has worked the whole year of 198711990 in a 
health care occupation. 
Almost universally ordinary least squares estimates imply smaller programme ef-
fects than 2-limit tobit estimates which take account the censored nature of the depend-
ent variable. Even though the homoskedastic tobit model was clearly rejected against the 
heteroskedastic one, there seems to be little to choose between the models when it 
comes to the magnitudes of programme effects9 . It is surprising to find out that the esti-
mated programme effects are practically invariant between the estimation period. En-
couragingly, the sharp increase in the share of laid-off trainees affects only the average 
gain of ALMPs, if left uncontrolled (figures in italic). The robustness of results implies 
that the lacking information about the training undertaken in 1988 has no significant im-
pact on the estimated job placement effects. Especially, since the share of laid-off train-
ees was below 10 per cent of all trainees at the end of the 1980s compared to almost 
half in 1991. 
When it comes to the effectiveness of different programmes, laid-off training 
stands out quite impressively with the beneficial effect of some 4 months. It is worth re-
membering that laid-off trainees formed the most advantageous group of all in terms of 
employment months. However, if taken at face value the results indicate that participa-
tion has significantly reduced their threat of unemployment. Job placement in the private 
sector increases participants' working months by some l. 5 months, other things equal. 
The benefit exceeds the gains of other controlled groups of selective employment 
9 In heteroskedasticitv corrected tobit models the unconditional expectation. f?rn~ula in Maddala 
(1983) can be modified" by incorporating multiplicatively mod~lled heteroske~aStIClty mto the. ~quatlon 
as cr
j 
= cr*EXp(AW), where A is the parameter vector to be estImated and W IS the data matnx of het-
eroskedasticity correction variables. 
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measures by 1 - 2 months and the effect of unspecified ALMPs by half a month. Finally, 
the obligation introduced in the 1987 Employment Act has actually worsened the em-
ployment prospects of participants for the reasons discussed above. 
To put the estimated programme effects in context it is useful to take a closer 
look at other personal characteristics associated with individuals' employment. The dif-
ference between the expected employment months of advantaged and disadvantaged 
persons is estimated as being close to ten months. This indicates that active programmes 
can help only so far as they go, the combined effect of other factors playing a larger role 
on individuals' employment possibilities. An interesting result is that the deterioration of 
employment prospects between 1989 and 1992 has affected all types of people, the im-
pact being the largest for a standard person. 
Next we turn to the results of selection corrected models given in equations (6) 
and (7) which take account of the correlation between primary and selection equations. 
The figures documented in table 6.6 are produced in a slightly different way to those 
given in the previous table. Instead of calculating the figures for some specific individu-
als, we calculated the expected employment months for every individual and the mar-
ginal programme effect for the participants. The means of these distributions are then 
reported in the table. 
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Table 6.6 The Estimated Marginal Programme Effects m Estimations. Selectivity Corrected 
1989 
Equation 6 Equation 7 
Y E(YIP) ALMP E(YIP) ALMP 
effect effect 
The group: 
Non-participants 7.01 7.26 n/a 7.14 n/a 
Participants 5.03 5.31 1.92 5.18 0.61 
Placement in the private sector 6.28 6.32 2.91 6.31 1.72 
Half-time placement 4.21 4.49 1.57 4.35 0.40 
Placement as a last resort 2.92 3.33 0.84 2.95 -0.38 
Rest of ALMPs 6.29 6.53 2.44 6.55 1.02 
1992 
Equation 6 Equation 7 
Y E(YIP) ALMP E(YIP) ALMP 
effect effect 
The group: 
Non-participants 4.14 4.20 n/a 3.88 n/a 
Participants 3.68 3.92 2.32 3.82 1.02 
Placement in the private sector 3.02 3.75 2.68 3.46 1.52 
Half-time placement 2.83 2.79 1.63 2.50 0.26 
Placement as a last resort 0.95 1.21 0.54 0.98 -0.29 
Laid-off training 9.78 9.97 5.72 10.31 3.63 
Rest of ALMPs 4.17 4.21 2.72 4.06 1.16 
Notes: The first column shows the observed mean of employment months. The E(yIP) column gives the 
mean of the estimated employment months. The ALMP effect -column reports the estimated marginal 
programme effects as discussed in the text and in appendix 6.1. 
Because of endogenous participation status, the focus is naturally on conditional 
expectations E(y I p=O) and E(y I p=l) which tell us the expected employment months 
given the selection process. In the current context these formulas, which are reported in 
appendix 6.1, become rather involved since the bivariate normal distribution under ex-
amination is censored in three directions. The estimated mean employment months are 
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given for non-participants and various participant categories in E(Y I P) columns. Esti-
mated models seem to predict the average employment months pretty well regardless of 
the exact group under consideration. The figures show that programme participants 
have worse subsequent employment record than participants but the gap has narrowed 
between the years 1989 and 1992, mainly due to an increase in the number of laid-off 
trainees. The average (and predicted) employment months of non-participants have 
dropped by almost three months, the reduction being one and a half months less for the 
programme participants. Table 6.6 documents also a reduction in working months 
across job placement programmes. The fall has been by far the greatest in private sector 
placements but these programmes still have the best expected (and realised) employment 
record of all selective employment measures. As confirmed by the earlier results, laid-off 
trainees' employment record is superior regardless of the exact group under comparison. 
Even though the comparison of predicted employment months is interesting in its 
own right, it is more fruitful to try to assess the impact of ALMPs on participants. The 
third and the fifth column (ALN.1P effect) show the estimated mean programme effects 
which are given by marginal effect calculations E(y=pX+ap I p=l) - E(y=pX I p=I). The 
first thing to notice is that the results produced by the likelihood function (7) imply 
greater gains than the estimates of the likelihood function (6), the difference being over 
one month across programme groups. This is explained by strong negative correlation 
between primary and selection equations in the former likelihood function. To recall, the 
limited information model employs mere information about the numbers of observations 
in the limits and between them. Even though, limit observations contain the bulk of in-
formation, and the parameter estimates are well in line with other estimation methods, 
the results shown in table 6.6 cast some doubts on the limited information model in 
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assessing ALMPs. Due to insignificant correlation coefficient the results based on the 
full information model are almost equal to ones given in table 6.S for single equation 
estimations. 
All in all, the estimated programme effects given in table 6.6 indicate an improve-
ment in participants' employment record due to participation, the average gain being 
about a month. In other words, if programme participants had not participated in a pro-
gramme their yearly employment record would have been a month shorter. Surprisingly, 
the marginal programme effect remains fairly stable regardless of the overall unemploy-
ment. There are some implications that the average gain of programme participants has 
increased but this increase is only a matter of a few weeks and mainly due to labour mar-
ket training. When it comes to differences between programme groups, the already fa-
miliar pattern emerges. Job placements in the private sector are superior to public sector 
placements. In the high unemployment situation training programmes are more beneficial 
than selective employment measures mainly due to training offered to laid-off persons. 
Finally, the obligation introduced by the 1987 Employment Act has worsened partici-
pants subsequent employment record, on average. 
6.5. Conclusions 
The findings of this chapter can now be summarised with respect to the usefulness 
of various programme groups in the eras of high and low unemployment. First, the large 
scale job placement obligation introduced in the 1987 Employment Act was unsuccess-
ful. It might be fair to conclude that the obligated placements worsened participants' 
subsequent employment record. Second, all other types of active programmes seem to 
improve participants' employment. Regardless of the estimated model or its exact speci-
fication, labour market training and job placements in the private sector yield the 
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greatest gains in terms of participants' subsequent employment record, the improvement 
being over a month in a year. One group of programme participants stands out, namely 
laid-off trainees, whose benefit from participation is estimated as being over three 
months. Third, the estimates suggest that the programme effect has remained remarkably 
constant despite a rapid increase in unemployment which happened at the beginning of 
the 1990s. As a consequence of this, also the ranking of different programme groups has 
remained the same. It has to be noticed, however, that active labour market programmes 
can help only so far as they go. The joint effect of other factors associated with individu-
als' employment record, which was estimated as being close to 10 months, more than 
cancels out the programme gains. 
From the methodological point of view, the study focuses on modelling endoge-
nous programme participation when the outcome variable is censored both in the lower 
and in the upper limit. Two different models are proposed; one which employs all infor-
mation and the other one which employs mere information about the numbers of obser-
vation in both limits and in between them. The latter model is motivated by the finding 
that the majority of individuals are observed as limit cases, i.e. either having no employ-
ment months or working the full 12 months in a year. These models are then compared 
to various single equation models. 
All models agree with the determinants of programme participation and employ-
ment months. But the two selection corrected models disagree on the role played by un-
observables. The correlation coefficient is estimated as being insignificantly different 
from zero in full information estimations and significantly negative in limited information 
estimations. The differences in the magnitude of the correlation coefficient is reflected in 
the programme effects, the limited information model estimating the beneficial effect as 
being over a month greater than other models. The similarity of the results produced by 
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single equation methods and the selection corrected full information method is encour-
aging given that various tobit models are special cases of the proposed model. This im-
plies that the proposed method is likely to prove useful in correcting the selection bias if 
it cannot be totally controlled through observables. 
How do the results of this chapter compare to the macroeconomic ones presented 
in chapter 4, according to which active labour market programmes are more effective in 
a period of high unemployment? The results imply only a slight increase in the average 
marginal programme gain between the years 1989 and 1992 which does not indicate any 
significant improvements in the efficiency of active programmes, with other things equal. 
There has been, however, two changes which may have affected the macroeconomic ef-
ficiency of active labour market programmes. First, there was a notable reduction in the 
number of working months across different groups of participants and non-participants. 
Accordingly, an improvement in participants' employment months increased from some 
15 per cent to over 30 per cent in the early 1990s, when compared to a hypothetical 
situation of non-participation. Second, the number of programme participants who expe-
rienced an average marginal programme gain of some one month doubled in the early 
1990s, which in tum increased the beneficial programme effect on the whole population. 
Hence, regardless of the fact that the effects of active labour market policy do not need 
to coincide at the macroeconomic and micro economic levels, due to substitution and 
displacement, the findings of these two chapters seem to be consistent with each other. 
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Appendix 6.1. Conditional Expectations of Employment Months 
The conditional expectation of working months consists of two terms; (i) the con-
ditional probability of being observed in the upper censoring point times the expected 
employment months in the upper limit (expected working months in the lower limit 
equals zero) and (ii) the conditional probability of being observed between the limits 
times the conditional expectation of uncensored employment months. In the general 
form conditional expectations can be written as (to simplify expressions all subscripts 
have been omitted) 
(AI) E(y I p* ~ 0) = Pr(y* ~ U I p* ~ 0) x 12+ 
Pr(L <y* < U I p* ~ 0) xE(YlL <y < U,p* ~ 0) 
(AI') E(y I p* > 0) = Pr(y* ~ U I p* > 0) x 12+ 
Pr(L <y* < U I p* > 0) xE(YlL <y < U,p* > 0) 
The conditional probabilities result in joint probabilities divided by the probability of the 
participation status. Under normality joint probabilities are given by standard bivariate 
normal distribution functions after the censoring points are suitably normalised. With the 
aid of general formulas given in Muthen (1990), the conditional expectation terms for 
bivariate normal distribution truncated in three directions can be written as 
(A2) E(Y I L <y < U,p* ~ 0) = ~X +ap+cryE(u I bl < u < aI, II ~ -yZ) = 
~x + ap + ~ [-<\>(al)<Il[(-yZ - padc] + <\>(bl)<Il[(-yZ - pb1)c]-
p<\>(yZ){<Il[(al -p(-yZ))c] - <Il[(b l -p(-yZ))c]}] 
(A2') E(Y I L <y < U,p* > 0) = ~X + ap + cryE(u I bl < u < aI, II > -yZ) 
~x + ap + ~ [-<\>(al )<Il[ -( -yZ - pal)C] + <\>(b 1 )<Il[-( -yZ - pb l)C]+ 
p<\>(yZ){<Il[(al - p( -yZ))c] - <Il[(b 1 - p( -yZ))c])] , 
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where u = clay, ay being the standard deviation of the employment equation; a] = 
L-(pX+ap) _ U-(pX+ap) . 
a and b l - a are the standardIsed upper and the lower censor-y y 
ing points, respectively; 1t stands for the joint probability of observing non-censored em-
ployment months, Pr(L < y < U, p=x), x = 0,1; <\> refers to the standard normal density 
function and cI> refers to the cumulative normal; and finally c = 1 where p is the es-
I-p2 
timated correlation coefficient between the error terms in primary and in selection 
equations. 
By employing equations (A2) in equations (AI) the expected employment months 
for non-participants (p = 0) and programme participants (p = 1) become 
(A3) E(y I p = 0) = cI>(2yZ) X {cI>2(-b l , -yZ, -p) x 12 + [<I>2(b l , -yZ, p)-
cI>2(al, -yZ, p)] x PX + ay x (-<\>(al)<I>[( -yZ - padc] + 
<\>(b I )cI>[(-yZ - pbl)c ]-p<\>(yZ){ <I> [(a I - p( -yZ))c] - <I>[(b I - p(-yZ))c]}) 
(A3') E(y I p = 1) = 1 X {<I>2(-b 1, yZ, p) x 12 + [<I>2(b 1, yZ, -p)-
cI>(yZ) 
cI>2(al, yZ, -p)] x (PX + ap) + ay x (-<\>(aI)<I>[-(-yZ - padc]+ 
<\>(b 1 )cI>[ -( -yZ - pb l)C])+P<\>(yZ){<I>[(al - p( -yZ))c] - <I>[(b 1 - p( -yZ))c]}). 
The reported marginal programme effects in table 6 are obtained from equation (A3 ') by 
giving programme dummies zero values and subtracting the expected, hypothetical 
working months from the ones given by equation (A3'). 
188 
Appendix 6.2. The Results of Employment Months Estimation; the Year 1992. 
Estimation method 
OLS 2-limit 2-limit Type 2 Eguation 
tobit tobit tobit 7 
Constant 4.168 2.500 1.854 7.205 3.263 
(0.51)*" (1.28)" (1.29) (3.39)" (l.37)"' 
Woman 0.125 0.314 0.334 -0.006 0.300 
(0.09) (0.22) (0.21) (0.38) (0.23) 
Age 
-0.088 -0.259 -0.263 -0.210 
-0.369 
(0.02)*" (0.06)"" (0.06)"" (0.11)" (0.07)"" 
Age squared! 1 000 0.321 l.241 l.348 1.590 2.640 
(0.34) (0.87) (0.84) (1.50) (0.92)"" 
Married 0.348 0.778 0.807 0.974 0.713 
(0.11)*" (0.27)"" (0.26)"" (0.41)"' (0.28)"' 
Education 0.390 0.926 0.920 0.678 0.790 
(0.04)"" (0.11)"" (0.12)"" (0.19)"" (0.12)"" 
Number of children 0.112 0.262 0.257 0.373 0.121 
(0.09) (0.22) (0.23) (0.32) (0.25) 
Youngest child 0-3 years -l.201 -3.089 -3.019 -1.998 -2.879 
(0.15)*" (0.37)"" (0.36)"" (0.57)"" (0.38)"" 
Youngest child 4-6 years -0.827 -l. 938 -l.873 -l.385 -l.573 
(0.21)"" (0.51)"" (0.49)*" (0.7l)" (0.53)"" 
Youngest child 7-16 years 0.124 0.217 0.245 -0.412 0.343 
(0.12) (0.29) (0.29) (0.47) (0.30) 
House owner 0.518 1.335 1.359 0.984 l.108 
(0.08)'" (0.21)"" (0.20)"" (0.32)"" (0.22)"" 
Spouse's education 0.023 0.004 0.011 -0.101 0.048 
(0.05) (0.11) (0.11) (0.18) (0.11) 
Disability -0.997 -3.450 -3.435 -1.783 -3.285 
(0.15)*" (0.48)"" (0.44)"" (0.52)"" (0.47)"" 
Union member 1.285 3.222 3.195 1.110 5.302 
(0.08)"" (0.21)"" (0.21)"" (O.-lS)"' (0.22)"" 
Unemployment rate -0.003 0.005 0.048 0.010 -0.065 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.03)" 
Ln(monthly unemployment -0.189 -0.-l1-l -0. -l16 -0.37) -0.386 
benefits in 91) (0.00)"" (0.01)"" (0.01)"" (0.03)""" (0.02)""" 
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Appendix 6.2. The Results of Employment Months Estimation; the Year 1992. 
Ln(Other income) 
-0.004 0.012 0.006 0.041 0.038 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)" (0.01)"" 
Ln(Spouse's income) 0.046 0.113 0.115 0.073 0.095 
(0.00)"'" (0.01)""" (0.01)""" (0.02)""" (0.01)""" 
Urban living community 
-0.184 
-0.525 
-0.510 -0.194 
-0.395 
(0.08)"" (0.20)"" (0.20)"" (0.35) (0.22)" 
Middle Finland 0.179 0.410 0.386 -0.006 0.072 
(0.09)" (0.23)" (0.23) (0.39) (0.25) 
Northern Finland 0.114 0.440 0.384 -0.309 0.194 
(0.13) (0.31) (0.31) (0.49) (0.33) 
Technical occupation 
-0.481 -1.003 -1.046 -0.326 0.73-l 
(0.21)"" (0.50)"" (0.52)"" (1.21) (0.62) 
Health care occupation 0.830 1.768 1.668 1.383 2.883 
(0.23)"'" (0.54)""" (0.51)"" (1.09) (0.61)""" 
Administrative occupation -0.208 -0.630 -0.657 -1.500 0.764 
(0.19) (0.45) (0.45) (0.92) (0.53) 
Mercantile occupation 0.373 0.773 0.738 1.397 2.413 
(0.19)" (0.46)" (0.45) (1.08) (0.55)""" 
Farming/forestry occu. 0.628 1.639 1.602 0.997 2.927 
(0.19)"'" (0.51)""" (0.53)""" (0.89) (0.60)""" 
Transport occupation 0.744 1.693 1.651 1.146 3.499 
(0.22)"'" (0.54)""" (0.54)""" (1.19) (0.66)""" 
manufacture occupation -0.060 -0.211 -0.198 0.175 1.287 
(0.12) (0.34) (0.34) (0.92) (0.46)""" 
Service occupation 0.006 -0.009 0.071 -0.315 l.409 
(0.21) (0.56) (0.53) (0.93) (0.62)"" 
Employment months in 1990 0.178 0.427 OA22 0.413 0.380 
(0.01)""' (0.02)""" (0.02)""" (0.04)""" (0.02)""" 
Unemployment months in 1990 -0.074 -0.202 -0.186 -0.226 -0.332 
(0.01)""" (0.05)""" (0.04)""" (0.12)""" (0.06)""" 
Placement in the private sector -0.652 -0.683 -0.755 0.777 0.993 
(0.28)"' (0.77) (0.76) (0.50) (0.82) 
Half-time placement -1.316 -3.1-l6 -2.673 -0.23-l -1.892 
(0.63)"" (1.70)" 0.63) (0.97) ( 1.85) 
Placement as a last resort -2.087 -6.575 -6.061 -2.869 --l.550 
(0.18)"" (0.58)""' (0.55)"" (OA1)""" (0.61 )"'" 
190 
Appendix 6.2. The Results of Employment Months Estimation; the Year 1992. 
Laid-off training nla nla nla nla ~ ... W3 
(0.80)'" 
Unemployment days in 1991 0.005 0.013 0.012 0.003 0.013 
(0.00)'" (0.00)"" (0.00)"" (0.00)"' (O.OOr" 
Recurrent participation 
-2.609 -5.787 -5.609 -l.994 -5.093 
(0.07)"" (0.27)"" (0.28)"" (0.32)'" (0.28)'" 
Programme participation 1.977 4.608 4.398 nla 7.622 
(0.15)"" (0.38)"" (0.38)"" (l.19)"** 
4.031 8.539 1l.374 5.214 10.268 
(0.10)"0' (0.88)*" (0.27)"" (0.82)'" 
P nla nla nla -0.279 -0.316 
(0.19) (0.06)"" 
LogL R\dj = 0.27 19969.760 19938.970 7179.539 13144.420 
Heterosked. correction Standard No Yes No Yes 
errors 
Notes: see table 6.4. 
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Appendix 6.3. The Results of Participation Equations. 
The year 1988 The year 1991 
Probit Equation 6 Equation 7 Probit Equation 6 Equation 7 
Constant -0.618 (0.24)*' -0.574 (0.25)*' -0.616 (0.25)*' -2.322 (0.20)*" -2.375 (0.20)*" -2.340 (0.20)*" 
Woman 0.131 (0.05)*' 0.127 (0.05)"' 0.131 (0.05)*' -0.196 (0.03)*-- -0.206 (0.03)*" -0.197 (0.03)*" 
Age -0.030 (0.01)*' -0.033 (0.01)"' -0.030 (0.01)"' 0.062 (0.01)"-- 0.063 (0.01)"'· 0.063 (0.01)"·' 
Age squared/1000 0.226 (0.19) 0.268 (0.19) 0.229 (0.19) -0.797 (0.14)*" -0.795 (0.14)*" -0.809 (0.14)*" . 
Married -0.099 (0.06) -0.100 (0.06) -0.099 (0.06) -0.071 (0.04) -0.056 (0.04) -0.067 (0.04) 
Education 0.036 (0.02) 0.042 (0.03) 0.037 (0.03) -0.018 (0.02) -O.Oll (0.02) -0.015 (0.02) 
Number of children 0.011 (0.04) 0.01l (0.04) 0.011 (0.04) 0.013 (0.03) 0.017 (0.03) 0.014 (0.03) 
Youngest child 0-3 years -0.334 (0.10)"" -0.333 (0.09)"'· -0.334 (0.09)*·' 0.029 (0.06) 0.022 (0.06) 0.032 (0.06) 
Youngest child 4-6 years 0.030 (0.08) 0.023 (0.08) 0.030 (0.08) 0.091 (0.08) 0.079 (0.08) 0.090 (0.08) 
Youngest child 7-16 years -0.004 (0.06) -0.008 (0.06) -0.005 (0.06) -0.003 (0.05) -0.004 (0.05) -0.002 (0.05) 
House owner -0.038 (0.04) -0.044 (0.04) -0.039 (0.04) -0.057 (0.03) -0.047 (0.03) -0.056 (0.03) 
Spouse's education -0.010 (0.02) -0.010 (0.02) -0.010 (0.02) 0.016 (0.02) 0.010 (0.02) 0.195 (0.06)*·· 
Disability 0.444 (0.07)*·* 0.441 (0.07)*** 0.444 (0.07)"" 0.196 (0.06)**' 0.200 (0.06)"** 0.~13 (0.03)*" 
Union member 0.120 (0.04 r** 0.137 (0.04)"** 0.121 (0.04)"" 0.413 (0.03)*** 0.404 (0.03)"** 0.042 (0.00)"'-
Unemployment rate 0.036 (0.00)"" 0.036 (0.00)*** 0.036 (0.00)"** 0.042 (0.00)*** 0.043 (0.00)"-- -0.023 (0.00)"'* 
Ln(monthl~ unemployment benefits) -0.012 (0.00)"" -0.012 (0.00)*'* -0.012 (0.00)**' -0.023 (0.00)"** -0.023 (O.OOr** -0.001 (0.00) 
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Ln(Other income) -0.002 (0.00) -0.002 (0.00) -0.002 (0.00) -0.002 (0.00) -0.001 (0.00) -0.003 (0.00) 
ILn(Spouse's income) -0.005 (0.00) -0.005 (0.00) -0.005 (0.00) -0.003 (0.00) -0.003 (0.00) -0.003 (0.00) 
Urban living community -0.147 (0.04)*" -0.149 (0.04)**' -0.147 (0.04)**' -0.147 (0.03)"·· -0.147 (0.03)"'· -0.146 (0.03)"" 
Middle Finland 0.075 (0.05) 0.077 (0.05) 0.075 (0.05) 0.097 (0.04)"' 0.105 (0.04)"' 0.096 (0.04) 
Northern Finland 0.123 (0.07) 0.128 (0.07)" 0.122 (0.07) -0.017 (0.05) -0.004 (0.05) -0.018 (0.05) 
Technical occupation -0.475 (0.11)'" -0.479 (0.12)"·' -0.475 (0.12)"·· -1.166 (0.08)"" -1.197 (0.08)"" -1.163 (0.08)"" 
Health care occupation -0.458 (0.10)"" -0.455 (0.10)"" -0.458 (0.10)"" -1.094 (0.09)"" -1.107 (0.09)"" -1.092 (0.09)"" , 
Administrative occupation -0.094 (0.08) -0.106 (0.09) -0.095 (0.09) -0.895 (0.07)*" -0.939 (0.07)"" -0.895 (0.07)"" 
Mercantile occupation -0.305 (0.10)"" -0.309 (0.09)"" -0.305 (0.10)"" -1.073 (0.08)"" -1.082 (0.08)"" -1.071 (0.08)"" 
Farming/forestry occupation. -0.245 (0.09)"'· -0.243 (0.09)"'· -0.245 (0.09)"" -0.854 (0.07)*" -0.871 (0.07)"" -0.856 (0.08)"" 
Transport occupation -0.703 (0.13)"" -0.688 (0.13)"" -0.703 (0.13)"" -1.203 (0.09)"" -1.199 (0.09)"·' -1.203 (0.09)"" 
manufacture occupation -0.410 (0.06)"" -0.414 (0.06)"" -0.410 (0.06)"" -1.096 (0.04)"" -1.095 (0.04)"" -1.097 (0.04)"" 
Service occupation -0.430 (0.08)"" -0.438 (0.08)"" -0.430 (0.08)*" -0.919 (0.08)"" -0.927 (0.09)"" -0.921 (0.09)"" 
Employment months in t-l -0.037 (0.00)"" -0.037 (0.00)"" -0.037 (0.00)"" -0.015 (0.00)*" -0.01l (0.00)"" -0.014 (0.00)"" 
Unempl. months in t-l 0.052 (0.00)"" 0.052 (0.00)"" 0.052 (0.00)"" 0.153 (0.00)"" 0.155 (0.00)"" 0.153 (OJ)O)""" 
Local supply of ALMPs 0.019 (0.00)"" 0.018 (0.00)"" 0.019 (0.00)"" 0.018 (0.00)"" 0.017 (0.00)"" 0.018 (0.00)"" 
Nates: The fi rst (last) three columns refer to the year 1988 (1991). All variables refer to these years if not otherwise stated. 
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Data Appendix. Means and Definitions of the Variables. 
The samvle 
.. 
t = 1989 t = 1992 
Woman 0.44 0.38 
Age# 34.85 36.09 
Married 0.40 0.40 
Education (t-l) 0.80 0.88 
(ranges between 0 = less than upper secondary 
education and 5 = more than master's degree) 
Number of children under 7 years of age# 0.25 0.22 
Age of the youngest child 0-3 years 0.07 0.13 
Age of the youngest child 4-6 years 0.07 0.06 
Age of the youngest child 7-16 years 0.15 0.15 
House owner 0.59 0.61 
Spouse's education (as educationt 0.52 0.52 
Disability (t-l) 0.06 0.05 
Union member (t-l) 0.54 0.55 
Unemployment rate# 5.79 19.36 
Unemployment rate (t-l)# 6.89 13.42 
Ln(monthly unemployment benefits in t-l t 4.58 4.91 
Ln( Other income t 1.25 0.55 
Ln(Spouse's income)# 4.42 4.48 
Urban living community 0.52 0.56 
Middle Finland 0.29 0.28 
Northern Finland 0.19 0.15 
Technical occupation (t-l) 0.05 0.06 
Health care occupation (t-l) 0.05 0.04 
Administrative occupation (t -1 ) 0.07 0.08 
Mercantile occupation (t-l) 0.05 0.06 
Farming/forestry occupation (t-l) 0.05 0.04 
Transport occupation (t-1) 0.03 0.04 
manufacture occupation (t -1 ) 0.37 0.46 
Service occupation (t-l) 0.11 0.04 
Employment months (t-2t 5.93 7.34 
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Unemployment months (t-2)# 3.12 1.45 
Recurrent participation 0.14 0.17 
days in (t-1)# 238 200 
(potential time for job search before the re-
sponse period) 
Placement in the private sector (t-1) 0.02 0.01 
Half-time placement (t-1) 0.02 0.00 
Placement as a last resort (t-1) 0.06 0.07 
Programme participation (t -1 ) 0.20 0.17 
Notes: The two samples refer to the low unemployment situation when t = 1989 and to the high unem-
ployment situation when t = 1992. # denotes that a variable is not a dichotomous one. 
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CHAPTER 7. 
Summary and Concluding Comments 
Assessing the effects of any public sector intervention is by no means a straightfor-
ward task. At the macroeconomic level an intervention and an outcome variable are 
likely to be related to each other often in a complex way. At the individual level an ana-
lyst needs to construct counterfactual states to approximate participants' labour market 
positions in a hypothetical situation of non-participation. This thesis has employed both 
macro and micro data in examining the effectiveness of active labour market policy in 
reducing the overall level of open unemployment, reducing participants' repeat unem-
ployment incidence and improving participants' subsequent employment record. The 
main finding is that active labour market programmes improve the employment perform-
ance of the economy but they are not a miracle cure. 
Chapter 4 focused on the functioning of active labour market programmes at the 
macroeconomic level. To be able to address the equilibrium unemployment effects 
through wage-setting, labour demand and labour supply curves, the Layard-Nickell 
model with imperfectly competitive firms and unionised wage setting was augmented by 
endogenous labour supply. The attempt to evaluate the influence of active labour market 
programmes both on discouragement and on open unemployment through time series 
analysis distinguishes chapter 4 from earlier studies. The main result suggested the de-
pendence between the efficiency of active labour market programmes and the overall 
level of unemployment. They become more effective in the high unemployment situa-
tion, confirming the hypothesis put forward in Calmfors (1994). 
To get a fuller picture of the functioning of active labour market policy, chapter 5 
went beyond the aggregated data and analysed the relation between participation in a 
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programme and participants' job stability. The main issue of interest was in assessing the 
differences in programme gains across individuals according to their characteristics. In 
contrast to the common practise of leaving the estimated microeconometric models un-
tested, the estimated models were put under scrutiny by various misspecification tests. 
Most notably, the distributional assumption of bivariate normality was tested both in the 
bivariate probit model and in the switching bivariate probit model. The results con-
firmed, with some exceptions, the emphasis towards targeting active programmes at dis-
advantaged persons expressed for instance in Jackman et. al. (1996). 
The complementary view to the effectiveness of active labour market programmes 
at the individual level was provided in chapter 6 which examined the effects of different 
groups of programmes on participants' subsequent employment record. This required the 
formulation of a generalised tobit model which tackled the problem of self-selection by 
estimating the bivariate normal distribution truncated in three directions. The main find-
ing was, quite surprisingly, that the marginal programme effect remained fairly stable be-
tween the eras of low and high unemployment. Accordingly, the differences in relative 
effectiveness of various active labour market programmes has remained unaltered de-
spite a sharp increase in unemployment. 
The empirical analysis of the thesis therefore reported a significant influence of ac-
tive labour market policy on various outcome variables regardless of estimation method, 
exact sample or the level of aggregation. To complement the broad findings stated 
above, the answers to the questions put forward in chapter 1 can be summarised as 
follows: 
• Active labour market programmes have not affected wage-setting during 
the 1980s. The results suggest that they have some downward effect on 
wages in the high unemployment situation. 
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• There seems to be some discouragement preventing effects of ALMPs 
which show up at the macroeconomic level. 
• When it comes to overall unemployment, the results imply that Finnish 
active labour market programmes increased open unemployment in the 
1980s but the effect was reversed during the early 1990s. 
• The micro econometric evaluations strongly suggest that active pro-
grammes improve participants' subsequent employment record, the esti-
mated effect being, on average, some 10 percentage points on job stability 
and about 1 month on employment months during the following year. But 
these beneficial effects are far from removing the initial differences in em-
ployment prospects between advantaged and disadvantaged individuals. 
• The results lend some support to targeting active programmes to hard-
to-employ persons with the notable exception of the disabled. This is not 
universal, however, the gains of higher educated persons also exceeding 
the average ones. 
• The results place the aim of reducing regional unemployment differences 
through active programmes under serious doubt. 
• There are clear indications that training programmes and job placements 
in the private sector are the most efficient type of active programme. 
• The results cast considerable doubt on large scale job placement obliga-
tions. The effects of the statutory obligation introduced in the 1987 Em-
ployment Act were estimated as being either negligible or even negative. 
• The estimated marginal programme effects are almost invariant between 
the eras of high and low unemployment. When combined with a reduction 
in actual working months and a sharp increase in the number of 
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participants between the years 1989 and 1992, this finding implies that ac-
tive programmes have bigger gains at the macroeconomic level in the high 
unemployment situation. 
• The ranking of different programmes does not depend on the overall 
level of unemployment. 
• Characteristics which can be thought of as describing a hard-to-employ 
person have well determined positive impacts on individuals' participation 
decisions. There are some indications that the selection is also based on 
unobservables, the correlation coefficients suggesting that programme par-
ticipants' initial labour market possibilities are inferior compared to non-
participants' ones. 
Like all empirical studies, the estimated models are not without caveats. In the 
macroeconomic part of the study all estimations are based on single equation methods. 
Even though standard system estimations by 3 SLS verified the parameter estimates, we 
do not know what would happen in full system cointegration estimations. Unfortunately, 
the number of variables made it impossible to identify any meaningful co integrating vec-
tors from the unrestricted cointegration space. So in this sense the results rely on asymp-
totic results about the endogeneity bias vanishing in cointegration regressions when the 
number of observations becomes large enough. Another possible shortcoming of the 
macroeconomic study is the recursive instability of the wage variable in the labour de-
mand equation in the 1990s. As such this is not too surprising given that in the early 
1990s the number of employed persons collapsed whereas real wages remained more or 
less the same. One possible explanation for this is that the employment stock is not a 
suitable measure of labour demand. However, since the specification is a standard one in 
labour demand literature it is felt that there is no need to challenge it in current context. 
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The drawback of micro economic evaluations is that ALMPs are assessed within an 
arbitrarily selected period of time. It is argued that the gains of the adopted modelling 
strategies, i.e. the ability to deal with the self-selectivity within the well established 
framework and the ability to test the distributional assumptions, more than offset this ca-
veat. Unfortunately, the latter argument is not valid in chapter 6 due to the complexity 
of the likelihood function. All in all, it would have been an interesting challenge to esti-
mate employment related programme effects in the non-stationary environment of the 
early 1990s. Most likely it would have required some new techniques to simultaneously 
tackle rapidly changing employment possibilities and endogenous selections of individu-
als within non-linear models. Having said that, we strongly believe that the evaluations 
of this study, despite their cross-sectional nature, offer valuable information both about 
the functioning of Finnish active labour market programmes and about the methods of 
estimating programme effects. 
Finally, in conclusion, it is worth presenting the main finding running though all 
chapters of the thesis. Active labour market programmes improve the employment per-
formance of the economy, but the gains remain much too limited either to solve the cur-
rent unemployment problem or to clear away the gap in labour market possibilities 
between advantaged and disadvantaged individuals. This is not to say that active labour 
market policy would not be useful in conjunction with other policies, but without any 
support its effects will remain modest. 
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